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ABSTRACT
This Handbook entry presents a conceptual, normative overview of the subject of taxation. It
emphasizes the relationships among the main functions of taxation  ￿ notably, raising revenue,
redistributing income, and correcting externalities  ￿ and the mapping between these functions and
various forms of taxation. Different types of taxation as well as expenditures on transfers and public
goods are each integrated into a common optimal tax framework with the income tax and commodity
taxes at the core. Additional topics addressed include a range of dynamic issues, the unit of taxation,
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1.  Introduction
The subject of taxation is vast and has been a major focus of numerous economists over
the ages.  Accordingly, a single survey must be highly selective.  Because there exists a four-
volume Handbook of Public Economics (1985, 1987, 2002a, 2002b), a substantial portion of
which is devoted to taxation, and numerous other survey articles on various aspects of taxation,
this review does not attempt to cover all the traditional topics, which would be impossible in any
event.  Instead, it aims to offer a guide that will complement existing work.
Specifically, this essay presents a conceptual, normative overview of the subject of
taxation.
1  It emphasizes the relationships among the main functions of taxation – notably, raising
revenue, redistributing income, and correcting externalities – and the mapping between these
functions and various forms of taxation.  In presenting a unified view, one grounded directly in a
standard social welfare function, it should help expose and clarify connections among particular
subjects in ways that often are beyond the purview of more focused treatments that consider, in
much greater depth, a single piece of the larger puzzle.
Implicit in a conceptual approach is that empirical literature will not be a focus.  Also
excluded will be most aspects of tax incidence, questions of political economy, and
macroeconomic issues.  In other respects as well, this survey will not attempt to be
comprehensive.  Nevertheless, it covers a wide canvas and seeks to go into enough depth on the
matters it does address to provide significant illumination.
Core features of the analysis appear in the preliminary sections.  Section 2 considers the
purposes of taxation, discusses the need for an integrated view that relates different policy
instruments to specific objectives, and motivates and introduces the standard welfare economic
approach to taxation.  Section 3 presents optimal income taxation analysis, emphasizing the main
conclusions, the intuitions underlying them, and the results of simulations.
Section 4 extends the analysis of section 3 to consider optimal commodity taxation in a
setting in which an income tax is available.  This extension proves particularly valuable in later
sections because so many forms of taxation and other policies are analogous to differential
commodity taxation.  Some of the payoff appears in section 5, which considers other types of
taxation, including income taxes that apply to capital as well as labor income (and the contrast
between such income taxes and a personal consumption tax), corporate taxation, transfer (estate
and gift) taxation, social security taxation, state and local taxation, and international taxation.
Because raising revenue and redistributing income are two central functions of taxation, a
complete understanding requires further attention to government expenditures.  Accordingly,
section 6 analyzes income transfer payments and section 7 incorporates public goods into the
framework.  An additional function of taxation, the correction of externalities, is the subject of
section 8.2See also subsection 4.4 on Ramsey taxation.
3Progressive, proportional, and regressive taxes are ordinarily defined as ones whose average rates rise, are
constant, or fall with income.  Occasionally, these terms are associated with marginal rates, but that usage will not be
followed here.  A motivation for focusing on average rates is that “progressive” taxes are often associated with
redistributive taxes, and as subsection 3.2 will make clear, a tax with constant marginal rates (a flat tax) can be highly
redistributive, in which case it will have rising average rates.
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A range of further topics are related to the central framework in the remaining sections. 
Section 9 examines a number of issues that arise in a dynamic setting: inflation, risk-bearing,
transitions, capital gains, human capital, a lifetime horizon, and budget deficits and
intergenerational redistribution.  Section 10 addresses how different types of family units (single
individuals, married couples, households with children) should optimally be treated relative to
each other.  Section 11 introduces problems of administration and enforcement.  Section 12
briefly considers other important features of tax systems: the choice of the tax base and the
differences among various forms of consumption taxation.  Section 13 discusses tax equity,
including the question whether social welfare functions should depend only on individuals’
utilities, the choice of social welfare function, and other normative criteria sometimes suggested
to be pertinent to tax policy.
2.  Framework
2.1.  Purposes of taxation
Raising revenue to fund government expenditures on public goods and services is a
fundamental purpose of taxation.  This task of raising revenue is intimately related to the second
purpose of taxation, achieving an acceptable distribution of income.  The reason is that, if all
individuals were identical or if raising revenue was the only objective, the revenue need could be
met in developed economies without distortion through the use of a uniform, lump-sum tax,
sometimes referred to as a head tax or poll tax.  Substantial reliance on constant per capita levies
is unacceptable precisely because of distributive concerns.
2  And once distributive concerns are
admitted, it is familiar that economic distortion becomes a central problem.  Hence, using tax and
other instruments to optimize the tradeoff between distribution and distortion is a principle focus
of the economic analysis of taxation.
Taxation is also employed to achieve additional goals.  The correction of externalities
will be considered in section 8, while other objectives, notably economic stabilization, are
beyond the scope of this survey.
2.2.  Integrated view
To analyze a type of taxation or a particular tax reform proposal, it is helpful to bear in
mind a number of considerations that involve the relationships among various components of the
fiscal system.  First, it is important to specify a policy completely rather than to consider
individual pieces in a vacuum.  For example, a gasoline tax increase may appear to be moderately
regressive, which is to say that the average tax burden may increase less than proportionately
with income.
3  See the dashed line, “tax increase,” in Figure 2.1.- 3 -
Figure 2.1
Government Expenditure Financed by Gasoline Tax Increase
A tax increase, however, generates revenue that upsets budget balance, so a complete
specification of this policy requires identification of how the funds will be spent.  Suppose that
the revenue will be expended on a public good (or a reduction in some other tax), and that the
incidence is favorable to the rich, but to an extent that is less than proportionate with income. 
See the dotted line, “dollar benefits,” in Figure 2.1.  The net effect, depicted by the solid line, is
to redistribute toward poor and moderate-income individuals.  Hence, what appeared to be a
regressive gasoline tax increase, considered in isolation, has a net redistributive effect. 
Obviously, a different conclusion could be reached with different assumptions about
expenditures, and the same point holds if the initial tax increase had instead been proportional or
progressive.  Because individual tax changes (and expenditure decisions) are part of a larger
system with many instruments that may be adjusted in various ways, it is often unhelpful and
potentially misleading to characterize any one instrument in a vacuum.
Second, particular policy instruments, such as forms of taxation, should be matched to
those objectives to which they are most suited.  For example, if consumption of gasoline causes
pollution, a gasoline tax would likely be a superior means of correcting this externality than an
income tax, though the latter does tend to reduce consumption as a whole, including the
consumption of gasoline.  Conversely, if the objective is income redistribution, an income tax is
likely to be more appropriate than a gasoline tax (which, as the preceding example indicates, is
capable of income redistribution in combination with other instruments).
It turns out that most types of taxation are optimally utilized in specialized ways.  A
general income tax (or personal consumption tax) tends to be best to address redistribution, while
most other forms of taxation are primarily justified because they target particular externalities or- 4 -
other imperfections, or because they address administrative and enforcement problems associated
with other taxes.  Although it is familiar that addressing a specific externality is best
accomplished, if feasible, with a highly focused instrument, such as a corrective tax based on the
externality itself, the notion that redistribution should be addressed almost exclusively with the
income tax is less widely understood and thus deserves some further elaboration.
Consider, for example, whether luxury taxes should be employed to aid in the
redistribution of income.  (A complete analysis appears in section 4, on commodity taxation.) 
Initially, observe that any redistribution thereby accomplished could instead have been achieved
with an adjustment to the income tax.  That is, whatever is the incidence of the luxury taxes
across the income distribution, one instead could have modified the income tax schedule to
obtain the same result.  Moreover, the use of luxury taxes tends to be a less efficient means of
generating the same extent of redistribution.  The reason is that luxury taxes distort both the
consumption choices of the rich – who are induced to shift away from the taxed luxuries – and
also the labor-leisure choice of the rich for, just as with an income tax increase, the effect of
luxury taxes is to reduce the earner’s benefit from additional labor effort.  This lesson generalizes
to other forms of taxation (and to government expenditures and regulation; see sections 7 and 8).
Given this conclusion, it is often useful to assess tax and other policy changes – other
than pure reforms of the income tax and transfer system – using a distribution-neutral approach,
as outlined in Kaplow (1996a, 2004, 2006a).  That is, for any given policy, say a proposed
increase in luxury taxes or in the gasoline tax, one can imagine that it is accompanied by an
offsetting adjustment to the income tax and transfer system – one that, as a whole, keeps the
distribution of utility constant.  When such a policy experiment is examined, the relevant effects
will tend to be solely the efficiency consequences regarding the specific target of the instrument
in question: reduction in the consumption of luxuries or in the use of gasoline.  In the former
case, this consequence would tend to be inefficient (assuming the absence of externalities)
whereas in the latter case the result would enhance efficiency (assuming that the externalities to
gasoline consumption were not already fully internalized).  The question in assessing the
desirability of various forms of taxation then becomes, for individuals at a given level of income:
Do we wish to relatively discourage – or in the case of subsidies or selective tax exemptions,
relatively encourage – particular behaviors?  For example, in examining the taxation of transfers
(gift and estate taxes), questions of distribution, labor supply, and revenue-raising can largely be
cast aside – for these are held constant by the offsetting income tax adjustment – and one would
focus instead on whether it is desirable to discourage private income transfers relative to
expenditures on direct consumption for oneself.
Relatedly, the foregoing distribution-neutral approach is extremely useful in examining
policy packages that may not be distribution-neutral.  In such cases, one can perform the
following two-step decomposition: (1) Implement the target policy with a hypothetical
adjustment to the income tax and transfer schedule that is distribution-neutral overall. 
(2) Implement a further reform that replaces the foregoing income tax adjustment with the one in
the originally specified (and non-distribution-neutral) policy package.  Step 1 can be analyzed as
suggested previously.  Step 2, it should be observed, is a purely redistributive adjustment to the
income tax.  Accordingly, for a vast range of policy packages – involving various mixes of4It is common for analysts of other policy reforms to choose an income tax adjustment in a simple but essentially
arbitrary manner, for example, by assuming that individuals’ tax burdens adjust by a constant amount or proportionately. 
There is no accepted standard approach, and those most commonly used often involve redistribution (whether more or
less redistribution depends on the target policy under consideration).  Analysts also may consider actual reform proposals,
although these often evolve and themselves may be incomplete (for example, they may not involve budget balance but
instead increase a deficit that must in principle be financed by future tax adjustments).  Although this survey does not
consider matters of political economy, it should be noted that the political assumption implicit in the distribution-neutral
approach – that the particular reform in question will not change the existing equilibrium of political forces with regard to
the extent of redistribution – appears more plausible (on average and over time) than an arbitrary specification of how
redistribution would change or an assumption that all reforms, regardless of their individual or cumulative distributive
effects, would be financed in a particular, pre-specified manner.
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taxation, expenditure, and government regulation – one can employ a generic approach to step 2. 
Furthermore, the necessary analysis for this step is the same as that required to assess pure
questions of redistribution, as developed in section 3.
Use of a distribution-neutral approach (employing, where necessary, the proposed two-
step decomposition) has many virtues.  Most important, it greatly facilitates the analysis of the
intrinsic effects of a policy, permitting specialization by analysts and comprehension of results by
policy-makers.  Note that if this approach is eschewed, anyone analyzing a gasoline tax increase,
for example, would not only have to determine and assess the intrinsic effects of taxing gasoline,
but would also have to determine what degree of redistribution should be assumed to accompany
the reform, undertake an analysis of this redistribution (including the choice of labor supply
elasticities and other parameters), and choose a social welfare function (SWF) to evaluate the
consequences.
4  Likewise, two studies of a given gasoline tax increase could reach different
conclusions for a variety of reasons that could prove difficult to untangle.  Indeed, different
conclusions are likely even if the studies agree on the intrinsic effects of the gasoline tax
increase, that is, on the analysis of step 1 of the decomposition.  A further benefit of this
separation is for policy-makers, who may well wish to make their own choices regarding
redistribution, applying their own assessments thereof.  The two elements of the decomposition
can in fact be implemented independently of each other, and enactment of only a single
component will often be sensible, notably, if the intrinsic policy is efficient but the redistributive
effect is deemed undesirable, or vice versa.  For all of these reasons – though primarily for the
greater conceptual clarity that results – a distribution-neutral approach will be utilized in much of
this survey (though obviously not when analyzing pure redistribution) in attempting to illuminate
the distinctive features of various forms of taxation.
2.3.  Social objective
Evaluation of purely redistributive changes to the tax system, the focus of section 3 on
optimal income taxation, requires specification of the social objective, in the guise of a social
welfare function.  The need for an explicit statement of the social objective is heightened by a
number of considerations: Not all reforms affecting distribution can readily be classified as more
or less redistributive (replacing a graduated income tax with a flat tax may benefit both the poor
and rich at the expense of the middle class), subtle effects on distribution are caused by important
tax policy choices (adjusting the accuracy of the tax system will increase the tax burdens of some
and reduce those of others), and heterogeneity (especially among different types of family units)- 6 -
is an important feature bearing on redistribution in complex ways.
Despite the need for explicit use of a social welfare function, tax policy analysis has often
adopted a looser approach.  Standard treatments such as Musgrave and Musgrave (1973) and
Stiglitz (2000) list multiple objectives of tax policy, like efficiency, fairness or equity (itself
consisting of various dimensions or principles), revenue adequacy, simplicity, and
administrability.  Some of these criteria seem to be proxies for or subsets of others (simplicity is
not a good in itself, but bears on efficiency and fairness) and others, especially various notions of
fairness (such as “ability to pay”) are notoriously vague, subject to competing interpretations, and
in some instances largely free of content.
Mirrlees (1971) seminal contribution on optimal income taxation, it should be noted, was
motivated in significant part by the desire to link positive analysis of the effects of taxation to a
normative framework that allowed for a rigorous synthesis of concerns for efficiency and
distribution.  This framework is provided by the standard welfare economic approach of basing
all policy assessment on effects on individuals’ utility and employing a social welfare function to
aggregate individuals’ utilities to make a comprehensive appraisal.  This approach will be
outlined here and followed throughout this essay.  The justification for focusing exclusively on
individuals’ well-being, the choice of social welfare function, and the possible relevance of other
equity criteria will be considered in section 13.
A social welfare function SW(x) indicates how any regime or social state x (taken as a
complete description thereof) is evaluated, where higher values indicate superior outcomes. 
Here, we are concerned with so-called individualistic SWF’s, wherein social welfare depends
only on individuals’ utility or well-being.  The functional form of SW incorporates a view of
distributive justice.  In the present context of assessing redistributive taxation, it is standard to
use an additive form that assumes a continuous population.
( ) ( . ) ( ) ( ) ( ) , 21 SW x W u x f i di i = ￿
where u is a utility function, the subscript i indexes individuals’ types, and f(i) is the density of
type i individuals in the population.  The functional form of W on the right side of (2.1)
incorporates a view of distributive justice, as can be seen from the following common
formulation.
( . ) ( )
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￿5To motivate the latter version in (2.2), for the case in which e = 1, the numerator in the former may
alternatively be written as ui(x)
1-e - 1 (subtracting the constant having no effect on the ordering of states).  Then, taking
the limit as e approaches 1 (using l’Hôpital’s rule) yields the latter expression.
6As is familiar from Edgeworth (1897), any concavity in u would, but for incentive and any other cost concerns,
be sufficient to warrant complete equalization in individuals’ levels of consumption.
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where e indicates the degree of aversion to inequality in the distribution of utility levels.
5  If
e = 0, social welfare is the sum (integral) of utilities, so the SWF is utilitarian.  Higher levels of e
correspond to increasing degrees of social aversion to inequality in the distribution of utilities.  In
the limiting case, as e approaches infinity, one has the maximin formulation associated with
Rawls (1971) under which all weight is placed on the utility of the least-well-off individual.
It is useful to distinguish between two sources of aversion to inequality in the distribution
of incomes.  First, there is concavity in individuals’ utilities as a function of consumption.  To
focus on this feature, consider the utilitarian SWF (e = 0).  Furthermore, consider the case in
which (abstracting from the effect of labor effort on utility) individuals’ utility functions are
given by ln c, where c denotes consumption.  Marginal utility equals 1/c, so the marginal utility
of a poor person with consumption of $10,000 is ten times that of an upper-middle-income
person with $100,000 and one hundred times that of a rich person with consumption of
$1,000,000.  If one considered a utility function with constant relative risk aversion of 2 (instead
of 1, as in the preceding case), marginal utility would equal 1/c
2; then these multipliers would be
one hundred and ten thousand respectively.  These factors indicate how much distortion would be
tolerable in redistributing income: For example, when the factor is ten, then further redistribution
would raise social welfare as long as less than 90% of what the higher-income individual pays is
lost in the redistributive process.  Clearly, concavity of individuals’ utility functions is an
important source of a social preference for redistribution.
6
Second, concavity in the SWF itself – in the W function in (2.1), corresponding to e > 0 in
(2.2) – further favors redistribution.  The relative importance of this factor will depend on the
concavity of individuals’ utility functions.  If they are highly concave, then concavity in W may
not contribute that much more to the social preference for equality.
Analysts sometimes, such as in performing optimal income tax simulations, use a single
concavity parameter to refer to the overall concavity of social welfare as a function of
individuals’  consumption, in which case one may interpret any results as produced by varying
combinations of concavity in the underlying u and W functions.  Nevertheless, the two sources or
concavity are conceptually distinct: The degree of concavity in u is an empirical question,
whereas the degree of concavity in W is a normative matter.
For most of this essay, the degree of concavity in either u or W will not have a qualitative
effect on the analysis.  In section 3, addressing the optimal extent of redistribution, concavity will
obviously be quantitatively important.  In most other sections, there will not even be a
quantitative effect because, as subsection 2.2 explained, the extent of redistribution will be held
constant.  However, in addressing some topics, such as in section 10 on taxation of different
family units, it turns out that the extent of concavity may have qualitative effects, for subtle7Much literature on optimal labor income taxation expresses utility as a function of leisure, or 1-l, where “1”
denotes a normalized available amount of time for each individual.  Additionally, it is common to use indirect utility
functions, perhaps expressed as a function of lump-sum or virtual income and of a net-of-tax wage rate.  Though these
devices offer advantages, for purposes of the present exposition the use of direct utility expressed as a function of
consumption and labor minimizes notation and is more transparent.
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reasons that will be elaborated.
3.  Optimal Income Taxation
3.1.  Model
The analysis of optimal income taxation addresses the question of how an income tax
should be designed in order to maximize a standard SWF subject to a revenue constraint, thus
integrating consideration of the revenue-raising and distributive objectives of taxation.  The
standard model considers a one-period setting in which individuals only choice variable is their
degree of labor effort, there is a single composite consumption good, and government
expenditures on public goods are taken as given.  A variety of extensions will be examined in
subsequent sections.
An individual’s utility is given by u(c, l), where c denotes consumption, l denotes labor
effort, uc > 0, and ul < 0.
7  An individual’s consumption is given by
( . ) ( ), 31 c wl T wl = -
where w is the individual’s wage rate and T is the tax-transfer function (usually referred to simply
as a tax function or schedule).  Each of these components deserves further elaboration.
The motivation for redistributive taxation is that individuals differ, in particular in their
wages, that is, their earning abilities.  The distribution of abilities will be denoted F(w), with
density f(w), the population being normalized to have a total mass of one.  Individuals’ abilities
are indicated by their given wage rate, taken to be exogenous.  Their pre-tax earnings are the
product of their wage rate and effort level.  More broadly, one can interpret effort as including
not only hours of work but also intensity, and not only productive effort but also investments in
human capital.
Taxes and transfers, T(wl), at any income level may be positive or negative.  The
(uniform) level of the transfer received by an individual earning no income, that is, ￿T(0), is
usually referred to as the grant g.  See Figure 3.1.8The inclusion of transfers is extremely important both practically, since they are in fact significant, and
conceptually, since otherwise redistribution would be limited to transfers between the rich and middle class, once the
poor were exempted from the tax system.
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Figure 3.1
Nonlinear Income Tax and Transfer Schedule
The tax schedule T(wl) is taken to represent the entire tax-transfer system.  Taxes may
include sales taxes or value-added tax (VAT) payments in addition to income taxes.  Transfers
include those through the tax system, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the United
States, welfare programs (see section 6), and under some interpretations public goods (see
section 7).
8
Taxes and transfers are taken to be a function of individuals’ incomes, assumed to be
observable, and it is this dependence of taxes on income that is the source of distortion.  If taxes
could instead depend directly on individuals’ abilities, w, individualized lump-sum taxes would
be feasible and redistribution could be accomplished without distorting labor supply.  Ability,
however, is assumed to be unobservable.
Individuals choose the levels of labor effort l that maximize u(c,l) subject to their budget
constraints (3.1).  An individual’s first-order condition is
( . ) ( ( )) , 32 1 0 w T wl u u c l - ¢ + =
where a prime denotes the derivative with respect to a function’s only argument.  In this case,
T￿(wl) indicates the marginal tax rate of an individual earning income of wl.
The government’s problem is taken to be the choice of a tax-transfer schedule T(wl) to
maximize social welfare, which (appropriately modifying expression (2.1)) can be expressed as
( ) ( ) ( . ) ( ), ( ) ( ) , 33 W u c w l w f w dw ￿9Some of the literature equivalently expresses this constraint in terms of aggregate resource balance, which
requires that the sum of resources devoted to private and public goods equals the amount produced by all individuals’
labor efforts.
10Substituting individuals’ first-order conditions can be problematic when there may be multiple local optima, as
recognized and addressed by Mirrlees (1971).  Though much subsequent work sets aside such complications, the matter
is potentially important because, as will be seen, optimal tax schedules can involve falling marginal tax rates, which
produce nonconvexities.  In such instances, changing marginal rates can cause individuals to “jump” to a different level
of income, a phenomenon found to be important in Slemrod et al. (1994).
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where c and l are each expressed as functions of w to refer to the level of consumption achieved
and labor effort chosen by an individual of type (ability) w.  This maximization is subject to a
revenue constraint and to constraints regarding individuals’ behavior.  The former is
( . ) ( ( )) ( ) , 34 T wl w f w dw R ￿ =
where R is an exogenously given revenue requirement.
9  Here, revenue is to be interpreted as
expenditures on public goods that should be understood as implicit in individuals’ utility
functions; because these expenditures are taken here to be fixed, they need not be modeled
explicitly.  Regarding the latter constraints, individuals are assumed to respond to the given tax
schedule optimally, as described by their first-order conditions (3.2), which determine the
functions c(w) and l(w).
10
Mirrlees’s (1971) original exposition has been followed by subsequent elaborations,
much of which is synthesized in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Stiglitz (1987), Tuomala (1990),
and Salanié (2003).  Because the problem is formidable, the present survey will be confined to
stating basic results, such as are embodied in first-order conditions and produced by simulations.
3.2.  Linear income tax
A linear income tax is defined as a tax schedule
( . ) ( ) , 35 T wl twl g = -
where t is the (constant, income-independent) marginal tax rate and g, as previously noted, is the
uniform per-capita grant.  For example, consider the linear (flat) tax depicted in Figure 3.2.- 11 -
Figure 3.2
Linear Income Tax Schedule, t = 40% and g = $12,000
In the literature, the schedule T(wl), as mentioned, refers to a unified tax-transfer schedule.  Note
that this can be reinterpreted to align more closely with existing institutions and understandings. 
For example, the portion of the schedule to the right of $30,000 of income can be understood as
an ordinary (positive) flat or proportional income tax, with a marginal rate of 40% and an
exemption for the first $30,000 of income.  The portion to the left of $30,000 can be viewed as a
transfer program having a value of $12,000, a 40% phase-out rate, and a breakeven point of
$30,000.  (Numerous other interpretations are also possible, including transfers that are not fully
phased out until after $30,000 but with an income tax exemption of less than $30,000.)  Further
elaboration regarding transfers will be offered in section 6.
Expression (3.5) and Figure 3.2 also help illustrate how the degree of redistributiveness is
not intimately connected to whether an income tax has graduated rates.  Suppose, for example,
that t = 0 and g = 0 (and that there is no revenue requirement).  The result would be a totally
nonredistributive flat tax: T(wl) would be a horizontal line coincident with the x-axis.  Now
suppose that t = 100% and g is set equal to mean income (ignoring incentive effects).  This
would be a completely redistributive flat tax: T(wl) would be a 45-degree line intersecting the x-
axis at mean income and the y-axis at negative of the mean income.  Hence, a purely proportional
tax covers the full range of redistributive possibilities.  It follows that nonlinearities in an optimal
tax schedule, considered in subsections 3.3 and 3.4, will have less to do with the extent of
redistribution and more to do with accomplishing redistribution in a more efficient manner
(although the two dimensions are obviously interrelated).
To derive the optimal linear income tax, the government’s maximization problem can be
written in Lagrangian form as choosing t and g to maximize
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( . ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , 36 1 W u t wl w g l w twl w g R f w dw - + + - - ￿ l
where ￿ is the shadow price of revenue, referring to the constraint (3.4), and (3.5) is substituted
into (3.1) so that consumption is expressed in terms of the specific linear tax system under11There are many derivations of this condition, and it is expressed in a variety of equivalent ways.  The present
notation and manner of expression is close to that in Stiglitz (1987), page 1016, expression (29), and his derivation
appears in note 31.  See also Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, pp. 407-08).  These derivations, it should be noted, typically do
not take into account that some individuals (those of low ability) will choose not to work, in which case (3.2) no longer
characterizes their behavior (because they are at a corner solution).  This problem is more often addressed in analyses of
the optimal nonlinear income tax and in simulations.
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consideration.  The first-order condition for the optimal tax rate can usefully be expressed as
( )
( . )
cov ( ), ( )











where y(w) = wl(w), income earned by individuals of ability w; ￿(w) is the compensated elasticity
of labor effort of individuals of ability w; and ￿(w) is the net social marginal valuation of income,
evaluated in dollars, of individuals of ability w.
11  Specifically with regard to the latter, 
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The numerator of the first term on the right side of (3.8) indicates how much additional (lump-
sum) income to an individual of ability w contributes to social welfare – uc indicates how much
utility rises per dollar and W￿ indicates the extent to which social welfare increases per unit of
utility – and this is converted to a dollar value by dividing by the shadow price of government
revenue.  The second term takes into account the income effect, namely that giving additional
lump-sum income to an individual of ability w will reduce labor effort (￿l(w)/￿g < 0), which in
turn reduces government tax collections by tw per unit reduction in l(w).
Expression (3.7) indicates how various factors affect the optimal level of a linear income
tax.  Beginning with the numerator, a higher (in magnitude) covariance between ￿ and y favors a
higher tax rate.  In the present setting, ￿(w) will (under assumptions ordinarily postulated) be
falling with income.  Note that a larger covariance does not involve a closer (negative)
correlation but rather a higher dispersion (standard deviation) of ￿ and y.  The dispersion of ￿
will tend to be greater the more concave (egalitarian) is the welfare function W and the more
concave is utility as a function of consumption (i.e., the greater the rate at which marginal utility
falls with income).  Income, y, will have a higher dispersion (again, under standard assumptions)
when the distribution of underlying abilities is more unequal.  In sum, more egalitarian social
preferences, greater individual aversion to risk (more rapidly declining marginal utility of
consumption), and higher underlying inequality will all contribute to a higher optimal tax rate.
The denominator of (3.7) indicates that a higher compensated labor supply elasticity
favors a lower tax rate.  The other terms in the integrand indicate that, ceteris paribus, the labor
supply elasticity matters more with regard to high-income individuals and at ability levels where
there are more individuals (typically the middle of the income distribution) because of the greater12In many simulations, including this one by Stern, investigators calibrate labor supply responsiveness by the
elasticity of substitution between consumption and labor in a CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function. 
Such elasticities do not directly correspond to a compensated or uncompensated elasticity of labor supply.  In fact, Stern’s
0.4 elasticity of substitution corresponds to a case in which the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is negative.  
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sacrifice in revenue.  Note further that, if this compensated elasticity is taken to be constant, as is
common in performing simulations, then the denominator is just the elasticity weighted by
average income.
The foregoing exposition is incomplete in not emphasizing the various respects in which
income effects are relevant (they influence ￿ and also ￿) and in ignoring that the values on the
right side of (3.7) are endogenous.  Especially for the latter reason, the literature has relied
heavily on simulations.
The most-reported optimal linear income taxation simulations are those of Stern (1976). 
For his preferred case – an elasticity of substitution of 0.4,
12 a government revenue requirement
of 20% of national income, and a social marginal valuation of income that decreases roughly
with the square of income – he finds that the optimal tax rate is 54% and that individuals’ lump-
sum grant equals 34% of average income.  (To put these figures in perspective, it should be
understood that these estimates refer to the combination of all taxes; all government expenditures
and all redistribution are financed by this single tax.)  To illustrate the benefits of redistribution,
he finds that a scheme that uses a lower tax, just high enough to finance government programs
(that is, with a grant of zero), produces a level of social welfare that is lower by an amount
equivalent to approximately 5% of national income.
Stern considers a number of other variations.  If there is virtually no weight on equality,
the optimal tax rate is only 25%, whereas if there is extreme weight on equality, specifically, the
maximin case, the optimal tax rate is 87%.  Returning to his central case, an extremely low labor
supply elasticity implies an optimal tax rate of 79%, and an elasticity as high as had been used in
some earlier literature implies an optimal tax rate of 35%.  Additionally, his central estimate
assumes that (nonredistributive) government expenditures are approximately 20% of national
income.  In the absence of the need to finance such expenditures, the optimal tax rate is 48%, and
if expenditures were twice as high, the optimal tax rate is 60%.
3.3.  Two-bracket income tax
Before proceeding to the general optimal nonlinear income tax problem, it is illuminating
to consider briefly a simpler extension.  A two-bracket income tax applies a constant rate t1 to all
income up to some specified level y° and another constant rate t2 to all income over the specified
level y°.  See Figure 3.3 for an illustration in which t1 >  t2.- 14 -
Figure 3.3
Two-Bracket Income Tax Schedule
Here, the government chooses t1, t2, y°, and g to maximize social welfare.
This problem has been explored by Slemrod et al. (1994).  They report simulations for an
optimal two-bracket income tax using functional forms and parameters similar to those employed
by Stern (1976) and others.  In all of the cases they consider, the optimal upper-bracket marginal
tax rate is less than the optimal lower-bracket rate.  Nevertheless, in all simulations in which the
optimal transfer, g, is positive, the overall income tax schedule is progressive, which one should
recall is defined as exhibiting rising average tax rates.  In the case closest to Stern’s central case,
the optimal linear income tax has a rate of 58% whereas the optimal two-bracket tax has a
marginal rate of 60% on low incomes and 52% on high incomes.
The intuition behind their results is that the lower rate on high-income individuals
induces greater labor effort and thus raises more revenue without having to sacrifice revenue on
income subject to the lower-bracket rate.  This allows a larger grant g to be financed.  Put another
way, raising the bottom rate by ￿t1, while keeping the top rate fixed, is inframarginal regarding
upper-bracket individuals; it collects ￿t1y° from them without distorting their labor supply. 
Indeed, there is also an income effect on upper-bracket individuals that further increases their
labor supply and thus revenue.  Interestingly, as the social preference for equality increases, not
only do the tax rates and level of grant increase, but the absolute size of the gap between the two
tax rates widens in their simulations; that is, a greater preference for equality makes it optimal for
the marginal rate on low-income individuals to be further above the marginal rate on high-
income individuals.  The intuition is essentially that just noted: Allowing the first rate to be
higher enables additional revenue to be raised from high-income individuals to fund a higher
transfer g, and this increase in g is relatively more valuable the greater the social benefit from
redistribution.
3.4.  Nonlinear income tax
Returning to the more general formulation of the optimal income taxation problem
described in subsection 3.1 and depicted in Figure 3.1, the government chooses a tax schedule13Relatedly, following Stiglitz (1982a), many have advanced intuition and derived results by considering models
with a finite number of types of individuals, often two.  (This analysis parallels similar work on adverse selection in
insurance models and on nonlinear pricing.)  Corresponding incentive-compatibility constraints require that individuals
will not wish to mimic other types, the problem in the case of redistributive taxation usually being that high-ability types
may wish to mimic low-ability types in order to pay lower taxes.
14The relationship between Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1980) expression (13-54) on page 417 and that in the text is
entirely straightforward except that their term ￿* appears in the numerator rather than in the denominator.  The difference
in how ￿* is defined (that here is the reciprocal of theirs) accounts for the difference in placement.  The reason for the
deviation is that it is convenient to follow convention and employ an ￿* that corresponds more directly (and in particular
is positively related) to the elasticity of labor supply.  (Additionally, the assumption that uc is constant allows some further
simplification.)  Expression (3.9) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) are essentially identical to Stiglitz (1987) (expression
(25) on page 1007 and the expression in note 17 on page 1008), Diamond (1998) (expression (10) on page 86), Dahan
and Strawczynski (2000) (expression (2) on page 682), and Auerbach and Hines (2002) (expressions (4.12) and (4.15) on
pages 1381-82).  It is also similar to the two formulations in Saez (2001, p. 215).
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T(wl) to maximize the SWF (3.3) subject to a revenue constraint (3.4) and constraints (3.2)
requiring that individuals of all ability levels be maximizing their utility, taking the tax schedule
as given.  Mirrlees (1971) and subsequent investigators employ control-theoretic techniques to
address this problem.  In this maximization, the constraints regarding individuals’ maximizing
behavior entail that no individual of any type w will prefer the choice specified for any other type
w°.  (Readers may recognize this problem as related to the revelation principle used in work on
mechanism design.
13)
This analysis can be summarized in a first-order condition for the optimal marginal tax
rate at any income level y*, where w* and l* correspond to the ability level and degree of labor
effort supplied by the type of individual who would earn y*.  Following the presentation in
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), who make the simplifying assumption that utility is separable
between consumption and labor effort, adding the further assumption (discussed below) that
marginal utility uc is constant, conforming the notation, and engaging in some additional






































where ￿* = 1/(1+l*ull/ul) – which, when marginal utility is constant as assumed here, equals
￿/(1+￿), where ￿ is the elasticity of labor supply.  (This ￿ is often stated to be the compensated
elasticity, but with constant marginal utility of consumption there is no income effect, so the
compensated and uncompensated elasticities are identical.)
To aid in understanding expression (3.9), it is helpful to have in mind a simple
perturbation of the income tax schedule that is used, for example, by Saez (2001).  If one begins
with some tax schedule T(wl), assumed to be optimal, it must be that no slight adjustment to the
schedule will change the level of social welfare.  Consider an adjustment that slightly raises the
marginal tax rate at some income level, y* (say, in a small interval from y* to y*+￿), leaving all
other marginal tax rates unaltered.  There are two effects of such a change.  First, individuals at15Just as when interpreting the first-order condition (3.7) for the linear income tax, income effects and the
endogeneity of terms being interpreted will be ignored.  The latter problem is more serious here because parameters on
the right side of (3.9) depend implicitly on marginal tax rates other than at y* (through the term W￿uc/￿).
16This result first appears in Phelps (1973) and Sadka (1976) and is explored in some detail by Seade (1977).  In
(3.9), 1-F also appears in the denominator of the second term; however, the integral in the numerator of the second term
also equals zero.  As w* approaches its maximum, the second term as a whole approaches 1 minus the welfare weight on
the top individual whereas the first term approaches zero.
17See, for example, Tuomala (1990).
18See, for example, Alm and Wallace (2000), Auten and Carroll (1999), Gruber and Saez (2002), and Moffitt
and Wilhelm (2000).
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that income level face a higher marginal rate, which will distort their labor effort, a cost.  Second,
all individuals above income level y* will pay more tax, but these individuals face no new
marginal distortion.  That is, the higher marginal rate at y* is inframarginal for them.  Since those
thus giving up income are an above-average slice of the population (it is the part of the
population with income above y*), there tends to be a redistributive gain.
Expression (3.9) can readily be interpreted in terms of this perturbation.
15  Begin with the
first term.  Revenue is collected from all individuals with incomes above y*, which is to say all
ability types above w*; hence the 1-F(w*) in the numerator.  This factor favors marginal tax rates
that fall with income: As there are fewer individuals who face the inframarginal tax, the core
benefit of higher marginal rates falls.  In the extreme, if there is a highest known type in the
income distribution, the optimal marginal rate at the top would be zero because 1-F would be
zero: A higher rate collects no revenue but distorts the behavior of the top individual.
16 
However, when there is no highest type, known with certainty in advance, this result is
inapplicable.  Furthermore, even with a known highest type, simulations suggest that zero is not a
good approximation of the optimal marginal tax rate even quite close to the top of the income
distribution, so the zero-rate-at-the-top result is of little practical importance.
17
Raising the marginal rate at a particular point distorts only the behavior of the marginal
type, which explains the f(w*) in the denominator of the first term.  For standard distributions,
this factor is rising initially and then falling, which favors falling marginal rates at the bottom of
the income distribution and rising rates at the top.  The denominator also contains weights of ￿*,
indicating the extent of the distortion, and w*, indicating how much production is lost per unit of
reduction in labor effort.  The elasticity is often taken to be constant, though some empirical
evidence on the elasticity of taxable income (see subsection 11.3) supports a rising elasticity due
to the greater ability of higher-income individuals to avoid taxes.
18  This consideration may favor
marginal rates that fall with income.  Finally, w* is rising, which also favors falling marginal
rates: The greater the wage (ability level), the greater the revenue loss from a given decline in
labor effort.
The second term applies a social weighting to the revenue that is collected.  The integrand
in the numerator is the difference between the marginal dollar that is raised and the dollar
equivalent of the loss in welfare that occurs on account of individuals above w* paying more tax. 
As in the interpretation of (3.7), uc is the marginal utility of income to such individuals, W￿
indicates the impact of this change in utility on social welfare, and division by ￿, the shadow19Another natural way to think of the experiment of raising the marginal rate T￿(w*l*) is to suppose further that
the additional revenue will be used to increase the uniform grant.  The marginal social value of increasing the grant will,
at the optimum, necessarily equal the shadow price ￿ of government revenue.
20Brito and Oakland (1977) and Seade (1977) showed that the optimal marginal tax rate at the bottom of the
distribution is zero, a phenomenon that can be understood by reference to this term: If the higher marginal rate applies to
literally everyone, so they all pay the same increment in tax, then there is no redistribution, but there still is distortion of
the lowest type, who is subject to a positive marginal rate.  However, since it is typical that the optimum has all
individuals below some low ability level not working, it is not in fact the case that there is no redistribution from applying
a positive marginal rate to the lowest type who chooses to work, and Ebert (1992) shows that a positive marginal tax rate
at the bottom is indeed optimal in this case.
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price on the revenue constraint, converts this welfare measure into dollars.
19  This integral is
divided by 1-F(w*), which makes the second term an average for the affected population.
This term tends to favor marginal rates that rise with income.  The greater is w, the lower
is W￿ (unless the welfare function is utilitarian, in which case this is constant) and the lower
would be the marginal utility of income uc (had we not abstracted from this effect in the
assumptions); hence at higher w*, the average value of the term subtracted in the integrand is
smaller, making the entire term larger.  Note further that if social welfare or utility is reasonably
concave, W￿uc will approach zero at high levels of income, at which point this term will be nearly
constant in w*.  That is, the term favors rising marginal tax rates when income is low or
moderate, but has little effect on the pattern of marginal tax rates near the top of the income
distribution.
20
Because of difficulties in determining the shape of the optimal income tax schedule by
mere inspection of the first-order condition (3.9), analysts beginning with Mirrlees (1971) have
used simulations to help join the theoretical analysis with empirical estimates of labor supply
elasticities and of the distribution of skills or income in order to provide further illumination. 
The discussion here will emphasize how the shape of the optimal nonlinear income tax varies
from linearity because subsection 3.2 on the optimal linear income tax already reports how the
overall level of marginal tax rates is affected by various parameters of the problem.  Tuomala
(1990) offers a useful survey and set of calculations.  Perhaps his most notable conclusion is that,
in all the cases he reports, marginal tax rates fall as income increases, except at very low levels of
income.  Mirrlees’s (1971) original calculations had displayed a similar tendency, but subsequent
researchers questioned the extent to which this result may have depended on the social
preferences he stipulated or the arguably high labor supply response he assumed.  Subsequent
work, however, suggests that a greater social preference for equality or a lower labor supply
response tends to increase the level of optimal marginal tax rates but does not generally result in
a substantially different shape.
Some more recent work explores further whether there exist circumstances in which
optimal marginal tax rates rise with income.  Kanbur and Tuomala (1994) find that when
inequality in individuals’ abilities (wages) is significantly greater than previously assumed (but in
ranges they suggest to be empirically plausible), optimal marginal tax rates do increase with
income over a substantial range, although for upper-income individuals optimal marginal rates
still fall with income.  Diamond (1998) examines a Pareto distribution of skills, instead of the21For example, in his simulation with a utilitarian welfare function, a compensated elasticity of labor supply of
0.5, and a functional form for utility that has income effects, his optimal schedule has a marginal rate near 80% at the
bottom of the income distribution that falls to approximately 40% at $80,000, and then rises to nearly 70% at the upper
end, where it roughly levels off.  However, his functional form for utility has income effects that rise with income to such
an extent that the uncompensated elasticity approaches zero as w increases, which favors higher marginal rates at the top
than otherwise.  See also Dahan and Strawczynski (2004), who explore the role of varying assumptions about the
concavity of utility in consumption and in leisure and about the distribution of abilities in determining the optimal
asymptotic marginal tax rate.
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commonly used lognormal distribution, under which the (1-F)/f component of (3.9) rises more
rapidly at the top of the distribution, and finds that optimal marginal tax rates are rising at the
top.  However, Dahan and Strawczynski’s (2000) simulations indicate that Diamond’s result was
driven in large part by his additional assumption that preferences were quasi-linear, thus
removing income effects.  (Nevertheless, their diagrams do suggest that, consistent with
Diamond’s claim, moving from a lognormal to a Pareto distribution favors higher rates – still
falling, but notably less rapidly – at the top of the income distribution.)  Saez (2001), using
income distribution data in the United States from 1992 and 1993, finds that the shape of the
distribution of (1-F)/wf is such that optimal rates should fall substantially well into the middle of
the income distribution, to an income of approximately $80,000, rise until approximately
$200,000, and then be essentially flat thereafter.
21
Another important conclusion in Mirrlees’s (1971) original work is that the optimal
nonlinear income tax is approximately linear.  If this is true, it may be that there is little loss in
social welfare if only a linear income tax (which may have administrative advantages) is used. 
Subsequent investigators report a range of cases in which the optimal nonlinear income tax
departs more substantially from a linear tax, but they do not generally report how much welfare
loss would be involved in using only a linear scheme.
An additional result from the simulations is that, at the optimum, a nontrivial fraction of
the population does not work, and this fraction is larger when social preferences favor greater
redistribution and when the labor supply elasticity is higher.  This outcome should hardly be
surprising because, as the analysis of (3.9) and the simulations suggest, high marginal rates tend
to be optimal at the bottom of the income distribution, along with a sizable grant.  Relatedly,
little productivity and thus little tax revenue is sacrificed when those with very low abilities are
induced not to work (whereas substantial revenue is raised from the rest of the population, for
whom marginal tax rates on their first dollars of income are inframarginal).
3.5.  Elaboration
3.5.1.  Taxation of earning ability
The need to use a distortionary labor income tax to achieve distributive objectives is
premised on the infeasibility of individualized lump-sum taxes based on individuals’ earning
ability, which would be nondistortionary.  The assumption is that differences in earning ability
are unobservable, so income, a signal of earning ability, is taxed instead.  However, given that
income taxation is distortionary and, as a result, society cannot fully meet its desired distributive22One could also allow the utility function in expression (3.9) to depend on ￿, recognizing, for example, that
both utility levels and the marginal utility of consumption could be affected by such observable characteristics as
disabilities or family composition, the latter case being the subject of section 10.
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objective, and that income itself is neither costlessly nor accurately observable (see section 11), it
is worth considering the possibilities for basing taxation more directly on ability.
One strategy would be to attempt to observe individuals’ wages or to infer wages from
income and hours.  Hours, however, are difficult to observe and both hours and wages are
manipulable, such as by extending reported hours and lowering the reported wage (keeping
earnings constant, and thus both employer and employee indifferent); self-employment poses a
particularly serious problem.  Another approach would be to measure proxies of earning ability,
such as through testing.  Unfortunately, skills measurable by testing explain only some of the
variance in earnings ability.  Furthermore, if taxes were to be based on test results or other ability
measures, individuals would adjust their performance and thereby distort the measurement.  A
third technique – one sometimes employed – is to adjust taxes and transfers for observable
attributes, such as physical disability, age, or family composition.
There has been little formal analysis of the taxation of earning ability.  Stern (1982) 
compares an ability tax supplemented by a purely proportional income tax and an optimal
nonlinear income tax.  He assumes that there will be classification errors with an ability tax and
considers how large the errors have to be to make the nonlinear income tax preferable.  He finds
that, the greater the preference for equality, the less attractive is an ability-tax scheme because
mistakes in which low-ability individuals are misclassified as high types are more socially costly. 
Unfortunately, his comparison is not clean because he allows a more powerful (nonlinear)
income tax when there is no ability tax; moreover, he uses a model with only two types of
individuals, which further increases the relative power of a nonlinear income tax.
A broader approach would be to suppose that there exists an imperfect signal (or signals)
of ability and allow the government to make the tax and transfer schedule a function of the
signal.  The signal, call it ￿, could be an index of discrete classifications or a continuous variable. 
Then, the first-order condition for the optimal nonlinear income tax problem, expression (3.9),
could be restated, showing that the tax schedule and the distribution and density functions also
depend on ￿, giving us T(w*l*,￿), F(w*,￿), and f(w*,￿), respectively.
22  (Note that the separate
tax schedules would be linked in a common optimization by the shadow price ￿.)  This approach
will be used in subsection 6.2 to address the optimal form of categorical assistance under transfer
programs.  As a special case, if one supposes that one of the groups is homogeneous (all of one
type), the optimal schedule for that group would involve a zero marginal tax rate, with all
redistribution to or from the group accomplished through the group’s lump-sum transfer.  This is
the structure of Akerlof (1978), in which he assumes that a subset of the lowest-ability group can
be identified perfectly (“tagged”).
3.5.2.  Additional considerations
In addition to factors explored elsewhere in this survey, a number of considerations23See, for example, Hochman and Rodgers (1969) on the possibility that the rich benefit from redistribution to
the poor, Pauly (1973) on redistribution as a local public good, Veblen (1899), Duesenberry (1949), Boskin and
Sheshinski (1978), Frank (1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1999), and Tuomala (1990) on individuals’ concern for status, and
Easterlin (1973, 1974, 2001), Frank (1984b, 1985), and Veenhoven (1991) on the possibility that individuals’ long-run
preferences may be largely relative.
24See, for example, Hoff and Lyon (1995), Hubbard and Judd (1986) (and Hall’s and Summers’s comments
thereon), and Polinsky (1974).
25See, for example, Feldstein (1973), Allen (1982), Carruth (1982), and Stiglitz (1982a).
26Commodity taxation was traditionally referred to as a form of indirect taxation, in contrast to an income tax (or
personal consumption tax), which was described as direct taxation.  The standard interpretation is that direct taxes can
plausibly be tailored to individuals’ circumstances, allowing notably for uniform per capita taxes or transfers and for
nonlinear taxation.  By contrast, indirect taxes, such as commodity taxes, are impersonal; they do not allow a uniform
levy because individuals cannot (at least for purposes of indirect taxes) be identified.  Relatedly, nonlinear indirect
taxation is presumed to be impossible because of the infeasibility of charging different rates that depend on the amount an
individual consumes, which would require identification of who purchases commodities and also that resale (arbitrage
between individuals whose different consumption choices lead them to face different marginal tax rates) be preventable.
27Perhaps the closest case involves tax preferences such as deductions, exemptions, or credits for particular
activities (such as energy conservation) in income tax systems, which are similar to direct subsidies.
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further complicate the optimal income taxation problem.  One is that income may be a noisy
signal of ability, whether because of variations in occupations (for a given ability, one job may
pay more to compensate for specific disamenities) or in preferences (an individual may earn
more not because of greater ability but rather due to a higher marginal utility of consumption or a
lower marginal disutility of labor effort).  Another possibility is that individuals may have
preferences concerning redistribution itself, perhaps due to altruism or envy.
23  Other topics that
have been explored include liquidity constraints
24 and general equilibrium effects of
redistribution on the distribution of pre-tax wages.
25  Some of these factors may make
redistribution more attractive than otherwise, some less attractive, and some are indeterminate
without further specification of the model or parameter values.  Most of these subjects have
received only modest attention despite their potential importance to the optimal income taxation
problem.
4.  Commodity Taxation
The analysis of labor income taxation may be extended by considering a setting in which
consumption consists not of a single, composite good but a range of goods and services, and each
type of consumption may be taxed or subsidized at its own rate.
26  Commodity taxation is
important in its own right, for it is possible to tax commodities differentially and this is often
done (e.g., taxes on gasoline, hotel stays, alcohol, and tobacco).  Additionally, in general sales
tax or value-added tax (VAT) systems, it is common to apply differential rates, such as by
providing rate reductions or exemptions for purchases of food.  Whether luxury taxes are
desirable on redistributive grounds is another sort of question directly investigated in this section.
Moreover, commodity taxes are important conceptually because they provide a basis for
analyzing (directly or by extension) a number of other subjects.
27  For example, taxation of
savings can be viewed as differential taxation of future versus present commodities, and transfer
(estate and gift) taxes are differential taxes on different forms of consumption by donors.  Other
subjects, including expenditures on public goods and corrective taxes, can also be analyzed by28This approach was first used by Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) in arguing that distributive concerns should
play no role in cost-benefit analysis and was developed further in Kaplow (1996a, 2004).  See subsection 7.2.  Other
discussions of commodity taxation in the presence of nonlinear income taxation that may not be optimal include Konishi
(1995) and Laroque (2005).  Additionally, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) and Deaton (1979) characterize the restrictions
on utility functions necessary for no differentiation to be optimal when the optimal income tax is restricted to be linear.
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reference to the basic commodity taxation model.  See subsections 7.2 and 8.3.  As will become
apparent, this section contains a formalization of the distribution-neutral approach presented in
subsection 2.2 that is applicable to a broad range of tax and other governmental policies,
including most of those that are not concerned exclusively with redistribution (i.e., the pure
optimal income tax problem of section 3).
To foreshadow the results, the main conclusion for the basic case is that no differentiation
in commodity taxes – equivalent to a system of no commodity taxes or subsidies – is optimal. 
This important result was established by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) for the case in which the
nonlinear income tax is set optimally.  The exposition here will follow Kaplow (2006a), who
extends their result to the more general case in which one begins with an arbitrary nonlinear
income tax in an intuitive manner that uses the previously described distribution-neutral
approach.
28  The argument shows that, in a basic setting, if the income tax is adjusted to hold
distribution constant, labor supply also remains unchanged, so the only effect of commodity
taxation is on the allocative efficiency of individuals’ consumption decisions.  The optimal
result, therefore, involves no differential taxation; indeed, the elimination of differential
commodity taxation can be accomplished in a manner that results in a Pareto improvement. 
Likewise, any reform of a system of commodity taxes and subsidies in the direction of simple
efficiency with regard to consumption choices can be implemented in a way that makes everyone
better off.
4.1.  Model
The model employed in section 3 for studying income taxation can be modified to
incorporate commodity taxation as well.  Instead of a single, composite consumption good c, it is
now supposed that individuals may spend their after-tax-and-transfer income, wl - T(wl), on any
of n commodities, x1, ..., xn.  Commodity prices (which equal constant unit production costs
measured in units of income and thus may be thought of as prices paid to competitive producers)
for goods xi are pi and commodity taxes are ￿i (which may be subsidies, in which case they are
negative).  Individuals as consumers thus face net prices of pi + ￿i, assumed to be positive.
An individual’s budget constraint, instead of that given in expression (3.1), is now
( . ) ( ) ( ) ( ), 41 p x wl wl T wl i i i + = - ￿ t
where summations throughout are from i equals 1 to n and the notation xi(wl) denotes the level of
xi chosen by an individual of earning ability w (and l likewise implicitly refers to the labor effort
of an individual of type w).  The government’s budget constraint, instead of (3.4), becomes- 22 -
[ ] ( . ) ( ) ( ) ( ) . 42 T wl x wl f w dw R i i + = ￿ ￿ t
Before undertaking the analysis, it is useful to discuss the relationship between the
average overall levels of commodity taxation and of income taxation, and also related matters of
normalization.  Initially, observe that there are infinitely many equivalent ways to describe and
implement any commodity tax system.  To see this, consider uniform commodity taxes, that is,
commodity tax schemes for which ￿i = ￿ pi, for all i.  Compared to a baseline with no commodity
taxation, if ￿ > 0, everyone pays proportionally more for any bundle of commodities.  Such a
commodity tax system is equivalent to the imposition of a linear income tax (or to a uniform
adjustment of a preexisting, possibly nonlinear, income tax).  To see this, examine the budget
constraint (4.1) for this commodity tax system when there is no income tax at the outset.
( . ) ( ) ( ) . 43 p p x wl wl i i i + = ￿ a
Factoring 1+￿ outside the summation on the left, dividing both sides by 1+￿, and letting
t = ￿/(1+￿) yields
( . ) ( ) ( ) . 44
1
1




The left side of expression (4.4) is the cost of consumption in a world with no commodity taxes,
and the right side is disposable income for the case of a linear income tax (with no grant). 
Introducing uniform commodity taxation is indeed equivalent to a uniform shift in the level of
income taxation.  Put in other words, a uniform consumption tax is equivalent to a linear tax on
labor income, a simple result that is useful in examining the differences between consumption
taxes and general income taxes (which also reach capital income) and also in understanding the
relationships among various forms of consumption taxes, including a VAT.  (See subsections
5.1.1 and 12.2.)
Because varying the overall level of commodity taxes is equivalent to varying the level of
marginal tax rates under an income tax, which is the subject of the optimal income taxation
literature surveyed in section 3, work on commodity taxes and subsidies has focused on the
question of whether and when differential commodity tax rates are optimal.
4.2.  Analysis
Assume that individuals’ utility functions are weakly separable between labor (leisure)
and all other commodities, taken together.  That is, their utility functions can be expressed as
u(v(x1, ..., xn), l), where v is a subutility function.  This formulation implies that, for a given level
of after-income-tax income, individuals will allocate their disposable income among
commodities in the same manner regardless of the level of labor effort required to earn that level
of income.  Put another way, the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption for any two
commodities, at given levels of consumption of those commodities and of all other commodities,29It is familiar to refer to this experiment as involving a (utility) compensated change, so at each level of income,
wl, T(wl)￿T(wl)° is the (Hicksian) compensating variation associated with the change in relative prices due to the
commodity tax reform.  (A difference is that, in the present formulation, labor supply is held constant, although it is to be
demonstrated that this is indeed the case in any event.)
- 23 -
is independent of the level of labor effort.  (For commodities i and j, this ratio is simply
uvvi/uvvj = vi/vj.)  As will be seen, this further implies that changes in the allocation of after-tax
income among commodities that are caused by commodity tax reforms (that are compensated in
the sense of keeping utility constant) will not affect the choice of labor effort.  This separability
assumption will be discussed further in subsection 4.3.
Using this framework, a differentiated tax system {￿1, ..., ￿n}, T(wl) is one for which there
exists i, j such that (pi+￿i)/(pj+￿j) ￿ pi/pj.  In other words, the ratio of net prices of at least one pair
of goods does not equal its production cost ratio.
Assume that there exists some differential taxation and consider a commodity tax reform
that eliminates all differentiation, specifically, by moving to a regime in which ￿i = 0, for all i. 
Suppose that as an initial matter this commodity tax reform is combined with a distribution-
neutral (offsetting) income tax adjustment that has the feature that every individuals’ utility
remains unchanged.  Moving to the new commodity tax vector will tend to change individuals’
utility because they no longer pay commodity taxes (or receive subsidies) and because, with a
new relative price vector, they will change their consumption vectors.  Whatever is the net effect
on utility for any ability level w and given labor effort l(w), define an intermediate income tax
schedule T°(wl) at each income level so as to offset the net effect on utility.  That is, examine an
income tax schedule T°(wl) that has the property that, if all individuals (of every type w)
continue to choose the same level of labor effort l(w) as under the initial tax system, then their
utility will be unchanged.
29
This reform, consisting of the elimination of commodity taxation and an offsetting
income tax adjustment, can be shown to induce individuals to choose the same level of labor
effort.  Initially, observe that T°(wl) has the property that it leaves subutility v unaffected for all
levels of income.  That is, stated in reduced form, V(wl) = V°(wl) for all wl, where V is the
maximized value of v (the value of v obtained at each wl when individuals choose the xi’s
optimally, taking the commodity and income tax regime as given).  This result about the
subutility functions must be true because the income tax schedule T°(wl) is constructed such that
u(V(wl),l) = u°(V°(wl),l); because the function u does not change, the levels of subutility must be
unchanged for each given level of l and thus of wl.  To be sure, changing commodity taxes and
changing the income tax schedule each will alter the level of subutility V produced by a given
level of income wl; however, because of how the income tax schedule adjustment is constructed,
these two sets of effects will be precisely offsetting.  Furthermore, if the level of subutility V is
unchanged for every possible level of income, then it also must be true that, for any choice of
labor effort l, each type of individual’s total level of utility is the same as it was before.  In other
words, U(l(w)) = U°(l(w)) for all l(w), where the reduced form U(l(w)) refers to the level of30These functions, because denominated in utility, will differ among individuals with different earning abilities. 
However, with homogeneous preferences and weak leisure separability, as assumed here, the same tax adjustment
(denominated in dollars) will work for all individuals.
31For a formal demonstration of the entire argument, see Kaplow (2006a).
32Dixit (1975) and others characterize efficient partial reforms, although in a Ramsey model in which there is no
concern for distribution and no income tax.  See subsection 4.4.
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utility achieved for any choice of l by the given type w.
30  Since utility as a function of labor
effort is precisely the same under the new, intermediate regime as it is under the initial regime, it
follows that whatever level of labor effort l(w) maximized U(l(w)) will also maximize U°(l(w)). 
Accordingly, individuals will indeed choose the same level of labor effort under the newly
constructed intermediate regime.
To complete the argument, consider the effect on revenue of the elimination of
differential commodity taxation combined with the distribution-neutral tax adjustment involving
the intermediate income tax schedule, T°(wl).  The income tax adjustment, recall, derives from
two effects of the commodity tax reform.  First, the reform changes individuals’ commodity tax
payments, even assuming that they do not change their consumption decisions, and the income
tax adjustment offsets this effect.  Clearly, this combination will be revenue-neutral as a whole,
because each type of individual’s income tax payments rise or fall by just the amount that
commodity tax payments fall or rise.  Second, due to the changes in relative prices, individuals
will be induced to change their consumption of various commodities.  This change can only
increase utility (for otherwise individuals would not choose to adjust their consumption choices). 
Hence, the income tax schedule adjustment that offsets this effect on utility will result in
additional revenue being raised, generating a surplus.
31  Therefore, one can further adjust the
income tax schedule to rebate this surplus, say in equal amounts to every individual.  Because
everyone’s utility is the same under the intermediate regime and the initial regime, it must be
that, with the rebate, everyone’s utility is greater in the resulting regime that eliminates
differential commodity taxation than it is in the initial regime.
Accordingly, it is possible to eliminate differential commodity taxation in a manner that
generates a Pareto improvement – specifically, by adjusting the income tax in a manner that
produces a reform package that is overall distribution neutral.  As shown in Kaplow (2006a), a
similar approach can be used to show that proportional reductions in differential commodity
taxation as well as other partial reforms that are efficient in the simple sense of reducing the
amount of resources required to achieve individuals’ initial levels of utility can be implemented
in combination with an offsetting income tax adjustment so as to make everyone better off.
32  In
the set of cases under consideration, a distribution-neutral reform also keeps labor supply
constant; hence, the income redistribution problem, concerned with both distribution and labor
supply distortion, can be separated from the commodity tax problem, which only affects
individuals’ choices among commodities.  In other words, one can legitimately ignore
distribution and labor supply because the reform packages under consideration hold both
constant.  When this is possible, it should not be surprising that standard efficiency principles
indicate which commodity tax reforms are optimal.33This point is first suggested by Corlett and Hague (1953), although in a Ramsey tax setting.
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4.3.  Qualifications
There are a number of qualifications to the foregoing conclusion that differential
commodity taxes and subsidies are inefficient.  Most obvious is the case in which the
consumption of some goods involves externalities, on which see section 8.  Two additional
qualifications concern the argument that a distribution-neutral (offsetting) income tax adjustment
will not affect labor supply.
The assumption that individuals’ utility is weakly separable in labor (leisure) rules out
one source of possible labor supply effects.  To illustrate the phenomenon, consider that taxing
books, movie tickets, or swim suits (relative to other goods) tends to make leisure relatively less
attractive.  Given the distortion in favor of leisure caused by the income tax, this effect would be
beneficial.  Likewise, subsidizing substitutes for leisure, such as labor-saving devices, would
tend to be advantageous.  Because of the second-best setting that exists due to the assumed
impracticality of taxing leisure directly (to offset the effect of taxing labor), it is optimal to distort
other activities if (but only if) the distortion of the labor-leisure choice is thereby mitigated.
33 
Some possible examples are identified in empirical work: Barnett (1979) finds that consumers
substitute durable goods for leisure (and thus are a candidate for subsidies), Iorwerth and
Whalley (2002) find that restaurant meals substitute for leisure whereas raw food complements
leisure (implying that it may be optimal to reverse the common practice, superficially appealing
on distributive grounds, of taxing restaurant meals but exempting sales of raw food from sales
taxes), and West and Williams (2004) find that gasoline is a leisure complement and thus should
be taxed (by more than the level of the externalities associated with gasoline consumption).
As suggested by Mirrlees (1976), the inability to tax ability directly (see subsection 3.5.1)
provides another possible basis for differential taxation in cases in which preferences for some
commodities depend directly on individuals’ abilities (rather than on their incomes, which reflect
their abilities).  Specifically, it tends to be optimal to impose a heavier burden on commodities
preferred by the more able and a lighter burden on those preferred by the less able.  For example,
efficiency may favor taxing expenditures related to fine art (acquisitions of art objects,
attendance at museums and the opera, and purchases of high-brow literature) and subsidizing
simpler pleasures (bowling, attendance at professional wrestling, and viewing of trashy movies). 
Notice, however, that this argument does not imply that one should tax luxuries in general;
because higher demand for luxuries is, by definition, a consequence of higher income, taxing
luxuries distorts the labor-leisure decision.  The present consideration is distinctive because it
depends on preferences that differ with ability per se.  Put somewhat differently, assuming two
individuals were to earn the same income, the relevant question is whether the higher-ability
person would, relative to the other, prefer a different mix of commodities.
The strong conclusion that reducing differential commodity taxation can be accomplished
in a manner that yields a Pareto improvement is qualified by a number of additional
considerations: heterogeneity of individuals’ preferences, administrative and enforcement34Another important result is that, with constant returns to scale in production or the availability of a 100%
profits tax, production efficiency is optimal (i.e., no differential taxation of inputs).  See Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)
and Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), and also Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1972) and Mirrlees (1972a) on how this result may
differ when distribution is a concern.
35Regarding the latter, taxes or subsidies on private goods correspond to setting public sector prices above or
below marginal cost, respectively.
36Not all Ramsey principles differ, notably, Corlett and Hague’s (1953) argument (noted in subsection 4.3) that
leisure complements (substitutes) should be taxed (subsidized) relative to other commodities.
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concerns, political economy considerations, and other factors.  It should be emphasized,
however, that most qualifications to the basic conclusion are largely orthogonal to standard
redistributive considerations.  Notably, one does not seek adjustments that are directly
redistributive, such as by (relatively) taxing luxuries and subsidizing necessities.  Indeed, as
suggested by the foregoing example of expenditures on meals and on unprepared food, opposite
adjustments may well be optimal.
4.4.  Ramsey taxation
Most surveys and textbook treatments of optimal taxation devote substantial attention to
Ramsey’s model of taxation and the principles derived therefrom.  See, for example, Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1980), Auerbach (1985), Auerbach and Hines (2002), and Sandmo (1976). 
Ramsey’s (1927) seminal paper addresses how to raise a given amount of revenue through
commodity taxation when distributive considerations are ignored and an income tax is assumed
to be unavailable.  The familiar prescription is that, in the special case in which compensated
demand schedules are independent (zero cross-elasticities), taxes should be inversely
proportional to the elasticity of demand because distortion is less when the elasticity is lower.
34 
The major qualification involves distribution, which favors higher taxes on goods consumed
disproportionately by higher-income individuals.  See, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972,
1976), Feldstein (1972), and Diamond (1975).  These competing considerations pose a tradeoff,
especially because it often is supposed that necessities, consumed disproportionately by the poor,
have relatively inelastic demands, and conversely for luxuries.
In addition to being widely taught, the Ramsey tax model and principles have provided
the basis for extensive literatures on particular subjects, such as the taxation of capital, taxation
and imperfect competition, and public sector pricing.
35  However, the foregoing analysis of
optimal commodity taxation – which suggests that uniformity is optimal in the basic case without
regard to demand elasticities or whether goods are disproportionately consumed by the rich or the
poor – stands in sharp contrast to the leading principles of Ramsey taxation and thus calls into
question results in the many literatures that build on the Ramsey model.
36  It is useful to set forth
this tension briefly and explain why conflicting Ramsey principles are indeed inappropriate in the
presence of an income tax.
Begin with the original Ramsey model in which individuals are assumed to be identical
and the government’s sole objective is to raise revenue with minimal distortion.  When one
allows for an income tax (linear or nonlinear) – one feature of which is the possibility of a
uniform lump-sum tax or subsidy (which, unlike individualized lump-sum taxation, is feasible) –37Following the discussion of normalizations in subsection 4.1, it is sometimes believed that a model with
commodity taxation and no income taxation is equivalent to one that also allows linear income taxation.  This, however,
is incorrect because, as the discussion in the text (and the analysis in subsection 3.2) makes clear, an important feature of
a linear income tax is that it permits a uniform lump-sum grant (or tax) g, which a system of pure, anonymous commodity
taxation does not allow.
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there is no need to rely on distortionary commodity taxation.
37  This result obviously does not
depend on any special assumptions about the form of the utility function.
The reason that raising all revenue by uniform per capita taxes is problematic has to do
with income distribution, for in a world in which individuals’ abilities vary, the poor are hit hard
by such a tax, whereas social welfare may be maximized when they receive net transfers. 
(Likewise, as noted, the simple Ramsey prescription arising from models that assume identical
individuals favors commodity taxes that may fall most heavily on necessities.)  When distributive
concerns are incorporated, however, the analysis in subsection 4.2, drawing on the initial result of
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), shows that differential commodity taxes also have no role in an
overall optimal scheme (under simplifying assumptions examined in subsection 4.3).  Although
Ramsey rules modified for distributive considerations differ from the simpler prescriptions
derived when individuals are assumed to be identical, they still generally involve adjustments
that deviate, perhaps substantially, from uniformity – even when separability is assumed so that
no differentiation is optimal with an income tax.  For example, under Ramsey rules commodities
consumed primarily by the rich (poor) should typically be taxed (subsidized) if inequality is
sufficiently great and if distributive concerns are sufficiently important.  But this result does not
hold when an income tax is available.  As explained above, any effect of commodity taxation
regarding income distribution can better be produced directly, through the income tax, which
undertakes redistribution in an across-the-board fashion.  (Interestingly, the grant component of
the income tax involves a uniform tax when only distortion is a concern, rendering commodity
taxes unnecessary, whereas the grant is positive – a subsidy – in most simulations of an optimally
redistributive income tax, under which commodity taxes are also unnecessary in the basic case.)
In sum, whether or not distribution is a concern, results derived in the original Ramsey
framework, in which no income tax is available, fail to provide proper guidance in a world with
an income tax.  Accordingly, as Stiglitz (1987) suggests, Ramsey principles may be relevant in
developing economies, in which income taxation may be infeasible (though he suggests that
other modifications may be required), but not in developed economies.  Likewise, as implied by
Atkinson and Stiglitz’s (1976) original paper and subsequently reinforced by Stiglitz (1987),
various models and associated prescriptions based on the Ramsey framework are likewise poor
guides when an income tax is available.  See also Mirrlees (1994, p. 223) making a similar
observation with regard to the analysis of public goods provision.  Accordingly – and on account
of space constraints – derivations of Ramsey tax principles are not covered here, and the reader is
referred to the surveys cited at the outset of this subsection.
5.  Other Types of Taxation
This section addresses additional major forms of taxation.  As suggested in the- 28 -
introduction and subsection 2.2, most types of taxation can best be understood and their optimal
use properly determined by examining them through interpretations or extensions of the model of
optimal labor income and commodity taxation.  In this fashion, one can obtain an integrated view
of how different tax instruments should be used together to maximize social welfare, thereby
achieving the revenue-raising and distributive objectives of taxation.
5.1.  Capital Taxation
In sections 3 and 4, income taxation referred to the taxation of labor income.  In a static
(one-period) model, the question of the optimal tax treatment of income from capital does not
arise.  Many forms of taxation, including the corporate tax as well as a standard income tax, do
reach the returns to capital (savings), so extending the foregoing framework to capital income is
important.  Many dynamic issues are deferred to section 9; this section focuses on fundamentals.
5.1.1.  Income versus consumption taxation
Following Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980), it is useful to begin by employing the
model of commodity taxation to illuminate the difference between a classical, accrual income tax
and a pure (cash-flow) consumption tax, taking advantage of the fact that consumption in
different time periods can be conceptualized as consumption of different commodities.  As
subsection 4.1 explains, a uniform commodity tax at rate ￿ (the same as a proportional
consumption tax), which gives the budget constraint in expression (4.3), is equivalent to a linear
tax on labor income at rate t = ￿/(1+￿), which gives the budget constraint in expression (4.4).
To introduce returns to capital and the possible taxation thereof, it is helpful to consider a
two-period model wherein individuals work only in period 1 and consume in periods 1 and 2. 
(Period 1 can be thought of as an aggregate of one’s working years and period 2 as retirement
years; the extension to more periods or to a continuous time model is straightforward.)  Suppose
further that there is only one type of commodity in each of the two periods, denoted c1 and c2. 
That is, we are considering a two-good version of the commodity tax problem in which the first
commodity is period 1 consumption and the second commodity is period 2 consumption. 
Individuals’ utility is u(c1, c2, l).  In this model, a pure labor income tax (equivalent to a uniform
commodity or consumption tax) gives the budget constraint
( . ) ( ) , 51 1
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where r is the interest rate (and g = 0 to simplify the exposition).
By contrast, a standard income tax is defined as a tax on both labor and capital income at
the same rate.  A common statement, referred to as the Haig-Simons definition, is that the
income tax base equals consumption plus changes in wealth, the latter of which in the present
model arises on account of earnings on first-period savings.  More generally, it includes all
returns to capital, such as interest, dividends, and capital gains (the latter determined in principle38In similar spirit, the Haig-Simons definition is often rearranged to state that consumption equals income minus
changes in wealth (net savings or dis-savings), an identity made use of in personal (cash-flow) consumption tax proposals
that define the tax base as income minus all savings plus all dis-savings.  See subsection 12.2.1.
39The formulations in the text examine proportional income taxes.  With nonlinear taxes, one could state
equivalences with regard to marginal rates.
- 29 -
on an accrual basis) – and also allowing offsets for negative values (notably, interest payments
and capital losses).  When the income tax applies to labor and the returns to capital, the budget
constraint becomes










In comparing expressions (5.2) and (5.1), it is sometimes noted that a labor income tax is
equivalent to an income tax that exempts the return to capital, and, given the aforementioned
equivalence between a labor income tax and a consumption tax, that a consumption tax is
likewise equivalent to an income tax that exempts the return to capital.
38
It is also illuminating to rewrite expression (5.2) as














Because (1+r)/(1+r(1￿t)) > 1 when t > 0, expression (5.3) indicates that a full income tax is
equivalent to a labor income tax combined with a differential tax on second-period consumption. 

























Expression (5.4) indicates that a standard income tax is also equivalent to a differential
commodity tax scheme under which second-period consumption is taxed at a higher rate than is
first-period consumption.
39
5.1.2.  Capital taxation more generally
A standard income tax can be understood as a special case of a labor income tax
combined with a supplemental tax on second-period consumption.  To generalize, one can let tr
denote the tax rate applied to the return to capital, r, in which case expression (5.2) becomes









+ -40An ex post wealth tax (i.e., a tax on savings plus interest, available for consumption in period 2) or an ex ante
wealth tax (i.e., a tax on period 1 savings, which equal wl(1￿t) ￿ c1) could be set at the rate trr/(1+r).  In either case, the
result would be the same as that from supplementing a labor income tax at rate t with a capital income tax at rate tr.
41The result that no capital taxation is optimal also arises asymptotically in models with infinitely-lived
individuals, see Judd (1985), Chamley (1986), and the survey in Auerbach and Hines (2002), although these analyses are
in a Ramsey setting, on which see subsection 4.4.
42Accordingly, the notion that consumption taxes are less redistributive than standard income taxes because the
rich have more savings and thus more capital income is not emphasized here; adjusting the tax schedule to allow a
distribution-neutral comparison clarifies the analysis of intrinsic differences between the two types of taxation.  In
practice, it is notable that the United States, which relies primarily on the income tax for redistribution, is generally
viewed as engaging in less redistribution than many European countries, most of which rely heavily on a VAT, a form of
consumption taxation.
43As Feldstein (1978) emphasizes, the extent of intertemporal distortion is not indicated by the compensated
elasticity of savings but instead by the effect of differential taxation on consumption across periods.  For example, even if
the compensated elasticity of savings is zero, it is still true that c2 falls relative to c1 as tr increases.
44On taxation and saving more generally, including behavioral theories, see Bernheim (2002).  On myopia,
capital taxation, and labor supply, see Kaplow (2006d).
- 30 -
When tr = 0, we have a labor income tax or a pure (undifferentiated) consumption tax, and when
tr = t, we have a standard income tax.  But we may also consider schemes under which tr may
take on any value, positive or negative.  The choice between a standard income tax and a
consumption tax thus poses a particular slice of the question of the optimal level of tr.  (Note as
well that wealth taxes are equivalent to supplemental taxes on second-period consumption.
40)
The analysis in subsection 4.2 indicates that, when labor is weakly separable in the utility
function, so we can write u(v(c1, c2), l) (and other qualifications noted in subsection 4.3 are
inapplicable), no differentiation is optimal, so tr should equal zero.  This means that a
consumption tax is superior to an income tax and, for that matter, to any nonzero tax or subsidy
on capital income.  See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) and Stiglitz (1987).
41  The intuition is
that one can achieve any degree of redistribution by adjusting the rate schedule, so the only
remaining question concerns efficiency, as in the original commodity tax problem.
42  That is, we
can ask whether an individual of a given earnings level should be taxed relatively more or less
depending on whether more income is allocated to first-period or second-period consumption.  In
this basic case, neutrality is optimal because it avoids an additional distortion (of the
intertemporal pattern of consumption), whereas differentiation would not help to offset the
preexisting distortion (of labor supply).
43  This benchmark facilitates the analysis of reasons for
departure from the zero-tax result, including arguments favoring capital income taxation
(although it is unlikely, except on administrative grounds, that the optimal level of tr would
precisely equal t, as under a standard income tax).
One reason for departure is nonseparability.  For example, if higher consumption (viewed
here as an aggregate in each period) in period 1 enhanced the value of leisure whereas
consumption in period 2 has no effect, it would be optimal to subsidize savings relative to first-
period consumption.  Another is myopia – see, for example, Laibson (1998) – which also may
favor savings subsidies.
44  Additionally, in a general equilibrium setting in which wages are not
given, capital taxes or subsidies may be optimal if they favorably influence the distribution of
pre-tax income through the effects of changes in the capital stock on wage rates.  See Stiglitz
(1985b).  (Compare the general equilibrium effects noted in subsection 3.5.2.)  In this instance45For further exploration using overlapping generation models, see, for example, Atkinson and Sandmo (1980),
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Ordover and Phelps (1979), and Stiglitz (1985b).  If individuals differ not only in earning
ability but also in their ability to invest successfully – and if, moreover, capital markets are imperfect so those most
productive at investment do not manage others’ savings – additional subtle adjustments may be optimal.  See Stiglitz
(1985b).
46It is worth noting that the core difference between income and consumption taxation is less significant
regarding existing income tax regimes than may appear to be the case.  First, as suggested in portions of sections 9 and
12, actual income taxes exempt or tax at a lower rate much of capital income.  (Notably, human capital is largely taxed as
it would be under a pure consumption tax; likewise for retirement savings.  Imputed income from owner-occupied
housing is exempt, dividends and capital gains may benefit from preferential rates (including the exclusion of capital
gains at death), and the realization requirement provides substantial deferral on much remaining capital income.) 
Second, as subsection 9.2.2 indicates, the tax on capital income falls primarily on the riskless return, well below the total
return on equity.
47See generally Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Auerbach (2002), Bradford (1980, 1986), Graham (2003),
Gravelle (1994), King (1977), and McLure (1979).
48Rules that vary across jurisdictions and over time determine which entities are subject to the corporate tax.  In
the United States, most large, widely-held entities (and many others) are covered.
49Another effect of corporate taxation is that it induces avoidance behavior – including  in recent times the
increasingly creative use of financial instruments to issue equity-like securities that will be treated for tax purposes as
debt – and governmental regulatory responses that themselves consume resources.
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and more broadly, when the government cannot directly control the capital stock through debt or
other policies, taxation or subsidization of capital serves as a substitute instrument.
45  Separate
arguments that favor consumption taxation over income taxation focus on administrative
grounds, some related to issues explored in section 9.
46  See subsection 12.2.1.
5.1.3.  Corporate taxation
47
The corporate income tax (in its classical, unintegrated variant) is levied on equity
investment undertaken in the corporate form.  Specifically, corporations subject to it pay an
income tax on their earnings, and individual taxpayers pay a further round of tax under the
personal income tax on dividend distributions.  (Individuals also pay tax on interest receipts, but
interest payments are deductible to the corporation.)  By contrast, investments through sole
proprietorships, partnerships, and certain types of corporations are not subject to an entity-level
tax; instead, income is attributed to owners who are taxed accordingly.
48
The corporate tax adds a further layer to the foregoing analysis of capital taxation.  Just as
one can determine whether capital taxation is efficient by holding the distribution of income
constant, so one can assess intrinsic features of the corporate tax most directly by considering
changes in its level as part of a reform that keeps the level of capital taxation constant.  Viewed
in this light, the central feature of the corporate income tax is that capital invested in certain legal
forms is subject to a higher level of tax than capital invested in other forms.  Moreover, as noted,
because interest is deductible, the corporate tax only applies to corporate equity.  Such
differential taxation tends to distort investment decisions, in the present context by discouraging
operation in the corporate form, by encouraging the use of debt rather than equity, and perhaps
also (see below) by discouraging dividend distributions, in each case relative to the levels that
would be chosen for nontax reasons.
4950Justifications and problems that arise in an international setting are not considered here.
51Methods include treating the corporation as a pass-through entity, like other entities; giving corporations a
deduction for dividends paid like their deduction for interest; and giving shareholders a credit for corporate taxes paid or
an exclusion for dividend income.  See, for example, American Law Institute (1989, 1993), McLure (1979), and U.S.
Department of Treasury (1992).  Most OECD countries provide some degree of integration, usually providing relief at the
shareholder level.  See, for example, Messere, de Kam, and Heady (2003).
52Were it not for nontax costs or legal limitations, firms might, for example, use exclusively debt to finance
incremental investments, thus avoiding the marginal distortion caused by the corporate tax.  See Stiglitz (1973).
53Viewing the benefit to old equity as a pure windfall is subject to doubt because anticipation of such relief from
corporate tax would partially offset the existing distortion, especially given the long delay between contemplation of
integration, which has been ongoing, and its ultimate enactment.  See subsection 9.3.
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A natural question to consider is: Why tax corporations per se?
50  Most analysts, who
emphasize that the burden of the corporate tax is ultimately borne by individuals, are skeptical
that good reasons exist.  One justification is that the corporate tax prevents avoidance of the
individual income tax on capital, for in the absence of a corporate tax, individuals could invest in
corporate form and defer taxes on capital income until they withdraw their funds, capturing the
interest on tax that would otherwise be due in the interim.  However, most proposed reforms
involve methods of integration under which such deferral would not be possible.
51  It is also
suggested that corporations benefit from limited liability and thus should be taxed; however, the
argument is a non sequitur (prices should equal marginal costs, which here may be near zero, not
benefits), the corporate tax obligation is not directly related to any such benefits, and other
limited liability entities are not subject to the tax.  Various additional theories, based on different
governmental benefits or other grounds, have been offered, but few relate closely to the form of
the corporate income tax and most apply in principle to entities not subject to it.
Regarding distortion, the seminal contributions by Harberger (1962, 1966) present a
general equilibrium model that, among other results, shows how the tax is likely to be borne by
all capital, not just corporate equity.  The basic point is that, in equilibrium, all forms of
investment must offer the same after-tax rate of return; with differential taxation, this condition
implies differences in before-tax returns, which are the source of distortion.  Accordingly, the
corporate tax imposes welfare costs if there are nontax reasons – perhaps relating to agency
problems, asymmetric information, and costs of financial distress – that some firms would find it
efficient to employ the corporate form, use of equity rather than debt, and distribute rather than
retaining earnings.
52  For estimates, see, for example, Goolsbee (1998, 2004), Gordon and
MacKie-Mason (1994), Gravelle (1989), Gravelle and Kotlikoff (1989), MacKie-Mason and
Gordon (1997), and U.S. Department of Treasury (1992).
An issue that has proved perplexing concerns dividend distributions.  The new or tax
capitalization view (contrasted with the so-called traditional view) holds that distortion is limited
to contributions to new equity because the effect of the corporate tax on preexisting equity is
capitalized into share prices in the first instance.  See Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and
King (1974) developing the new view, and subsequent analysis and surveys in Auerbach (2002),
Gravelle (1994), Poterba and Summers (1985), and Zodrow (1991).  Under this view, repealing
the corporate tax would confer a windfall on previously invested capital – although transition
provisions might avoid this effect.
53  It is disputed whether the new view is empirically valid. 
Most analysis of the effects of the corporate income tax, particularly regarding firms’ dividend54It is often imagined that much giving, including all bequests, is from savings; to the extent this is the case, gifts
can be embedded in the multi-period model considered in subsection 5.1 on capital taxation.
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policy, is confounded by the uncertainty about why corporations pay taxable dividends in the first
instance, especially when share repurchases accomplish very similar results but do not subject
shareholders to the tax on dividends (but only to taxes on capital gains that often would be
lower).
5.2.  Transfer (estate and gift) taxation
Many jurisdictions impose taxes on voluntary transfers, either nominally on the gifts and
estates of donors or, through inheritance or accessions taxes, on the receipts of donees.  Whether
such taxation, usually limited to large transfers, is appropriate, should be expanded, or should be
repealed has proved controversial.  See, for example, Aaron and Munnell (1992) and Joint
Economic Committee (1999).  A closely related issue concerns the treatment of voluntary
transfers in income tax systems: Generally, there is no deduction to the donor and no inclusion by
the donee (though some, notably Simons (1938), advocate such inclusion).  Ordinarily, all that
matters will be the aggregate net tax or subsidy on transfers, so the analysis here will proceed
accordingly, not distinguishing among these forms of transfer taxation.
Following Kaplow (2001), transfers (hereinafter, generically referred to as gifts) can be
analyzed as a specific form of consumption.  A donor’s utility is given by u(c, c￿, l), where c
refers to expenditures on own-consumption and c￿ to expenditures on gifts to others.  The
donor’s budget constraint can be depicted as
( . ) ( ) ( ) , 56 1 wl T wl c t c - = + + g g
where t￿ is a differential tax or subsidy on giving.
54  The question is the optimal sign and
magnitude of t￿.  As with commodity taxation generally and capital taxation, the present analysis
– unlike much policy debate – does not consider revenue-raising or redistribution to be central to
understanding transfer taxation.  The reason, as before, is that the income tax can be adjusted in a
revenue- and distribution-neutral fashion, leaving only the efficiency effects that are intrinsic to
the specific form of differential taxation.  The question presented is whether, at a given level of
income, a donor should be taxed relatively more or less on account of giving an additional dollar
to a donee rather than spending it on own-consumption.
The answer might appear to be the same as that for the general differential commodity tax
problem considered in section 4.  With weak separability – if we can write the donor’s utility
function as u(v(c, c￿), l) – we know that t￿ = 0 is optimal.  One might imagine that, instead,
giving is a substitute for leisure (i.e., the less own-consumption, the less valuable is leisure
because one has less funds to spend on leisure activities), justifying a subsidy.  Or the
relationship may be the opposite, for example, if giving more to grandchildren increases the
value of time spent with them (though if it is in retirement, labor supply may be unaffected).55See, for example, Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1993), Imbens, Rubin, and Sacerdote (2001), and
Joulfaian and Wilhelm (1994).
56See, for example, Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), Cox (1990), and Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen
(1994a, 1994b).
57For a survey, see Andreoni (2005).
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Such an analysis of giving, however, is incomplete because it ignores the effects of gifts
on donees.  For each person who is a potential donor, suppose that there is a single potential
recipient, whose budget constraint is
( . ) ( ) , 57 wl T wl c - + = g
where the ￿ in (5.7) equals c￿ in (5.6), the amount given by the donor, and c in (5.7) is total
consumption by the donee.  Giving by donors thus involves two sorts of externalities.  First, there
is a positive effect, that on the donee’s utility.  Even an altruistic donor (see subsection 10.4)
considers only the effect of the donee’s gain on the donor’s own utility, whereas an SWF will
also count the utility gain to the donee per se.  This suggests a basis for subsidization.  Second,
gift receipts produce an income effect on donees, leading to a reduction in labor supply.
55  With a
preexisting income tax, this involves a negative externality to the public fisc.  (A contrary effect
arises to the extent that gifts relax liquidity constraints, such as by enabling investments in
human capital or entrepreneurship.
56)  Depending on the relative magnitude of these effects, a
subsidy or tax may be optimal.
Although individuals’ motives are often irrelevant in economic analysis (for example, it
usually will not matter why individuals prefer a particular mix of vacations and home-based
leisure activity), motives are important in analyzing voluntary transfers.  Whether a gift is
motivated by altruism, various forms of warm-glow giving (see Andreoni (1990)), exchange (see
Cox (1987) and Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985)), or accident (notably, accidental
bequests due to imperfect annuity markets) may have important effects on how taxes or subsidies
affect giving behavior and also on how any particular giving pattern affects donors’ and donee’s
utility.  See Kaplow (2001).
A natural extension to consider involves charitable giving.
57  Though often viewed as a
subject in its own right, it clearly is a species of voluntary transfer, and the foregoing model and
analysis is largely apt.  Donors would be treated in the same fashion, and charitable organizations
can be seen as conduits for individual donees (directly, such as when funds are dispersed to the
poor, or indirectly, such as when medical research is produced that ultimately benefits victims of
disease).  The case for subsidy may be greater with many charities on account of the production
of public goods; that is, though all pure giving produces a positive externality, the externality
may on average be larger with certain charities than with others or than in the case of direct gifts
to particular individuals.  This may help to explain why subsidies to charitable giving, such as
through an income tax deduction, are currently employed.58See generally Diamond (2002, 2003, 2004), Feldstein (2005), and Feldstein and Liebman (2002a, 2002b). 
These and other overviews of social security address many important issues beyond the scope of this chapter (with its
focus on taxation per se), notably including funding (various forms of pre-funding versus pay-as-you-go systems,
particularly with regard to effects on national savings), investments (investment mix, such as in equities versus
government bonds, and private versus public control), how benefit rules affect retirement decisions, annuitization of
benefits at retirement, intergenerational redistribution and risk-sharing, political economy considerations relating to
benefit levels, and how current social security surpluses affect overall government deficits.
59This brief subsection focuses on income replacement, but many systems also fund medical care, disability
insurance, and unemployment insurance.
60One difference is that net transfers through social security depend on lifetime income, although the income tax
and transfer system could, in principle, as well.  See subsection 9.6.
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5.3.  Social security taxation
58
In many countries, payroll (labor income) taxes are levied on individuals (or,
equivalently, on their employers) to fund retirement insurance, referred to in the United States as
social security.
59  At one extreme, if there was no linkage whatsoever between individuals’
payroll tax payments and their own retirement benefits, the taxes could be analyzed precisely as
before.  At the other extreme, if an individual’s tax payments funded the equivalent of an
individual account, earning the market return – and, moreover, if individuals would have saved at
least as much in any event – the system would have no effect at all.
In reality, tax-benefit linkages exist but are complex.  In the United States, some
individuals receive no marginal benefits for their tax payments (young workers, very low-income
workers, some second earners), some pay a negative net tax (because own plus spousal benefits
exceed in present value the marginal tax cost), and many individuals pay positive taxes net of
benefits at widely differing rates that vary over their working lives.  The divergence arises
because, on average, many currently working cohorts will receive benefits less than taxes
(whereas those first covered by the system received benefits significantly in excess of taxes) –
see, for example, Leimer (1994) – and because there is substantial intracohort redistribution,
including direct rich to poor redistribution through benefit formulas and supplemental assistance
for the poor, offsetting redistribution because retirement annuities are more valuable to those
with greater longevity (who tend to be higher-income individuals), and significant transfers
among different family units (notably, to married couples having a spouse with no or low
earnings).  See, for example, Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (1980), Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass
(1999), Feldstein and Samwick (1992), and Liebman (2002).  Any net tax or subsidy at the
margin operates, in principle, like a pure tax on labor income.  Accordingly, redistribution
through social security is not (as a first approximation) qualitatively different from redistribution
through the tax and transfer system.
60
Two major qualifications are important.  First, given the complexity of the formulas
relating current taxes to future benefits, that benefits are far into the future and have contingent
values, and that there is considerable uncertainty concerning future benefit levels (given that
most systems are not in long-term fiscal balance), there is room for substantial heterogeneity in
beliefs and outright misperception about tax-benefit linkages.  See, for example, Dominitz,
Manski, and Heinz (2003).  It is suspected that many, especially younger workers, may
underestimate the marginal benefits that accrue as they work, so that the labor supply effects of61Other rationales that do not have the same implications include asymmetric information and other
shortcomings in the annuity market (see, for example, Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba (2002)), the Samaritan’s dilemma
(see Buchanan (1975)), and a desire to redistribute based on lifetime income.
62If so, social security may not significantly displace private savings for such individuals.
63See generally Inman and Rubinfeld (1996), Mieszkowski and Zodrow (1989), Musgrave and Musgrave
(1989), Oates (1972, 1999), Rubinfeld (1987), Scotchmer (2002), Wildasin (1986) and Wilson (1999).  An important set
of issues ignored in this subsection concerns horizontal relationships across taxing jurisdictions, the issues being
analogous to those considered in subsection 5.5 on international taxation.
64An exception would arise to the extent that redistribution itself is a local public good.  See Pauly (1973).
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payroll taxes are greater than they would be if benefits were fully appreciated.
Second, a major rationale for social security is that forced savings is beneficial on account
of individuals’ myopia.
61  Many retire with few other assets, even though the social security
replacement rate is significantly below plausible targets for optimizing life-cycle behavior.  It
may be that many individuals, even if they understood the benefits associated with the taxes they
pay, would give such benefits little weight.
62  This factor may also seem to indicate that the effect
of payroll taxes on labor supply is more analogous to that of simple taxes on labor income than to
that of voluntary personal retirement contributions.  Myopic individuals’s behavior may be
different, however, when one takes into account the influence of their myopia on savings
decisions as well as labor effort.  See Kaplow (2006d).
5.4.  State and local taxation
63
The central difference in analyzing taxes imposed by subnational jurisdictions is due to
taxpayer mobility.  In the perfect-competition version of Tiebout’s (1956) model, individuals sort
themselves into homogenous jurisdictions, each of which provides the desired public goods
funded by benefit taxes, which, given the presumed homogeneity, would be uniform lump-sum
(head or poll) taxes.  In such a world, the payment of taxes to finance local public goods would
be analogous to consumers’ payments of prices to purchase private goods.  There would be no
distortion and, relatedly, no redistribution.
64
In fact, smaller jurisdictions rely on other forms of taxation.  In the United States, for
example, localities heavily use property taxes and states primarily employ sales and income
taxes.  Because there is significant, even if imperfect, mobility and because of local political
forces, the distribution of benefits and of taxes still tends to be somewhat aligned.  To the extent
that the coincidence is incomplete, there may be redistribution and corresponding distortion.  See
section 7 (which implicitly refers to a national government’s provision of public goods).  
However, redistribution may not occur because tax-benefit divergences may be capitalized into
land prices, as suggested by Hamilton (1976), although under the new view of the property tax
developed by Thompson (1965), Mieszkowski (1972), and Aaron (1975), the tax is borne by
owners of capital and capitalization may not occur.
Additionally, even if benefits equal taxes, this equivalence will tend to hold on average
rather than at the margin.  Thus, a worker contemplating additional labor supply may not expect
to benefit more from public goods, in which case labor income taxes (and, relatedly, sales taxes)65See generally Dixit (1985), Gordon and Hines (2002), and Slemrod (1988).  Of necessity, this subsection
omits many substantial topics, including avoidance and evasion issues that are prominent in an international setting, the
corporate tax and its application to multinational enterprise, uncertainty and investor portfolio diversification, the
interaction between tax policy and limits on capital mobility (including government actions that tend to offset capital
flows), transition issues (accentuated by the fact that a capital levy would in part be borne by foreigners), and concerns
about other countries’ retaliation and the scope for international agreements.
66Similar analysis is applicable as well to capital taxation by subnational jurisdictions.
67The inefficiency of such taxation is an implication of the production efficiency result described in note 34.
68Allowing for both types of taxation, the result may well be specialization in simple models.  All domestic
saving may be invested locally or all local investment may be supplied by foreigners, depending on the relative levels of
taxes on residents investing domestically, on residents investing in foreign jurisdictions, and on foreigners investing
locally.  See, for example, Slemrod (1988).
- 37 -
will tend to have effects like those analyzed previously.  Similarly, property taxes will tend to
distort investment in housing and other structures.
5.5.  International taxation
65
Most international issues in taxation concern how the effects of capital taxation differ in
an open economy.  In the often-studied limiting case, capital is perfectly mobile and the taxing
jurisdiction is small.
66  A fundamental distinction arises between taxation of capital supply
(saving) by residents, which may be invested domestically or in foreign jurisdictions, and
taxation of capital use (investment) by location, which may be from domestic or foreign
investors.  In a closed economy, there is ordinarily no difference between the two because the
incidence of a tax is unaffected by the side of the market on which it is nominally imposed.
Taxes on investment in a home jurisdiction – so-called source-based taxation – lead to a
reduction in investment until the point at which the after-tax return is as high as for investments
elsewhere.  Hence, the incidence of such a tax falls on domestic labor and other fixed factors, not
on domestic capital.  From the home country’s perspective, such taxation is inefficient: It distorts
production without producing any unique benefit, such as taxing domestic capital (if that is
desirable) or extracting any benefits from foreign investors.
67  Accordingly. although consistent
with “capital import neutrality,” source taxation is not generally favored by economists writing
on international taxation, although such taxation is typically employed by developed countries.
Contrariwise, a so-called residence-based tax, equally applicable to residents’ investments
at home and elsewhere, reduces their return to saving but has no effect on domestic investment.
68 
The analysis of such a tax is similar to that in subsection 5.1 on the taxation of capital generally
(the earlier model suppresses production by implicitly assuming constant returns and competitive
pricing, so the focus is on the utility of investors).  Residence-based taxation, consistent with
“capital export neutrality,” is consistent with global production efficiency because the location of
investment is not distorted.  Developed countries in fact levy taxes on residents’ capital income. 
In addition, they often provide a foreign tax credit or occasionally exemptions to avoid double
taxation arising from source countries’ taxation of the same investments.  As Richman (1963)
explores, however, it would seem to be in a taxing jurisdiction’s interest to allow only a
deduction for foreign source-based taxation, treating it as a cost of doing business.  A credit or
exemption leaves investors indifferent between investing at home or elsewhere, but the home69For a more in-depth treatment of transfers, see Kaplow (2006e).
70For surveys, see Atkinson (1987a) and Moffitt (2002).
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treasury is not indifferent because shifting the marginal dollar elsewhere costs the domestic fisc. 
Note, however, that the foregoing traditional analysis of international taxation treats capital as
uniform, whereas capital taxation regimes may also distort ownership and thus the efficiency
with which intangible capital (intellectual property) is transferred within multinational firms.  See
Desai and Hines (2003).
If a country has market power, notably if it supplies or demands a large share of the
global capital stock, its nationally optimal policies tend to differ, by analogy to optimal tariff
analysis.  A large net capital importer will wish to tax the inflow and a large net exporter benefits
by taxing the outflow.
6.  Taxation and Transfer Payments
As subsection 2.1 indicates, two of the main purposes of taxation are redistribution and
raising revenue to finance public goods and services.  Accordingly, some analysis of
expenditures – on transfers and on public goods – is essential to a full understanding of taxation. 
Furthermore, as subsection 2.2 emphasizes, the optimal design of one part of the fiscal system
depends on what other instruments are available and how they are to be used, so any analysis that
focuses exclusively on a subset of the system is incomplete and potentially misleading. 
Accordingly, this section and the next explore the two main categories of government
expenditures, transfer payments (this section) and public goods and services (section 7).
69
6.1.  Optimal transfers
A substantial and growing literature addresses the design of transfer programs.
70  One
might, however, regard such treatments as unnecessary, at least at an abstract level; after all,
section 3 on optimal income taxation presents the optimal tax and transfer schedule, T(wl). 
Viewing transfers as part of the optimal tax problem is the approach adopted in a book review by
Diamond (1968) that predates the leading modern contributions on optimal income taxation and
advanced in Mirrlees’s (1971) conclusion, but it has not been followed very directly in most
subsequent work.
Drawing on the analysis in section 3, the most straightforward answer to the question of
how best to design transfers, notably concerning the optimal level of transfer to individuals
earning no income and the optimal phase-out rate, is that one should simply inspect the lower end
of the T(wl) schedule depicted in Figure 3.1.  As noted, ￿T(0) is the transfer g (which can be
treated as the combined value of all transfer programs to those earning 0 income), and T￿(wl) is
the net phase-out rate (combining the phase-out of all transfer programs with any positive or
negative marginal income tax or other tax separately imposed) at any income level wl.  In other
words, each tax and each transfer program can be represented by its own schedule T
i(wl), and we71A complication is that some transfer programs have a so-called cliff or notch effect, such that when income
reaches a certain point, a particular benefit is lost altogether; that is, some T
i(wl) may be discontinuous, so T￿(wl) may
not be defined at particular points.  Another complication is that some transfer programs are subject to asset tests, which
is to say, for example, that an individual must first consume all assets before becoming eligible for transfers.  This
formulation can act as a 100% tax on the principal of one’s savings in low-income states of the world which, as Diamond
(1968) explains, can be a substantial deterrent to savings.  Some evidence suggests that asset tests indeed discourage
savings.  See Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) and Powers (1998); but see Hurst and Ziliak (2004).
72See, for example, Dickert, Houser, and Scholz (1994) and Wilson and Cline (1994) before welfare reform, and
the post-reform studies by Acs et al. (1998), Gokhale, Kotlikoff, and Sluchynsky (2002), and Reed and Hepner (2004). 
These studies take into account the existence of the EITC: In the credit phase-in range, the EITC mitigates aggregate
marginal rates for very low-income individuals, but in its phase-out range, aggregate marginal rates are pushed higher. 
Although the EITC has received substantial attention and is viewed by nonspecialists as an alternative to traditional
welfare, it should be kept in mind that in fact it is roughly equivalent (for the relevant population) to stretching out the
phase-out of welfare.  (The marginal subsidy in the phase-in range has the same effect as reducing the phase-out rate of
other programs to the same extent, and the EITC phase-out is equivalent to extending welfare phase-outs by raising their
level and applying them to higher-income individuals, on account of the need to complete the phase-out that is prolonged
by the EITC subsidy.)
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can let T(wl) = ￿T
i(wl).
71  An immediate and obvious implication is that one cannot
meaningfully ask what in principle is the optimal design of a particular transfer program (or of a
particular aspect of the income tax schedule, such as the EITC in the United States), for all that
matters is the aggregate schedule, not the shape of any particular component.
Simulations reported in section 3 suggest that optimal grants are fairly generous in a wide
range of settings and that optimal marginal tax rates (phase-outs) are significant as well.  For
example, Stern’s (1976) simulations for a linear income tax have a central-case grant equal to
34% of average income and an optimal tax rate of 54%, Slemrod et al.’s (1994) optimal two-
bracket simulations for similar parameters have a similar grant and somewhat higher marginal
rates at the low end (approximately 60%), and simulations for the nonlinear case generally
feature marginal rates at the bottom that were at or near the highest and often fairly high in
absolute terms.  Recalling the intuition underlying these results for marginal tax rates (see the
discussion of expression (3.9) in subsection 3.4), rates at the bottom collect revenue from most of
the population but are inframarginal (and thus not distorting) with regard to them, they do not
apply to an extremely high density of the population (which tends to be at a maximum closer to
the middle of the income distribution), and they involve little productivity and thus revenue loss
per unit of work effort that is sacrificed.
The existing system of transfer programs in the United States has high aggregate marginal
rates (consisting mostly of welfare phase-outs) near the bottom of the income distribution,
indeed, even higher than seems likely to be optimal.  Before the welfare reforms in the mid-
1990’s, Giannarelli and Steuerle’s (1995) microsimulations found aggregate marginal rates
averaging 75% or more near the bottom and that many faced rates of 100% or more.  Post-
reform, Sammartino et al. (2002) find average marginal rates of roughly 60%-70% near the
poverty line and over 100% in a modest range just above the poverty line.  Other studies report
similar results.
7273The usual argument for high marginal rates near the bottom of the income distribution is inapplicable when all
earn above some minimum level because then it is more efficient to reduce the grant g than to apply a positive marginal
tax at the bottom.  This is the result in the optimal income tax literature, discussed in note 20, that a zero rate at the
bottom is optimal, which as mentioned is inapplicable in the ordinary (noncategorical) case in which the lowest-ability
individuals do not work.
74The analysis assumes that the traits determining the categorization are exogenous.  However, providing more
generous benefits to certain family units or to the disabled may affect incentives to marry, procreate, or avoid injuries,
which in turn will influence the optimal degree of differentiation of treatment between categories.
75Some offset will be provided through the second term because g
H < g* and the existence of higher marginal
tax rates at low income levels each implies that individuals at higher income levels will have somewhat higher marginal
utilities of income and (for strictly concave SWF’s) higher welfare weights.  On this account, it may not be optimal to
have g
H much below g*.  After all, with a steep phase-out, few individuals will benefit much from the grant in the higher-
ability group; those who do will be individuals who are misclassified.
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6.2.  Categorical assistance
Transfer programs often are targeted at or are more generous to particular groups, usually
individuals deemed less able to work on account of age, family configuration (single parent with
young children), or disability.  In this respect, transfer programs serve as ability-based taxation,
as discussed in subsection 3.5.1.  It is useful to extend that analysis by considering some special
cases.  First, suppose that it is possible to observe perfectly which individuals’ abilities are below
some low level, w°.  Then that group can be given a high transfer g that would not be very costly
to finance; g could be fairly low for everyone else without fear that such individuals would be
destitute because, by assumption, they all can earn at least a minimal income.  Relatedly, it would
be optimal not to tax low levels of earnings in the group for whom w ￿ w°, thereby avoiding any
labor supply distortion at the bottom of the group.
73
More realistically, signals about ability will be noisy.  Even though some features, such as
age or certain disabilities, can be observed nearly perfectly at low cost, there will usually be
differences in ability associated with these characteristics.  And other traits, including many other
disabilities, cannot be observed perfectly.  Accordingly, suppose that a low-cost signal makes it
possible to divide the population into two groups, group L consisting mostly of individuals with
very low ability and group H containing few such individuals.  That is, by reference to the
population density function f(w) from the optimal income taxation model in section 3, the density
f
L(w) is heavily concentrated at low levels of w and the density f
H(w) is very thin at the bottom.
74
The analysis of the optimal nonlinear income tax provides the basis for making
conjectures about the optimal tax and transfer schedule for each group.  To begin, it seems
plausible that g
L > g* > g
H.  To consider the shape of the optimal tax schedule for each group,
consider the first-order condition (3.9), reinterpreted for the present case involving two groups in
the manner suggested in subsection 3.5.1.  For the more able group, focus on low levels of
income.  The first term will be notably higher than in the single-group version of the problem. 
The 1-F component will be somewhat greater because almost everyone in the group will have
higher incomes; more significantly, the f component in the denominator will be smaller, indeed,
very small if the categorization is even moderately accurate.  This suggests that the optimal
marginal tax rate at low levels of income should be substantially higher than in the standard
problem.
75  For the less able group, the opposite result seems plausible.  The 1-F component will,76As the previous note indicates with regard to the higher-ability group, some offset will be provided by the
second term: Because of the more generous grant and low initial marginal rates, the welfare cost of higher payments by
those with greater income will be less than otherwise.
77This assumption about transfers and phase-outs often characterizes not only political debate but also formal
analyses, as reflected for example in Moffitt’s (2002) survey.
78If there were positive externalities to work by the poor (setting a good example for one’s children that has the
effect of reducing future dependency and crime) or negative externalities (such as may flow from reduced supervision of
children), the analysis would differ.
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after extremely low levels of income, be substantially smaller than in the combined problem, and
f will be much larger, favoring low marginal rates in this income range.
76
Interestingly, existing welfare phase-outs tend to have the opposite character: When
benefits are high, as they are for low-ability groups, aggregate phase-out rates are
correspondingly high because there are more benefits being phased out.  But it was just suggested
that optimal aggregate (phase-out inclusive) marginal tax rates for such individuals may be low,
even if that means that the substantial grant is not fully phased out until income reaches higher
levels.  For high-ability groups, benefits are low so there is little to phase out and, accordingly,
phase-out rates are low.  Yet the foregoing analysis explains that high marginal tax rates may
nevertheless be optimal.  This apparent deviation from optimality seems to be a product of
focusing on transfer programs in a vacuum and as if they are subject to their own special
requirements.  Specifically, it tends to be assumed that, when transfers are granted, they must be
phased out, and that the phase-out must be complete at reasonably modest levels of income, lest
welfare become too expensive and available to non-needy individuals.
77  And when there is little
welfare to be phased out, there correspondingly is thought to be no need for high marginal tax
rates.  A virtue of incorporating the analysis of transfer programs into the optimal income tax
framework is that potential errors that result from unintegrated thinking can be avoided.
6.3.  Work inducements
There has been ongoing concern with getting welfare recipients to work.  Optimal income
taxation analysis, however, does not attribute significance to work per se.
78  Inefficient work
disincentives are a byproduct of positive marginal tax rates, and this cost is factored into the
analysis.  Additionally, it was noted that a feature of the optimum in a unified system is that the
lowest-ability individuals do not work.  In a perfect categorical system, this would continue to be
true of those with the least ability, for it is optimal to give them a generous grant despite its work
disincentive effect.  If those above a minimum level of ability can be identified perfectly, they
will be induced to work because their grant, g
H, will be set very low.  When categorization is
imprecise, these results will be approximated imperfectly.
Though the analysis thus appears to be complete, it is interesting to examine schemes that
might induce additional work effort.  One might reduce transfers by the extent to which earnings
fall below some target level, perhaps the income produced in a full-time minimum-wage job. 
The marginal return to work in the relevant range for one who could earn only the minimum
wage would be double the wage (the earnings per se, plus a one-for-one reduction in the shortfall
penalty) minus taxes and benefit phase-outs.  Supposing that the latter aggregated to under 100%,79See also related models by, for example, Diamond (1980) and Saez (2002) that focus on the participation
decision.
80See, for example, Michalopoulos, Robins, and Card (2005) on an experimental program in Canada that
provides a large bonus to those working at least thirty hours.  A more moderate work inducement, corresponding to that
previously described in the text for the case in which only earnings are observed, takes the following form when hours are
also observable.  Let w° and l° denote the target wage and required labor supply and t the (flat) preexisting aggregate
(inclusive of phase-outs) marginal tax rate below the target income level.  Then, for l < l°, disposable income available
for consumption, c, is
c g wl t w l l or
g w l wl
= + - - ° °-
= - ° ° + -
( ) ( ),
[ ] ( ),
1
1 t
where ￿ = t - w°/w.  Note that wage subsidies are similar.
81There is also literature on the possible optimality of conditioning welfare on public employment.  See, for
example, Besley and Coate (1995) and Brett (1998).
82Many of the arguments are noted, for example, by Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982).
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the effective marginal tax rate would be negative, a net subsidy to earnings.  If everyone subject
to such a regime has the requisite ability such that, in an optimal scheme, they all would work at
least at the target level, then it is unproblematic.  However, if there are classification errors –
notably, if some subject to the work requirement have a lower ability – then the foregoing
analysis suggests that this scheme is not optimal.  The possibly extremely low implicit grant level
may well be too low, and marginal rates should be greater, possibly quite high rather than
negative near the target.  In any event, it is unlikely to be optimal for the marginal tax rate to
jump on the order of 100 percentage points at the target income level.
Some work incentive schemes assume that hours as well as earnings are observable.  As
noted in subsection 3.5.1, earning ability might then be inferred (earning ability, the wage, is
simply earnings divided by hours).  When ability can be observed, the first-best can be achieved
(individualized lump-sum taxes with zero marginal tax rates for everyone), and there is no role
for work requirements.  When hours are observed, however, ability is only conditionally
observable; individuals who do not work at all do not reveal their type.  The second-best
optimum for this case similarly involves individualized lump-sum taxes (for those who do work)
and zero marginal tax rates, although the extraction from higher-ability types is incomplete.  See
Dasgupta and Hammond (1980).
79  Existing programs premised on the observability of hours
differ qualitatively.
80  Furthermore, as mentioned in subsection 3.5.1, hours are manipulable, so it
is not obvious that the use of hours is feasible.  See Moffitt (2002).  With imperfect observability,
the analysis of categorization in subsection 6.2 becomes applicable.
81
6.4.  Cash versus in-kind transfers
It is ordinarily supposed that cash transfers are superior to transfers in kind because
individuals have different preferences and they tend to have better information than does the
government about their own situations.  Nevertheless, many transfers are given in kind, a practice
that may sometimes be optimal for a number of reasons.
82  The poor may be myopic or otherwise
unable to make wise spending decisions, a possibility strengthened by the fact that such
infirmities may have contributed to their low earning ability.  There may be externalities due to
certain forms of consumption, such as if housing reduces crime or immunization prevents the
spread of disease.  There may be psychic externalities when taxpayers feel better knowing that83See, for example, Bruce and Waldman (1991) and Coate (1995).
84It is sometimes suggested that giving low-quality in-kind goods has this benefit.  However, high-ability
individuals generally mimic low-ability individuals by earning less, and given their lower earnings they may have similar
preferences among goods to those of lower-ability individuals who earn the same amount.  Hence, using in-kind provision
of low-quality goods tends to be an inefficient means of improving screening.  Compare Munro (1989).  In contrast, in-
kind provision, notably, of medical care, may helpfully select individuals of high need.  See, for example, Blackorby and
Donaldson (1988).
85The analysis in this section is applicable to any government expenditures on goods and services, regardless of
whether they are public goods in the technical sense.
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the assistance they provide must be spent on food, shelter, medical care, or education.  In
addition, taxpayers may be subject to the Samaritan’s dilemma, concerned about strategic
imprudence by potential beneficiaries, a possibility that makes compulsory health and social
insurance particularly appealing.
83  In-kind assistance can also direct aid to children in particular,
such as by providing medical care, education, or meals served at school.  Furthermore, it may be
possible to use in-kind assistance to help mitigate labor supply distortion in subtle ways by
improving selection.
84
7.  Taxation and Public Goods
As noted previously, the revenue-raising objective of taxation makes analysis of the
relationship between taxation and public goods central to a comprehensive understanding of
taxation.  Furthermore, because a substantial fraction of GDP consists of governmentally
provided goods and services and because such provision itself has significant distributive
implications, analysis of taxation and public goods is also important in understanding the
redistributive function of taxation.
85  As one might expect, there are important interactions
between the two subjects: For example, how much redistribution is optimally undertaken through
the income tax will depend on the extent to which the public goods funded by income tax
revenue benefit the poor.  Thus, as in the case of other forms of taxation and of expenditures on
transfers, it is necessary to examine income taxation and public goods together to know how each
should be determined so as to maximize social welfare.
7.1.  Distributive incidence and optimal redistribution
The distributive incidence of public goods is relevant to the optimal income tax problem
because the optimal redistributive tax depends on individuals’ utilities, which in turn depend on
public goods.  Specifically, when the SWF is strictly concave in individuals’ utilities, the
marginal social benefit of redistribution depends on the extent of differences in individuals’
utility levels.  Additionally, public goods may affect individuals’ marginal utilities of
consumption, which likewise affects this marginal social benefit.
Consider, for example, the case in which public goods are a perfect substitute for
disposable income.  That is, utility can be written as u(c+b(G), l), where G denotes expenditures
on public goods and b indicates the dollar-equivalent benefit.  In this situation, public goods
provide equal benefits measured in dollars (rather than utility) to everyone.  Accordingly, the
benefit of the public good is equivalent to a higher g, the uniform grant.  Ignoring this effect of86See, for example, Aaron and McGuire (1970), Musgrave et al. (1974), Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), and
Ruggles and O’Higgins (1981) for the United States.
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public goods would lead one to overstate (perhaps greatly) the marginal social benefit of
redistribution.
Now suppose that utility is additively separable in consumption, public goods, and labor:
u = v(c) + b(G) ￿ z(l).  Public goods provide equal benefits measured in utility (rather than
dollars) to everyone.  Measured in dollars, the value of public goods is given by the inverse of
individuals’ marginal utility of consumption, which depends on the curvature of v.  For example,
if v(c) = ln c, then marginal utility is 1/c, so the public good has a dollar value proportional to
consumption.  In this case, because of separability, the benefit of the public good has no affect on
individuals’ marginal utility of consumption and thus no effect on the optimal extent of
redistribution through this channel, although raising everyone’s welfare level by a constant
amount (measured in utility) may affect the marginal social benefit of redistribution when the
SWF is strictly concave.
In sum, knowing the distributive incidence of public goods as well as how public goods
enter into individuals’ utility functions (the two questions are closely related) is necessary to
determine the optimal extent of redistributive taxation.  Unfortunately, ascertaining distributive
incidence empirically, especially for public goods like police protection and national defense, is
notoriously difficult.
86
Another question concerns how increasing government expenditures on some public good
or service at the margin affects the desirability of income redistribution and, in particular, how
this effect depends on the distributive incidence of the particular good or service.  Suppose,
following Kaplow (2006b), that the income tax was set optimally and that it became efficient
(perhaps due to technological change) to supply more of some public good.  Once that was done,
what if any adjustment to the extent of redistribution would be appropriate?  Clearly, the answer
to this question will depend on how the public good is financed in the first instance.  For
example, if it were financed by taxing the poor (rich), more (less) redistribution is likely to be in
order, but that would tell us little about how changing the public good per se affected the
desirability of redistribution.  Accordingly, it is useful to contemplate finance of the public good
by a distribution-neutral (offsetting) income tax adjustment (see section 4), so the change in
public good combined with its finance preserves the preexisting distribution.  Under these
circumstances, if additional redistribution then becomes desirable, it would be meaningful to say
that changing the provision of a public good affects the desirability of redistribution.
One might conjecture that with distribution-neutral finance there is no further need to
adjust the extent of redistribution.  Indeed, when a public good is a perfect substitute for cash,
such as in the first example above and therefore is worth the same (dollar) amount to everyone,
this conjecture can be shown to be valid.  In the more general case, however, redistribution may
become more or less desirable, through two channels.  First, the reform package may affect the
relative marginal utilities of the rich and the poor.  (With a strictly concave social welfare
function, changing relative utility levels would also matter, but the distribution-neutral tax87One way of viewing this suggestion is that it responds to the objection to the Kaldor-Hicks hypothetical
compensation test, see, for example, Little (1957), that standard cost-benefit analysis ignores distributive concerns.
88Pigou’s argument was subsequently explored by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971),
and Atkinson and Stern (1974) in models of optimal taxation (in the Ramsey tradition; see subsection 4.4); and further
developed in additional work, much of which is surveyed in Mayshar (1990), Fullerton (1991), and Ballard and Fullerton
(1992).
89See, for example, Mirrlees (1976), Konishi (1995), and Kaplow (1996a, 2004).
90Both c and G could be interpreted as vectors, but the scalar representation is used to simplify exposition.
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adjustment keeps these constant.)  Second, the reform package may affect the revenue impact of
adjustments to redistributive taxation.  After the hypothesized reform, raising marginal tax rates,
for instance, may have different labor supply effects and, for a given labor supply effect, have
different effects on revenue than before.  Analysis of both channels is somewhat subtle, and no
simple characterization has been obtained.
7.2.  Distribution and distortion
The preceding subsection considers the implications of public goods provision for
redistributive taxation.  This subsection considers the reverse: how the second-best nature of
redistributive taxation bears on optimal public goods provision.  The first-best rule – the
Samuelson (1954) rule – is that public goods should be provided until the point at which the sum
of individuals’ marginal benefits equals the marginal cost of provision.  Two second-best caveats
are standard.
First, Weisbrod (1968), Feldstein (1974), Drèze and Stern (1987), and others suggest that
distributive weights be incorporated in cost-benefit analysis.
87  Second, a large literature
following Pigou (1928) argues that the distortionary cost of finance should be accounted for in
determining the optimal level of public goods.
88
It turns out, however, that both qualifications arise from entangling choices of the extent
of redistribution and of the level of public goods, decisions which can be separated in principle
and in practice.  Once the problems are unscrambled, the basic Samuelson test provides an
appropriate benchmark for public goods provision.  The reasoning closely parallels that used to
analyze the inefficiency of differential commodity taxation in section 4.  Indeed, some analysts
have noted the analogy between the public goods and commodity tax problems.
89  Specifically,
providing more (less) of a public good than is otherwise efficient is analogous to subsidizing
(taxing) a particular commodity relative to other commodities.  The analogy is even closer if one
imagines a hypothetical public goods economy that employs Lindahl (1919) pricing, where a
subsidy (tax) on the public good would entail lowering (raising) the “prices” consumers face for
the public good just as commodity subsidies (taxes) on private goods entail lowering (raising) the
prices consumers pay for them.  Because the analysis is so similar to that of commodity taxation,
it will only be sketched briefly.
Suppose that individuals’ utility as a function of consumption c, public goods G, and
labor effort l can be written as u(v(c, G), l), which uses the assumption of weak separability of
labor, just as in the analysis of commodity taxation.
90  (When this and other assumptions are91For example, improvements to public beaches and libraries, plausible leisure complements, should be
undertaken to a lesser extent than that indicated by the Samuelson rule, whereas enhancing mass transit, a plausible labor
complement, should be done to a greater extent.
92For a more formal derivation along these lines as well as one that differentiates the first-order condition for l
with respect to G and uses the result to demonstrate that dl/dG = 0, see Kaplow (1996a, 2006b) and also Auerbach and
Hines (2002).
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relaxed, qualifications parallel to those in subsection 4.3 are applicable.
91)  Again, the approach
will be to identify the distribution-neutral (offsetting) adjustment to the income tax and transfer
system, show that it does not affect labor supply, and determine when it generates a budget
surplus or deficit.
The offsetting income tax adjustment for a marginal change in G is given by the marginal
rate of substitution, vG/vc.  To verify this, we need to consider whether this shift in the schedule T
will be such that ￿U/￿G = 0 for all types w and at every level of l that each type might supply. 
(This is a partial derivative because labor supply is being held constant; in the next step, it is
shown that individuals indeed do not change labor effort when this tax adjustment is employed.) 
Thus, we consider
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where the notation T(wl,G) is used to indicate how the tax schedule will be adjusted as G
changes.  If the tax adjustment is set equal to vG/vc, as suggested, then cG = -vG/vc.  Using this
result and substituting (7.2) into (7.1) yields the conclusion that ￿U/￿G = 0 for any given w and l.
Consider next whether individuals in fact would change their labor supply in response to
a change in G financed by the specified adjustment to the tax schedule T.  Just as in the analysis
of commodity taxation in subsection 4.2, it should be apparent that, indeed, individuals of all
types (w) would not change their labor supply.  The reason is that expression (7.1) equals zero for
any given l and hence for all l.  Therefore (for each type w), if l* was superior to all l ￿ l* before
G was changed, this will continue to be so afterwards because the utility at each and every l is
unaltered by the change in G, when combined with the offsetting adjustment to T.
92
Hence, government provision of a good or service when financed by a distribution-neutral
(offsetting) income tax adjustment keeps everyone’s utility (and hence the distribution of utility)
constant and everyone’s labor supply unchanged.  It remains to determine how the government’s
budget is affected.  But this is straightforward because the tax adjustment equals (at the margin)93The reconciliation between previous work finding that distortion is associated with public goods provision and
the present result is that the other work tends to find distortion when the combination of public good and tax adjustment
in the policy experiment under consideration result in an increase in redistribution – yet the distributive benefit is
disregarded (in a manner that may nominally be justified by the use of representative-agent models, which ignores that
the motivation for employing distortionary taxes like the income tax rather than a uniform lump-sum tax is precisely that
individuals are heterogenous, so distribution matters).  See the discussion of Ramsey taxation in subsection 4.4 and also
Kaplow (2004).  See also Allgood and Snow (1998), who show that much of the difference in leading empirical estimates
of the marginal cost of funds and of redistribution can be attributed to subtle ways in which different authors’ simulations
implicitly change the level of effective lump-sum transfers and thus the extent of redistribution assumed to take place.
94See also Ng (2000) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001).  Slemrod and Yitzhaki’s formulation for the optimal
provision of public goods allows for adjustments to the cost (taxation) and benefit (public good) side of a standard cost-
benefit equation to take into account (on each side) effects on labor supply and on distribution.  As the analysis in the text
indicates, in the basic case with distribution-neutral finance, all of these adjustments cancel.  Moreover, with non-
distribution-neutral finance, the two-step decomposition suggests that all effects that do not cancel will be associated with
a pure change in redistribution.  In this setting, it aids in analysis and interpretation (see subsection 2.2 and Kaplow 2004)
to think of the distributive effects from the public good and from the method of finance as being netted (and the resulting
labor supply effects will similarly offset in part), so one is left simply with a single cost and benefit associated with the
change in the extent of redistribution.
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individuals’ marginal rates of substitution.  Total revenue due to the tax adjustment, therefore, is
given by the integral of individuals’ marginal rates of substitution, so there will be a surplus
(deficit) if the Samuelson rule is satisfied (fails).  When the project passes the cost-benefit test, it
is possible to rebate the surplus to make everyone better off (and when the project fails the test, a
movement in the opposite direction will make possible a Pareto improvement).
It is immediately apparent why the two standard caveats are inapposite: One needs no
special adjustment for distributive or labor supply effects because, on account of the use of a
distribution-neutral income tax adjustment, there are none.  Relatedly, if a public good were not
to be financed by a distribution-neutral tax adjustment, the present approach is still warranted by
the analysis of subsection 2.2, in particular the discussion of the virtues of using a two-step
decomposition to separate the intrinsic effects of public good provision (hypothetically financed
in a distribution-neutral manner to remove the pure effects of redistribution) from those of
redistribution per se.
This view of public provision, which contrasts sharply with that in the literatures noted
previously, is associated with an emerging body of work.
93  Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) were
the first to use offsetting tax adjustments to show that distributive incidence should be ignored. 
Christiansen (1981) and Boadway and Keen (1993) show that the simple cost-benefit test for
public goods provision is correct if one assumes that the income tax is set optimally; they take
advantage of the fact that, when at the optimum, the marginal benefit of additional redistribution
equals the marginal cost of additional labor supply distortion, so marginal adjustments to the tax
system have no net effect on social welfare.  Kaplow (1996a, 2004, 2006b) builds on Hylland
and Zeckhauser’s approach to advance the view that both distribution and labor supply distortion
can be ignored with regard to a wide domain of government policy, notably including public
goods.
94  As should be apparent from the present analysis (and the analogous argument in section
4 on commodity taxation), when a distribution-neutral (offsetting) tax adjustment is employed,
features of the initial income tax and transfer system – notably, whether it is set optimally – are
irrelevant.95See, for example, Hines (2000) and the debate between Aaron and McGuire (1970, 1976) and Brennan
(1976a, 1976b).
96Another feature of the distribution-neutral approach is that it renders moot concerns about the progressivity of
benefit taxation, a subject that has received much attention.  See, for example, Hines (2000) and Snow and Warren
(1983).  Whatever is the degree of progressivity (or regressivity) of a tax that is set equal to actual benefits, its distributive
incidence is, by definition, precisely offset by that of the public good itself.  Hence, changing the level of public goods,
financed by such benefit taxation, has no distributive effect regardless of the shape of the tax adjustment viewed in
isolation.
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7.3.  Benefit taxation
The foregoing discussion of the use of distribution-neutral (offsetting) income tax
adjustments to finance public goods may be used to illuminate the long-discussed concept of
benefit taxation.  See, for example, Musgrave (1959).  The first observation is that this particular
mode of tax adjustment is indeed a sort of benefit taxation, as the magnitude of a marginal
adjustment equals marginal benefits.  (Recall that, at each income level, the marginal tax
adjustment equals individuals’ marginal rates of substitution.)  For discrete changes, the
offsetting tax adjustment equals individuals’ total benefits for the project.  Surplus is included, as
the total tax adjustment at any level of income equals the area under the implicit demand curve
for the public good.
This tax adjustment, however, differs from prior understandings of benefit taxation in
important ways.  First, as just explained, the posited tax adjustment is equivalent to Lindahl
(1919) pricing at the margin, but it is not equivalent for a discrete change.  Thus, if marginal
benefits are declining, the average rate of the offsetting tax adjustment would exceed the Lindahl
price, which equals the marginal benefit at the final point of the increase in G.  Second, the stated
tax adjustment differs from many notions of benefit taxation because it is based entirely on the
benefits of a public project without regard to its cost.
Various authors have proposed a number of candidates for benefit taxation, most of
which differ from the present formulation in other ways as well.  See, for example, Hines’s
(2000) proposal and his review of Lindahl pricing and related alternatives.  Such work usually
presents as its objective the derivation of a benefit measure that has certain properties in common
with the market’s pricing of private goods or that meets other a priori criteria.
95  However, the
purpose of providing such a measure is not explained.  By contrast, the distribution-neutral
(offsetting) income tax adjustment is chosen here because of its usefulness in policy analysis. 
This benefit measure also has descriptive functions.  For example, whether the median voter will
favor a project depends on whether that voter’s actual new tax obligation exceeds this
hypothetical offsetting tax adjustment.
96
Yet another reason for formulating a principle of benefit taxation is to determine the
proper manner of financing government expenditures on goods and services.  Yet when there is
also a system of redistributive taxation in place, that itself may be freely adjusted, the purpose of
isolating the benefit tax component is unclear.  From some normative perspectives, such as a
libertarian one, benefit taxation may be required and any redistribution may be deemed
impermissible.  Such an approach does require selection of a particular definition of benefit97Although it is conventional to focus on externalities alone, similar analysis is applicable to some informational
and self-control problems.  That is, if there is no externality but individuals underestimate the private benefit of some
activity, a subsidy may be used to offset the divergence, or if private harm is underestimated, a tax may be helpful.  See,
for example, Gruber and Mullainathan (2005) on the possibility that cigarette taxes may improve the welfare of myopic
smokers.
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taxation, and it is also necessary to confront the difficult (some would say insurmountable)
baseline question regarding the benchmark against which one measures the distributive incidence
of the entire public sector (is the hypothetical alternative anarchy?).
8.  Corrective Taxation
Correcting externalities is a third major function of taxation.  Subsections 8.1 and 8.2
review the analysis of corrective taxation when externalities are the only concern.  Subsection 8.3
integrates the analysis of corrective taxation with that of income and commodity taxes to
determine social welfare-maximizing corrective taxation when revenue-raising and distributive
concerns are also relevant.
8.1.  Pigouvian taxes and subsidies
Among the contributions of Pigou (1920) was his diagnosis of externalities in terms of
divergences between private and social costs or benefits and his suggestion of taxes and subsidies
as a possible cure.
97  To analyze Pigouvian taxation, we can extend the model of commodity
taxation from section 4, following Kaplow (2006c).  As before, there are n commodities,
x1, ..., xn.  Corresponding variables e1, ..., en denote the total consumption of each commodity:
ei = ￿xi(wl)f(w)dw, for all i.  Individuals choose levels of consumption and labor effort l to
maximize their utility functions u(x1, ..., xn, e1, ..., en, l).  Utility may have any relationship to the
level of the ei’s; that is, the external effect due to each of the commodities may be positive,
negative, or nonexistent.
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where ￿(w) is the Lagrange multiplier on individuals’ budget constraints (4.1) for individuals of
type w, signifying the marginal utility of income.  (U is also expressed as a function of w because
the partial derivative may differ by type due to differences in consumption and labor effort.)  The
first term in the integrand, therefore, is the marginal effect of the externality on utility divided by
the marginal utility of disposable income, which gives the marginal externality for a given type
w, measured in dollars.  Note that for positive externalities, hi < 0.
Using this expression for marginal external harm, we can define first-best Pigouvian
taxes and subsidies as a commodity tax vector {￿1, ..., ￿n} having the property that98If vaccinations are always completely effective, compulsory immunization of everyone is not only suboptimal,
but dominated by the laissez-faire solution.  See Brito, Sheshinski, and Intriligator (1991).
99When harm is uncertain, one can think of a Pigouvian tax imposed probabilistically – which is how the tort
system typically operates – or that a tax equal to expected harm is imposed with certainty.
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(pi+￿i)/(pj+￿j) = (pi+hi)/(pj+hj), for all i, j.  Notice that the definition does not require that ￿i = hi,
for all i.  The reason has to do with normalization, discussed in subsection 4.1: If all commodity
taxes are raised or lowered in such a manner as to leave all price ratios unchanged, individuals’
behavior will be unaffected – if the level of the income tax is also adjusted to produce the same
effective disposable income.  However, it is useful to think of a case in which the only
commodity taxes are Pigouvian, in which event it is true that ￿i = hi, for all i.
8.2.  Choice of instruments
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies not only constitute an important instrument for the control
of externalities, but our understanding of them also helps to illuminate other government
interventions that address externalities.  For example, free immunizations against communicable
diseases are akin to a Pigouvian subsidy that brings the price to zero, which would be optimal if
the external benefit happened to equal the cost.  However, if the external benefit is even larger
and if the private benefit is less than other private costs (which may include inconvenience,
modest pain, and the risk of adverse side-effects), one could employ a subsidy in excess of 100%
of the direct cost or, as is commonly done, impose a regulation that requires immunization.
98 
More broadly, in examining the choice among regulatory instruments, it is helpful to keep such
connections in mind.
 In many settings, particularly involving negative externalities, the Pigouvian tax
prescription is not employed.  Two alternatives with important similarities to Pigouvian taxation
are legal liability and tradeable permits.  A rule of strict liability requires the injurer to pay the
victim for all harm imposed, which from the injurer’s point of view is similar to a Pigouvian
tax.
99  A Pigouvian tax has the advantage that, because victims do not receive compensation, they
retain incentives to mitigate harm – although this is a disadvantage to the extent that the activities
of the injurer and victim combined bear excessive costs, creating insufficient incentives to
undertake the combined activities and excessive incentives to integrate if that would eliminate
tax liability.
Tradeable permits have the familiar virtue that, like Pigouvian taxes, they result in cost-
minimization because each purchaser equates the marginal cost of harm reduction to the
(common) market price of permits.  Permits importantly differ from Pigouvian taxation because
the overall quantity of the externality is not optimized – by polluters equating marginal cost to
the tax rate, itself set equal to marginal harm – but rather is determined by fiat.  Note, however,
that in principle the government could adjust the number of permits until the point at which the
market-clearing price equalled marginal harm at the given quantity.
A greater contrast is provided by command and control regulation, whether imposed
directly (such as with technological requirements) or indirectly (such as through liability100Weitzman (1974) argues that setting quantities (regulation) may be superior to setting prices (taxes) when
there is uncertainty, but his result arises largely because he rules out feasible instruments, notably a nonlinear Pigouvian
tax schedule under which the marginal tax rate equals the marginal expected harm, and because he assumes that the
linear instruments could not be adjusted over time, even when observable behavior revealed errors.  See Shavell (2006).
101See, for example, Casler and Rafiqui (1993) and West (2004).
102For a survey and a collection of literature, see respectively Bovenberg and Goulder (2002) and Goulder
(2002).
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involving injunctions or negligence rules under which damages are only owed if standards are
violated).  The common objection is that the government decision-maker has limited
information, for optimal regulation of this sort requires not only information about harm (which
is also required to set a Pigouvian tax) but also about the costs of various technologies.
100
An important qualification to the inefficiency of some forms of regulation, particularly
when implemented through liability rules rather than government edict, is that injurers and
victims may bargain to more efficient results.  This important point of Coase (1960) is true even
when no liability is imposed for externalities, for a victim could pay an injurer to abstain from
harm-causing activity if the cost of the harm exceeded the injurer’s benefit from the activity. 
This solution, of course, tends to be infeasible in large-numbers cases – such as with industrial
pollution and externalities associated with automobiles.  Furthermore, even when bargaining may
be feasible, asymmetric information interferes with efficiency, and accordingly there may be
benefits of legal rules that more closely mimic Pigouvian taxes.
The choice of instruments problem is a good deal more complex than the foregoing
suggests, involving comparisons between the government’s and private parties’ (including
victims’) information, concerns about the ability of injurers to pay for harm (especially large
harms that may occur with low probability), considerations of administrative costs, and other
factors.  See, for example, the Handbook surveys on environmental regulation by Bovenberg and
Goulder (2002) and Revesz and Stavins (2006) and that on tort liability by Shavell (2006). 
Nevertheless, it is worth emphasizing that much analysis of various forms of regulation is
illuminated by the comparison with the straightforward principles of Pigouvian taxation. 
Likewise, it is useful to take advantage of this relationship when considering how the problem of
controlling externalities interacts with other second-best considerations related to the other
functions of taxation, the topic of the next subsection.
8.3.  Distribution and distortion
The standard Pigouvian prescription that taxes should be set equal to the marginal
external harm applies in a world that is first best, other than for the externalities being corrected. 
Just as section 7.2 considered whether and how one should deviate from the Samuelson rule for
public goods when there is a concern for distribution and labor supply distortion in world that is 
second-best with regard to redistributive taxation, so we can ask whether these two
considerations call for modification of the Pigouvian prescription.  Distributive concerns are
often expressed, such as in the argument that a gasoline tax, which may be used to internalize
pollution and congestion externalities from driving, may be regressive and thus less desirable on
this account.
101  Labor supply distortion has received substantial attention in recent literature.
102 103See also Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) and Cremer, Gahvari, and Ladoux (1998).  The reconciliation between
this conclusion and that in much of the literature that does find additional distortion associated with greater environmental
regulation or particular environmental policies is, just as in the case of public goods (see note 93), due to the literature’s
employing combinations of regulation and income tax adjustments under which greater redistribution occurs.  See
Kaplow (2004, 2006c).
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Initially, some thought environmental taxation might produce a “double dividend” – both
correcting an externality and also raising revenue without distortion, permitting reductions in
distortionary income taxation – and a substantial subsequent literature has suggested that the
problem is more complicated and, as it turns out, environmental policies may exacerbate the
preexisting labor supply distortion due to income taxation.
It would seem, however, that in light of the previous analysis addressing these same two
concerns in the contexts of differential commodity taxation (section 4) and public goods
(subsection 7.2), one would expect, under similar simplifying assumptions, that first-best
Pigouvian principles provide an appropriate benchmark for analysis – and that the qualifications
to this conclusion (section 4.3) would be largely the same as in the previous settings.  This indeed
is the case, as developed in Kaplow (1996a, 2004, 2006c).
103
One way to view the intuition is to return to the model of differential commodity taxation,
wherein (with weak labor separability) uniformity was optimal.  The intuition was that
differential commodity taxation distorted consumption choices without reducing the distortion
caused by redistributive taxation; hence, differential taxation is inefficient.  Specifically,
eliminating (or reducing) differentiation, with a distributively offsetting adjustment to the income
tax schedule, results in a Pareto improvement.  Extending that logic to the present case with
externalities, the relative prices that result in no distortion are no longer ones with no differential
commodity taxation but instead are consumer prices that reflect the full extent of any
externalities, as in the definition of first-best Pigouvian taxes and subsidies in subsection 8.1. 
Hence, making this formulation of commodity taxes the benchmark rather than no
differentiation, any deviation from the benchmark will, as before, be inefficient.  Specifically, if
one removes any deviations – that is, reforms commodity taxes to equal first-best Pigouvian
taxes – and adjusts income taxes to offset distributive effects, a Pareto improvement will result. 
See Kaplow (2006c).  The proof essentially tracks that presented in subsection 4.2 for commodity
taxes.  The main difference is that, as individuals adjust their consumption, this now changes the
level of externalities and also changes the revenue from commodity taxes and subsidies (which
are not moved to zero, but instead to first-best Pigouvian levels).  Note, however, that the net
revenue produced by the latter effect precisely equals the revenue necessary to compensate
individuals for the former effect, through the income tax adjustment that holds everyone’s utility
constant.  Therefore, just as in the case without externalities, optimal commodity taxes are those
that otherwise would be efficient on first-best grounds.
As explored in subsection 8.2, the analysis of Pigouvian taxes and subsidies illuminates
regulation much more broadly; hence, it would seem, as a benchmark, that regulations should be
set with regard to the efficiency with which they mitigate externalities, independent of104The claim regarding distributive effects is first advanced by Zeckhauser (1981).  Distribution and labor
supply distortion are addressed more fully in Kaplow (1996a, 2004, 2006c).
105See generally Aaron (1976), Feldstein (1983), and Halperin and Steuerle (1988).
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distributive effects and labor supply distortion.
104  One particular regulatory instrument is the use
of legal rules, such as rules of tort liability.  Indeed, as explored in subsection 8.2, a legal rule of
strict liability is much like a Pigouvian tax (at least with regard to the injurer).  In the analysis of
legal rules, it has long been controversial whether adjustments should be made on account of
distributive effects.  Shavell (1981), in one of the first papers using the method of offsetting tax
adjustments, shows that it is inefficient to deviate from otherwise efficient legal rules on account
of distribution (which is held constant by the offsetting income tax adjustment).  See also
Kaplow and Shavell (1994).
9.  Additional Dynamic Issues
Dynamic considerations were first introduced in extending the basic optimal income and
commodity tax model to capital taxation in subsection 5.1.  In this section, a number of further
dimensions and complications that arise in a dynamic setting are examined. 
9.1.  Inflation
105
Inflation complicates measurement of the tax base under a standard income tax because
changes in wealth over time are subject to tax and the most readily available measures of such
changes are denominated in nominal prices at different points in time.  Note that an implication
of the source of the inflation problem is that a labor income tax and, likewise, a cash-flow
consumption tax do not require significant modifications to adjust for inflation because the tax
bases are appropriately measured in terms of current prices.  (In nonlinear systems, just as under
a nonlinear standard income tax, one would still need to index the bracket levels to avoid
“bracket creep,” wherein the real level of unindexed bracket boundaries declines over time as a
consequence of inflation.)
One sort of inflation adjustment necessary in a standard income tax is indexation of basis. 
For example, if an asset was purchased in period 1 for $100 and is sold in period 2 for $125, the
nominal gain of $25 will overstate the real gain if there is, say, 10% inflation.  Basis adjustment
involves restating the period-1 purchase price of $100 as $110 in period 2, so that the resulting
taxable gain of $15 properly measures the real gain.  Similar (ongoing) basis adjustments are
necessary to preserve the real value of depreciation and to properly measure changes in
inventories.
Another type of adjustment involves interest and related returns (which can alternatively
be accomplished in an accrual system through basis adjustments to debt and related instruments). 
Suppose, for example, that inflation is 10%, the real interest rate is 2%, and the nominal interest
rate is 12%.  A 50% income tax applied to nominal interest would produce an after-tax nominal
return of 6%, which would be a real after-tax return of ￿4%.  Failure to index, therefore, results
in an effective tax rate of 300% on the real return of 2%.  Relatedly, borrowers, who deduct106Symmetry in theory can lead to asymmetric effects in practice because of incentives for high marginal tax rate
actors to borrow from tax-exempt entities.
107LIFO accounting approximates the result of inflation adjustment as long as firms’ inventories are not
declining.  Observe further that, as outlined in note 46, much capital income is effectively exempt under the existing
income tax, so the inflation problem is limited to the remainder.  However, this suggests that there may be even greater
differentials in the taxation of capital than seems apparent, with some capital exempt and some of the rest effectively
taxed at higher than stated rates.
108Technically, one can analyze risk as resolved instantaneously, although as a practical matter the issues
examined herein typically arise in a dynamic setting.
109See, for example, Eaton and Rosen (1980a, 1980b, 1980c), Tuomala (1990), and Varian (1980).  Subsequent
work includes Strawczynski (1998) and Low and Maldoom (2004).
110Varian’s (1980) simulations suggest that, in light of moral hazard (i.e., the labor-leisure distortion), the
optimal level of insurance may be only a few percent, whereas Strawczynski’s (1998) and Low and Maldoom’s (2004)
simulations suggest that high marginal tax rates may be optimal.
111An important special case of income uncertainty involves the possibility that one will become disabled and
thus unable to earn income in the future.  See, for example, Diamond and Mirrlees (1986).  Unemployment insurance is
also pertinent.
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nominal interest payments, receive tax bonuses to a similar extent.
106
Most standard income tax systems fail to index basis or account for the inflationary
component of interest and related returns.  They may do so indirectly, such as by providing a
capital gains preference and more rapid depreciation, although such means often are not adjusted
as inflation changes over time, they do not cover all pertinent dimensions, notably, the problem
of interest, and they inevitably are more complete for some assets than for others.
107  As a
consequence, when inflation is nontrivial, standard income taxes in practice deviate substantially
from their idealized form and significant distortions can arise.
Indexing is more commonly employed by societies experiencing hyperinflation.  In such
settings, additional dimensions, in principle relevant even with low inflation, become significant,
such as the difference in time between the withholding of taxes and payment to the tax authority
and the fact that earnings and expenditures occur at different times within the standard
accounting period, which is typically one year in length.
9.2.  Risk-bearing
108
9.2.1.  Uncertain labor income
Uncertainty in labor income provides a supplemental, efficiency-based justification for
some redistributive income taxation.
109  Even if everyone is identical ex ante, individuals would
prefer to have income transferred from high- to low-earning states, which a redistributive income
tax does.
110  Given that existing income taxes and optimal schemes examined in the literature
involve high tax rates even without uncertainty, the optimal adjustment for uncertainty may not
be that large, both because the preexisting distortion is significant and because quite substantial
implicit insurance would already be made available.
111
The general  problem of optimal income taxation in the presence of uncertainty has not
been the subject of extensive study.  Mirrlees’s (1990) preliminary analysis (examining a linear112Tuomala (1990, section 9.3) finds that uncertainty in wages at the time effort is chosen (capturing such
decisions as investment in human capital and occupational choice) favors rising marginal tax rates, the intuition being
that high realizations are substantially attributable to luck, so the disincentive effect of taxing them more heavily is
modest.  His results are surprising in that the extent to which this is true in his simulations actually increases as
uncertainty falls, which seems to contradict both the given intuition and the results of his simulations elsewhere in his
book, which generally display falling marginal rates when there is no uncertainty.
113Compare Bulow and Summers (1984) and Gordon (1985).
114See Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991).
115On taxation, risk, and household portfolio behavior more generally, see Poterba (2002).
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income tax where the degree of variation in skill and the extent of uncertainty are assumed to be
small) suggests that, taking as given the total variation in observed income, greater income
uncertainty most plausibly favors a lower tax rate.  For given aggregate variation, higher income
uncertainty implies less variation in skill, and it turns out that skill variation is more powerful
than income uncertainty in leading to a higher optimal tax rate.
112
There are two caveats regarding the use of the income tax as insurance against uncertain
labor income.  First, to the extent that income uncertainty involves systematic risk, the
government is not able to solve the problem: Its resulting budget uncertainty must be addressed,
for example, by raising taxes or reducing spending if the resolution of uncertainty is adverse.
113 
Second, the standard analysis ignores private insurance, the possibility of which renders
government insurance through taxation not only unnecessary but also inefficient.  Specifically, if
the main inhibitor of private income insurance is moral hazard, as much of the literature asserts,
the government cannot combat it either; indeed, that is why there is a labor-leisure distortion
from income taxation.  However, if adverse selection or other imperfections impede private
insurance, then government insurance such as through taxation may be optimal.  It should be kept
in mind, however, that private and direct government insurance does exist for some important
sources of uncertainty in labor income, notably for disability and temporary unemployment, and
various other means allow individuals to mitigate income uncertainty to some extent.
114
9.2.2.  Uncertain capital income
115
Uncertainty is central to the understanding of capital income taxation because a
substantial portion of the return to capital, notably regarding equity investments, consists of a risk
premium.  Domar and Musgrave’s (1944) seminal paper offers a partial equilibrium analysis in a
model with two assets, one riskless and the other risky.  Their basic insight is that taxes on the
risky component of returns have no effect on individuals, who will simply gross up their
investments in the risky asset to offset the effect of the tax.
To verify this result, suppose that, in a world in which only the riskless return, r, is taxed
at the rate tr, an investor would invest X in a risky asset that pays Ri (possibly less than X) in state
of the world i.  (For simplicity, ignore the rest of the investor’s portfolio, which is held constant
and which is unaffected by the reform to be considered.)  Then, after risk is realized and tax is
paid, the investor will have Ri ￿trrX, the gross return minus the tax on the riskless return to the
initial investment.- 56 -
Now assume instead that all investment returns, including the risky component, are to be
taxed at the rate tr (in a fully symmetrical manner, allowing for complete deductibility of losses). 
The investor can offset the effect of this supplemental tax on risk by increasing his investment in
the risky asset from X to X/(1￿tr), borrowing the additional funds, trX/(1￿tr), at the riskless rate r. 
After risk is realized, the loan (with interest) is repaid, and tax is paid, the investor will have
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In the first line of expression (9.1), the first term is the gross return on the investment of X/(1￿tr),
the second term is the repayment of the loan, trX/(1￿tr), with interest, and the third term is the tax
owed, the tax at rate tr being levied now on the gross return net of the investment, with a
deduction allowed for the interest payment on the loan.  As can be seen, in every state (for any i),
the investor’s net return under this regime – having adjusted the initial level of investment – is
Ri ￿trrX, which is identical to the net return under the initial regime that taxes only the riskless
return to investment.
This basic model has been extended in various ways that, among other things, take
account of general equilibrium effects in asset markets and whether the government’s budget is
in balance in different states of the world.  See Bulow and Summers (1984), Gordon (1985), and
Kaplow (1994).  An important implication of this model is that capital taxation (see subsection
5.1) is less important than it may appear to be because a tax on all returns is, accounting for
portfolio adjustments, equivalent to a tax on only the riskless return, which is but a portion of the
total return to capital.  In addition, permutations of the foregoing analysis imply that various
equivalences among taxes (for example, between a labor income tax and a consumption tax) that
hold in a static model and in a dynamic world with certainty extend to the case of uncertain
capital income.  See Kaplow (1994).
9.2.3.  Other losses
Aside from uncertainty that may affect the return to labor effort and investment,
individuals may suffer losses directly, notably in cases of illness, requiring possibly significant
medical expenditures, and casualties, such as if one’s home is destroyed by fire.  A common
view, reflected to an extent in some income tax systems through deductions, is that individuals’
effective income is lower on account of such losses and hence their taxable income should be
reduced accordingly.
There are two shortcomings in this logic.  First, the point has not been developed properly
in an optimal income tax model.  Even if the marginal utility of consumption of an individual116See Kaplow (2003) on these and other transition issues; see also Shaviro (2000).
117For the classic statement of the dynamic commitment problem, which mentions capital levies as an
illustration, see Kydland and Prescott (1977).
118Compare the discussion of Ramsey taxation in subsection 4.4.
- 57 -
who, say, earns $50,000 and suffers a loss of $10,000 is the same as that of someone who earns
$40,000 and suffers no loss, their ability level and thus various aspects of the optimization are
different, so further analysis of the optimal treatment is required.  Second, a complete analysis
must take account of the possibility that individuals could insure or take various precautions ex
ante.  See Kaplow (1992).  Providing a deduction for losses is tantamount to providing free
insurance for a fraction of losses equal to an individual’s marginal tax rate.  Such implicit
insurance produces moral hazard, which distorts private insurance decisions.  If moral hazard is
the only market imperfection (or, even more so, if private insurance can combat moral hazard,
such as where some precautions are observable), insurance through the tax system is inefficient. 
Furthermore, if the tax deduction is limited to uninsured losses, as in the United States income
tax, private insurance is inefficiently discouraged.
9.3.  Transitions and capital levies
116
Many contemplated fundamental tax reforms involve transitions that entail what is
tantamount to a one-time capital levy (or grant).  One-time capital levies are traditionally viewed
as an ideal sort of tax.  Such a levy is imposed only on preexisting capital and, being one-time
(with a presumed credible commitment never to be repeated), is nondistortionary.
There are two major problems with arguments in favor of a capital levy.  First is the
familiar point that the future promise may not be credible.  The prospect of capital levies is a
serious fear in many developing economies, which discourages foreign investment and induces
residents to send capital outside the country.  Any government that actually imposes a capital
levy would not expect to be trusted anytime soon.  That most countries refrain from such policies
reflects some mix of constitutional limitations, strong norms, and the fear that future capital
flight would be more costly than any short-run, even if substantial, gain.
117
Second, there is a conceptual problem with the purported idyllic nature of a capital levy in
developed economies that have an income tax.
118  Specifically, one could in principle raise sums
distortion-free by reducing the grant component g of the income tax, even making it negative –
i.e., a uniform lump-sum levy.  The primary deterrent to using this approach is not inefficiency
but dislike of the distributive consequences.  If a capital levy is a mere substitute for lowering g,
and if g is already set optimally, then there is no benefit to a capital levy.
Further reflection suggests that a capital levy may nevertheless be welfare-increasing (if
the one-time feature were realistic) because, at any given point in time, it is likely that ownership
of the existing capital stock is distributed in a way that positively correlates with income and
underlying earning ability, for it constitutes the result of prior accumulations that ultimately
derive from labor income.  (The correlation will be highly imperfect due to differences in
lifecycle stage, preferences, and other factors.)  Thus, a capital levy may be distributively119For a theoretical exploration of taxation based upon prior economic choices, see Roberts (1984).
120See, for example, Bradford (1996a, 1996b), Kaplow (2003), Sarkar and Zodrow (1993), and Shaviro (2000).
121See, for example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) and Sarkar and Zodrow (1993).
122See, for example, the results reported in note 41.
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appealing whereas reducing g would not be.  Observe that this version of the argument is closely
analogous to the notion that it would be ideal to impose future individualized lump-sum taxes
based on ability as inferred from prior earnings or investments in human capital: The taxes would
be nondistortionary in the future, and as long as this regime was not anticipated ex ante, society
would not have suffered from prior distortions either.
119  If such a one-time imposition were
possible, it would be optimal to fashion the redistributive tax as a function of revealed labor
effort rather than imposing a uniform capital levy.
In sum, one-time capital levies may seem attractive, depending on the available
alternatives, but are generally regarded as infeasible, if not dangerous even to contemplate
actively.  It is interesting, therefore, that many fundamental tax reforms can involve what is
tantamount to a capital levy.  Most analyzed is the transition from an income tax to a
consumption tax (or simply the introduction of or raising the rates in a consumption tax): Unless
there is transition relief for pre-enactment accumulations, the effect is to reduce the purchasing
power of preexisting capital.
120  Thus, although a wage tax and a consumption tax may be
equivalent in steady-state, simulations of the transition to a consumption tax show greater
efficiency gains than result from transition to a wage tax because the former contains a
significant capital levy whereas the latter does not.
121  Of course, if the transition were
anticipated, say during years or decades of preceding debate, the implicit levy would not be
unanticipated and distortion would result.
Similar questions arise in other settings.  For example, analyses of the efficiency of
capital taxation more generally often envision a world in which there is a preexisting capital
stock without inquiring as to its origin – notably, as a consequence of prior earnings or of
inheritance, which itself is the product of a donor’s prior earnings, on which see subsection 5.2. 
In such a model, the intertemporal inefficiency of taxing capital in a simple setting (see
subsection 5.1) will be counterbalanced by the advantage of the capital levy, and a dynamic
analysis will accordingly suggest the seeming optimality of high capital taxes initially but no
capital taxation in the long-run steady state.
122  All of this, of course, assumes that the enactment
of the initially high capital tax is unanticipated and that the subsequent promise to eliminate
capital taxation is credible.
Likewise, negative capital levies – windfalls – can arise if, for example, corporate
taxation is reduced or eliminated.  Thus, a key point concerning the desirability and appropriate
form of integration of the corporate income tax (see subsection 5.1.3) concerns the fact that
existing corporate equity would thereby be freed of future tax liability.  This revenue loss is
ordinarily seen as unaccompanied by any corresponding efficiency gain, although in a setting in
which the possibility of integration may long be anticipated, an understanding that old equity123Expansions and contractions of social security benefits can be analyzed in an analogous manner: If taxpayers
perceive a significant tax-benefit linkage and if (but only if) benefit changes are anticipated, this prospect should affect
pre-enactment labor supply.
124Possible lack of liquidity is another reason sometimes given for disfavoring accrual taxation, although the
problem is unlikely to be significant for publicly traded assets for which mark to market is feasible.
125That the United States also provides a tax-free step-up of basis at death adds to the lock-in problem.  Note that
there is an important exception to the realization approach for business assets, namely, the provision of depreciation,
amortization, and other deductions for business expenditures on capital assets that predictably decline in value over time. 
(In the absence of such provision, taxpayers would have ongoing incentives to sell used plant and equipment, to realize
losses.)  To the extent allowed deductions depart from economic depreciation (on which see Samuelson (1964)),
interasset distortions result.  One case involves intangibles, such as investments in advertising and R&D, which are
permitted to be expensed.
126One of the simplest is the selective sale of assets with losses so that they can be deducted against other
income, while continuing to hold assets with unrealized gains.  See Stiglitz (1985a).  Capital loss limitations are
employed to counter this tactic.
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would benefit would tend to have the effect of reducing pre-enactment distortion.
123
9.4.  Capital gains
The attempt to employ an accrual income tax (taxing returns to both labor and capital) is
plagued by the problem of capital gains.  Proper taxation requires that gains be taxed as they
accrue or, in the alternative, following Vickrey (1939), that interest be charged on taxes that are
deferred until realization (ordinarily, the sale of the asset).  Ongoing accrual taxation (referred to
as “mark to market”) is feasible for many publicly traded securities but not for some other assets,
and selective application of accrual taxation would be distortionary.
124  As a consequence, most
assets are taxed on a realization basis, resulting in mismeasurement of income (which may cause
interasset distortion since the benefits of deferral vary across types of assets) and distortion of
investors’ portfolios on account of the lock-in effect, wherein taxpayers with accrued gains have
an incentive to defer sale in order to further defer taxation.
125  Additionally, the realization
requirement induces a variety of financial manipulations designed to take advantage of its
benefits.
126
An ingenious scheme, initially due to Auerbach (1991) and subsequently extended by
Bradford (1995) and Auerbach and Bradford (2004), solves the problem using a sort of
realization-based taxation that, in its most basic form, taxes investors as if the value of the asset
at the time of sale was produced by a hypothetical investment at the time of purchase that grew at
the riskless rate of interest.  Two desirable features of this approach are that relative risk-adjusted
asset returns are unaffected, just as under an idealized accrual tax, and lock-in is avoided.  An
apparent shortcoming is that actual tax payments diverge from what one would think should be
due in particular states of the world.  For example, if there is a huge gain, the investor’s tax based
on the imputed riskless return is far less than what would be due under an actual accrual tax, and
if there is a loss, the investor still pays positive tax based on the imputed riskless return. 
However, the central virtues of the tax scheme are unaffected by these apparent anomalies. 
Moreover, when one takes into account individuals’ portfolio adjustments (compare subsection
9.2.2), investors’ actual net positions in each state of the world are the same as they would be
under an ideal accrual tax.  See Kaplow (1994).127For a complementary treatment of some of these issues, see Andrews and Bradford (1988, appendix).
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9.5.  Human capital
Human capital constitutes a substantial majority of all capital.  See, for example, Davies
and Whalley (1991) and Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1989).  Furthermore, the returns to human
capital – wages – are the direct or indirect source of most tax revenue.  Accordingly, the
relationship between human capital and taxation deserves significant study.  Nevertheless, the
subject has received far less attention than has the taxation of physical and financial capital.  To
illuminate the matter, it is useful to compare the tax treatment of human capital under an accrual
income tax, which purports to tax capital income, with standard treatments of physical and
financial capital, following Kaplow (1996c).
127
An accrual income tax, which taxes both labor income and returns to capital, treats
human capital essentially on a realization basis by taxing wages while ignoring changes in the
value of an individual’s stock of human capital.  This is most apparent in an individual’s last year
of work: The year’s wages are taxed, but the individual’s stock of human capital will have fallen
during the year by approximately the full amount of these wages (the present value at the outset
equaling the year’s wages with a slight time value discount) while no offsetting depreciation
deduction is allowed, such as would be the case under pure accrual income taxation.  Under an
idealized accrual system, the receipt of human capital (at birth) would be subject to tax, and each
year’s earnings would be partially offset by depreciation deductions that would be growing over
time.  Further taxation (including negative taxation for falls in human capital) would arise as
uncertainty was resolved, just as with a physical or financial asset that produced a similar (yet
equally uncertain) pattern of future cash flows.
To highlight the difference between accrual taxation of human capital and the realization-
based approach implicit in taxing wages instead, with no adjustments for changes in the value of
human capital, one can ask, just as in subsection 9.4’s discussion of capital gains, what taxation
at realization would serve as a proxy for accrual taxation.  As a crude approximation, by analogy
to Auerbach’s (1991) scheme, any wage earnings would be subject to greater tax the longer the
holding period, i.e., the older the individual earning the wages.  Thus, pure accrual taxation
would be similar to applying to wage earnings a multiplier that grew over individuals’ lifetimes.
Given that actual taxation of human capital is realization based (with no multiplier) and
thus closer to the treatment appropriate under a consumption tax, we can ask what are the
efficiency implications of this attribute.  First, to the extent that consumption taxation is more
efficient by reducing intertemporal distortion (see subsection 5.1), this form of wage taxation
may seem desirable.  The discrepancy with the treatment of other capital suggests that individuals
would prefer to fund future consumption by deferring labor supply to later years rather than by
earning more now and engaging in conventional savings.  Because later years’ wages are not
taxed at a higher rate reflecting the implicit deferral whereas conventional savings are subject to
tax on appreciation under an accrual income tax (and to a lesser extent under existing, standard
income tax systems), there does exist a preference for saving through deferral of labor supply. 128There may be externalities to investment in human capital, and general equilibrium effects also influence
welfare, so such effects of taxation on human capital may still be of social consequence.  See, for example, Hamilton
(1987), Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1999), and Jacobs (2005).
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This secondary distortion of labor supply, in the timing of earnings, serves to partially offset the
distortion of intertemporal consumption choices under an accrual income tax.
Under standard forms of capital taxation, such as in an accrual income tax, investment in
human capital would appear to be favored over investment in other capital because human capital
is only taxed upon realization.  As noted, however, there are no depreciation deductions for
human capital and thus for incremental investments therein.  Some investments in human capital,
notably forgone earnings, are implicitly expensed since the forgone imputed income is never
taxed, which is more favorable than depreciation.  See Boskin (1977) and Heckman (1976). 
However, if such implicit deductions are taken in years in which marginal rates are low (due to
rate graduation), the result could be less generous.  See Nerlove, Razin, Sadka, and von
Weizsäcker (1993).  Many direct investment expenditures, such as on education, are never
deductible (although there are also substantial public subsidies).  Additionally, to the extent that
the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is positive (negative), the reduction (increase) in labor
effort due to labor income taxation will reduce (increase) the value of investments in human
capital.  Further influences on the return to human capital investment may arise on account of
general equilibrium effects on wages of the sort noted in subsection 3.5.2.  The net effect of these
(and other) factors is not entirely clear.  Nevertheless, Trostel (1993) estimates that income taxes
do significantly discourage investment in human capital, the primary channels being a
consequence of the taxation of labor income, implying that a consumption tax would have a
similar effect.  It does not follow, however, that all such effects involve inefficiencies: Taking as
given that individuals, say, will work less on account of labor income taxation, it is efficient for
them to invest less in their human capital to that extent.
128
Human capital is also treated qualitatively differently from other capital under transfer tax
systems.  See Kaplow (2001).  Many countries subject sizeable gifts and estates, usually transfers
to the next generation, to high marginal tax rates.  However, transfers of human capital are
largely exempt.  The primary constituents – genetic endowment, environment (parental
involvement and schooling), opportunities, and contacts (see Taubman (1996)) – are not
ordinarily considered as conceivable components of a transfer tax base.  Direct expenditures,
such as on private education or on more expensive housing that gives access to superior public
schools, are typically exempt as well.  As noted in subsection 5.2, however, the negative
externality of gifts due to the income effect may be reversed in the case of gifts of human capital
(and the standard positive externality to the donee remains), so preferential treatment of transfers
that contribute to human capital may be optimal.  Of course, there may be some inefficient
discrimination against other transfers having similar effects, such as those that relax liquidity
constraints and thereby facilitate entrepreneurship.
9.6.  Lifetime horizon
An important simplification implicit in standard, static optimal income tax analysis is that129For similar reasons, the incidence of many forms of taxation is more nearly proportional (rather than
progressive or regressive) if the basis of comparison is lifetime rather than annual income (or if it is consumption, which
over the lifetime is smoother than income).  See Fullerton and Rogers (1993).  There are also more subtle effects.  For
example, median-lifetime-income individuals have a later earnings peak than high- or low-income individuals and hence
save less when smoothing their consumption.  As a consequence, Fullerton and Rogers find that the lifetime incidence of
taxes on capital tends to be U-shaped, falling more heavily on the rich and the poor than on the middle class.
130The social security system (see subsection 5.3) is age-dependent, but primarily as a means of forced savings. 
It is unclear the extent to which its features, when combined with the annual income tax, are in accord with what would
be optimal.  On lifetime income, income taxation, and social security, see Diamond (2003).
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individuals’ lives, both their labor effort and consumption, are collapsed into a single period. 
However, because individuals’ earnings vary over the lifecycle both systematically and on
account of uncertainty and because individuals borrow and save to allocate (generally, to smooth)
consumption over the lifecycle, much of relevance is omitted as a consequence.  In particular,
with income taxes that are assessed on an annual basis, the mismatch between current and
lifetime distributive effects is significant.  Many of the current “poor” consist of young or old
individuals with low current but high lifetime income or individuals of any age who may be
having a bad year, whereas some of the “rich” may be moderate-lifetime-income individuals
having a good year.  With hump-shaped earnings profiles, even middle-lifetime-income
individuals with a certain wage stream will have below-average incomes when young and when
old and above-average incomes when in their peak earning years.
129  See generally Fullerton and
Rogers (1993).
If individuals engaged in no borrowing and lending (and there were no consumer durables
and no other sources of utility interdependence across periods), the optimal income tax problem
would be largely unaffected: In each period, individuals would have a given wage and the social
welfare optimization could proceed period by period.  If, however, there is significant borrowing
and lending (directly or indirectly), as clearly occurs, the problem changes.  The optimum would
involve age-dependent tax schedules, and the optimization would need to take into account
individuals’ consumption-smoothing behavior, including possible limits to theoretically ideal
smoothing due to liquidity constraints and myopia.
130
Short of a complete analysis, it is widely suggested, following Vickrey (1939), that some
sort of averaging scheme would be appropriate.  Lifetime averaging may seem ideal, and
following Vickrey’s proposal is less complex than it might seem, although changes in family unit
membership over the lifecycle do make the problem significantly more challenging.  See
Liebman (2003) for estimates of the effects of averaging over various periods under the current
United States tax and transfer system.  Liebman also emphasizes the need to relate income
averaging explicitly to social welfare, noting that averaging can produce not only distributive
benefits but also efficiency gains, on account of equalizing marginal tax rates across individuals
and over time.
Two caveats regarding the importance of averaging should be noted.  First, if the
redistributive tax is based on consumption rather than labor income or total income, the potential
mischief caused by focusing on annual information is greatly mitigated on account of
consumption smoothing.  In the simplest case (including a world with complete earnings131There still is an important effect in an income tax that includes both labor and capital income because, as
noted in subsection 9.5, earnings in earlier years of equal present value are disfavored by the tax on the return to savings.
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certainty and perfect annuity markets), individuals would consume evenly over their lifetimes, so
no adjustments would be required.  Second, even under an income tax, variable earnings over the
lifecycle would not have the ordinarily posited effects if the tax schedule were linear.
131  Only
with graduated rates are tax burdens higher as a consequence of uneven earnings.  As explored in
section 3, however, it is not apparent the extent to which highly nonlinear marginal tax rates are
optimal.
9.7.  Budget deficits and intergenerational redistribution
Another common assumption in much analysis of taxation is that budget balance is
required.  In a dynamic setting, this requirement need not be met in any particular accounting
period but must hold in the long run; deficits today must ultimately be financed, even if by
paying interest in perpetuity.  The time pattern of deficits is not, however, a matter of
indifference, even abstracting from macroeconomic effects.
First, Barro (1979) shows that it is advantageous to adjust short-run deficits so as to
maintain constant tax rates (in expectation).  Because the marginal distortionary cost of taxation
rises with marginal tax rates, it is better to raise revenue over time with tax rates that are as
nearly constant as possible rather than with more highly variable tax rates, just as in certain basic
static settings it is best to tax different activities uniformly.  Accordingly, whether a deficit makes
sense today depends on whether expenditures are temporarily high (for example, on account of a
war), on projections for future growth of the tax base, and on other factors bearing on whether
paying off the deficit will require higher tax rates in the future.
Second, different timing of deficits has distributive effects and, in particular, is one
potential source of intergenerational redistribution.  For this reason, Auerbach, Gokhale, and
Kotlikoff (1991) and others have proposed to track such effects using generational accounting,
wherein the aggregate effect of government tax and transfer policy (and, in some work, certain
government expenditures, such as on education) over time is imputed to different generations,
making the assumption that deficits or surpluses of the past and present will ultimately be borne
by future generations.  See Kotlikoff (2002).  Social security (see subsection 5.3), when funded
largely on a pay-as-you-go basis, obviously has important intergenerational effects.  Furthermore,
uncompensated transitions that may involve large capital levies (see subsection 9.3) can likewise
have distributive effects, such as by heavily taxing existing capital, owned disproportionately by
older living generations, which allows reduction of the national debt that otherwise would
ultimately be paid off by younger or future generations.  An important complication, related to
debates about Ricardian equivalence, see Barro (1974), concerns the extent to which private
intergenerational transfers (variations in the level of gifts and bequests) will adjust to offset
changes in public intergenerational transfers.132A further aspect of non-fixed family composition is that individuals spend different parts of their lives in
different types of family units, so optimization over the lifecycle raises additional complications in determining optimal
taxation of different family units.
133Allocations can be influenced by differential commodity taxation (assuming that spouses or children have
different demands) and by providing transfers in-kind.
134Two features are noteworthy.  First, each individual is the unit of analysis in the SWF, rather than referring to
a family utility function (though one could define the latter as the sum of the utilities of the family members).  Second,
this method does not involve defining an equivalence scale and considering, say, how to equalize equivalent income. 
See, for example, Deaton and Muellbauer (1986) and Gronau (1988).  As will become clear, this alternative approach
would not be tantamount to maximizing any standard SWF, except by coincidence.  For criticism of the use of
equivalence scales for welfare analysis, see, for example, Pollak and Wales (1979).
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10.  Unit of Taxation
10.1.  Framework
Treatment under income taxes and transfer programs depends on the type of family unit,
notably, whether there is a married couple or a single adult and whether and how many children
are present.  What treatment is proper has proved quite controversial, with actual practice varying
substantially among programs, across jurisdictions, and over time.  This section considers work
that seeks to relate issues involving the unit of taxation to the explicit welfare-maximizing
approach that serves as the basis for optimal income tax analysis when there is only one type of
taxable unit.
The framework and analysis outlined here and developed in subsections 10.2 to 10.5
follows Kaplow (1996b).  It simplifies the problem by holding labor supply and family
composition fixed (on which see subsection 10.6), thereby focusing on the question of how the
relative treatment of different types of family units affects social welfare on account of
distributive effects.
132  It is helpful to consider a simple model with two family units, a single
individual and a two-member family: For some applications, the two members may be thought of
as two adults, and for others as a representative parent and a representative child.  With labor
supply and thus total income fixed, it is assumed that the sole policy choice is an allocation
between the two units.  Allocations within the two-person family are assumed to be determined
in some internal fashion that the government is unable to observe or control.
133
To complete the description of the model, it is necessary to state the pertinent utility
functions, the mechanism by which sharing within the two-person unit is determined (see, for
example, Becker (1991)), and the SWF.
134  For the latter, analysis will consider the utilitarian
case; the implication of a strictly concave SWF will be apparent below because most results
depend on the concavity of individuals’ utility and a more concave SWF will usually have
implications similar to those of more concave utility functions.
As a benchmark, consider the case in which all individuals – the single individual and
both family members – have the same utility functions, there is equal sharing in the (two-person)
family, there are no economies of scale, and there are no interdependencies in utility functions. 
As with Edgeworth’s (1897) egalitarian result, the optimum here obviously involves giving the
single individual half the consumption as the family because this allocation equalizes everyone’s135See Apps and Rees (1988).  Note also that when family members’ earnings differ from their consumption
allocations, gifts or exchange are implicitly involved.  Hence, the question of taxation of different family units must, in
principle, be related to the question of transfer (gift and estate) taxation, see subsection 5.2, especially in light of the fact
that a substantial portion of all voluntary transfers are to other family members.  This relationship is illustrated in
subsection 10.4 on altruism.
136To illustrate, suppose that for single individuals there is a 20% marginal tax rate on income below $50,000
and a 40% rate above, and that married couples face the same rates with the upper tax bracket beginning at $100,000.  If
one individual earns more than $50,000 and another earns less than $50,000, marriage will reduce their combined tax
payments because part of the former’s income that would have been taxed at 40% will now be taxed at 20%.
137That is, letting C denote total resources, ￿ = (C￿c)/c.
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marginal utility of consumption.  Note that everyone’s total utility is the same as well.
10.2.  Intrafamily sharing
The optimal treatment of different family units may well depend on how sharing operates
within multi-person families.
135  Indeed, in debates about whether married couples should be
taxed as a unit (as in the United States) or as if they were two single individuals (as in many other
countries), it is often suggested that the former treatment is more appropriate to the extent that
sharing is equal.  (A primary reason the difference matters is due to graduated rates, which make
separate treatment less advantageous;
136 note, however, that the analysis in subsection 3.4 hardly
indicates that graduated rates are optimal.)  Such commonly held views, however, consider
neither how the resulting differences in tax burdens will actually be shared nor how the results
relate to maximization of a standard SWF.
Insight into the issue can be gleaned by beginning with the above-described benchmark
case and assuming now that the two-person family shares resources unequally in some stipulated
ratio, with ￿ being member 1’s share and 1￿￿ being member 2’s.  Without loss of generality,
consider the case in which ￿ > ½.  Furthermore, because we are abstracting from labor supply
and considering identical utility functions, we can let u denote each of the individual’s utilities as
a function of post-redistribution consumption.  It is also convenient to let c denote the total
consumption of the two-person family and ￿c that of the single individual.
137  This allows the
simple interpretation that, when ￿ equals (or is greater or less than) ½, the single individual
receives precisely (or more or less than) a pro rata share of total resources.
Social welfare is equal to u(￿c) + u((1￿￿)c) + u(￿c).  Differentiating with respect to c
(keeping in mind that ￿ is implicitly a function of c) yields the following condition for the
utilitarian optimum:
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This first-order condition, as one would expect, sets the sum of the two family members’
marginal utilities from an additional dollar allocated to the two-member family (taking account
of how much of the dollar each member actually will consume) equal to the marginal utility of an
additional dollar allocated to the single individual.  The first term on the left indicates the benefit
from the fraction ￿ of a dollar allocated to the family going to the first member, whose marginal- 66 -
utility reflects the consumption share ￿.  The second term likewise indicates the benefit from
1￿￿ of a dollar going to the second member.  The right side is the single individual’s marginal
utility of a dollar.
It is indeterminate whether ￿ exceeds, equals, or is less than ½.  The first term on the left
side of (10.1) is the effect of allocating additional funds to the family through its effect on the
individual who takes the greater share.  Since that person receives more than a pro rata share
(￿ > ½), this term receives more weight; however, for the same reason, that person’s marginal
utility will be lower, on account of the diminishing marginal utility of consumption, giving the
term less weight.  For the second person, these effects reverse.  Which effect is larger depends on
the curvature of the utility function.  Taking the constant-relative-risk-aversion case, if the
coefficient of risk aversion exceeds (is less than) 1, it can be shown that the allocation should be
more (less) favorable to the family – ￿ should be less (greater) than ½.  The intuition is that,
when the curvature is greater, it matters more that some of the additional resources to the family
are enjoyed by the less advantaged member because that member’s higher marginal utility of
consumption more than counterbalances the fact that a majority of the added resources go to the
more advantaged member.
This result assumes that, whatever is each family member’s share, it is constant rather
than a function of consumption.  If the share of the more-advantaged member rises (falls) with
consumption, treatment of the (two-member) family should be less (more) generous than implied
by expression (10.1).  This is because the marginal dollar more (less) favors the advantaged
member than does the average dollar, and the average dollar – really the total – determines
individuals’ marginal utilities of consumption.  In sum, to determine what treatment is optimal
on account of unequal sharing requires specifying (and justifying) a particular model of how
intrafamily sharing operates.  See, for example, subsection 10.4 and the surveys by Behrman
(1997) and Bergstrom (1997).
10.3.  Economies of scale
Economies of scale are thought to be the main justification for applying a higher tax
schedule to married couples than to (two) single individuals, such as is done in the United States. 
To assess this conventional wisdom, return to the benchmark case (with equal sharing) and
suppose that a dollar of consumption is worth more to the two-member family.  Specifically,
assume that each of the two family members’ utility is given by u(￿(c)/2), where ￿(c) > c.  For
concreteness, consider the linear case: ￿(c) = ￿c, with ￿ > 1.
The first-order condition for welfare maximization is now
( . ) ( / ) ( ). 102 2 b b w ¢ = ¢ u c u c
Again, there are two competing effects.  On the left side, the leading ￿ indicates that the two-
member family gets more per dollar than the single individual, which favors more generosity
toward the family (￿ < ½).  But the argument of u￿ on the left side is ￿c/2 rather than c/2, a
higher value, which reduces the marginal utility of consumption, favoring less generosity- 67 -
(￿ > ½).  (This latter effect corresponds to the conventional wisdom on the subject.)  Which
effect is greater depends again on the curvature of the utility functions, although the results are
opposite to those with unequal sharing.  With constant-relative-risk-aversion utility functions and
a risk-aversion coefficient above (below) 1, the latter (former) effect dominates, making less
(more) generous treatment of the family optimal.  The intuition is that, when curvature is high,
the higher standard of living due to scale economies greatly diminishes the marginal payoff to
additional consumption relative to the multiplier accounting for the family’s greater efficiency of
converting tangible resources into effective consumption.
10.4.  Altruism
One specific case of interest is that in which each family member is altruistic toward the
other.  Specifically, suppose that the utility of each member of the two-person family is given by
ui + ￿iuj.  Then the total utility entering into the SWF from the two-member family will be
(1+￿2)u(￿c) + (1+￿1)u((1￿￿)c).  For preliminary insight into the effect of altruism, assume equal
sharing (￿ = ½).  Then, the first-order condition is
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Clearly, the allocation should be more favorable to the two-member family (￿ < ½) to an extent
that increases with the level of altruism.  Here, the two-member family, like in the case of scale
economies, more efficiently converts tangible resources into utility.  However, given the
stipulated manner of the conversion, there is no offsetting effect from a diminished marginal
utility of consumption.
One suspects that stipulated equal sharing may be inconsistent with altruism, especially
when altruism is asymmetric.  Another simple possibility is that the shares are chosen to
maximize family welfare.  Compare Samuelson (1956).  Making use of the first-order condition
for the family’s optimization problem, one of the equivalent ways to express the first-order
condition for welfare maximization is
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(The parameter ￿1 implicitly enters, symmetrically, through the determination of ￿ in the
family’s first-order condition.)  It can be shown, as one would expect, that greater altruism favors
more generosity to the family.
Another interesting case is that in which only one member (member 1) is altruistic and
that member chooses ￿ to maximize personal welfare, as in Becker (1974).  In this case, the
optimal treatment will depend on the strength of altruism.  For example, if ￿1 = 1, which
corresponds to giving equal weight to the other member’s utility, equal sharing will result and the
outcome of the preliminary case in this subsection, involving more generous treatment to the
family, will govern.  When ￿1 < 1 but is still sufficiently large that some sharing occurs, the- 68 -
result is more complex.  As in subsection 10.2, although few incremental resources may go to the
less advantaged member, the marginal utility from those additional resources will be relatively
high.
10.5.  Children
If children were like adults (in terms of the model, meaning the same utility functions and
so forth), then no additional analysis would be required.  In the benchmark case of subsection
10.1, families’ allotments would optimally involve each member getting the same resources as a
single individual.  Such treatment is substantially more generous than that provided by tax
systems, which usually make relatively modest adjustments for children, especially for
individuals above fairly moderate levels of income.  (Indeed, in the United States, some
adjustments are phased out at higher levels of income.)  Existing treatment would be optimal if,
for some reason, the welfare of children simply did not count as constituents of social welfare, a
rather implausible view.
Suppose that children differ because they require fewer resources to achieve a given level
of utility.  Specifically, assume that member 2’s utility is given by u((1￿￿)c/￿), where ￿ < 1. 
Member 1, taken as a representative adult, continues to have the same utility function and thus to
achieve the same level of utility for a given level of consumption as does the single individual. 
First, consider the case in which the family’s sharing equalizes the utility levels of the two family
members.  This requirement implies that ￿ = 1/(1+￿).  The first-order condition for welfare
maximization is










Because ￿ < 1, the leading component on the left side of expression (10.5) exceeds 1.  Thus, it
must be that 1/(1+￿) > ￿.  Furthermore, because ￿ = 1/(1+￿), we have ￿ > ￿.  This means that
the optimal allocation is more generous to families than one that would equalize the total utility
of each person – or, equivalently in this case, equalize the utility of member 1 and that of the
single individual, each of whom has the same utility function.  This result is due to the fact that
member 2 is a more efficient generator of utility, and the only way to channel additional
resources to member 2 (given the stipulated intrafamily sharing rule) is to benefit member 1 as
well.  (Again, the curvature of the utility function will also affect the optimum: The greater the
curvature, the less is the efficiency effect relative to the diminishing marginal utility effect, so the
less is the aforementioned preference for the family.)
Second, consider the case in which the family’s allocation maximizes the sum of their
utilities rather than equalizing the levels of their utilities.  This allocation would be relatively
more advantageous to member 2, the more efficient utility generator, and the share would be set
at the level where the efficiency effect just equalled the diminishing marginal utility effect.  The
result is that the socially optimal allocation entails ￿ = ￿, an allocation under which member 1
has the same resources and utility as the single individual.  (The family equates the marginal138Another complication is that all government policy, including for example free public education, must be
taken into account in determining the extent of generosity in an existing system.
139Cremer, Dellis, and Pestieau (2003) examine a model with exogenous differences in family size and find that
marginal rates should be lower (or, for the highest type in a nonlinear scheme, the same) for families with more children. 
An explanation for this result can be found in the analysis of subsection 10.5, assuming that the absolute amount of
adjustments required to equalize effective marginal utilities across family types is rising with income, as seems plausible.
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utility of resources between the two members, and the social authority equates the marginal
utility of the family, which equals the marginal utility of either member – and we can take
member 1 – to the marginal utility of the single individual.  Since member 1 and the single
individual have the same utility function, they receive the same allocation.)  As in the prior case,
however, the family’s allocation is sufficient to allow member 2 to achieve a higher utility than
that of the single individual (so average utility in the two-member family remains higher).
It would seem that optimal allocations to families with children are more generous than is
typically provided.  Whether and to what extent this is true would depend on the actual form of
the utility function.  For example, if children are such efficient utility generators that they achieve
high utilities with virtually no resources and are subject to rapidly diminishing marginal utility at
that point, little adjustment for family size may be required.
138
Furthermore, the above results suggest that family size adjustments should not be limited
to lower-income families.  It is often thought that extending or expanding adjustments to higher-
income individuals (perhaps making them proportional to income) would be highly regressive. 
Such reasoning, however, is misleading in two respects.  First, it ignores that the overall tax
schedule can be adjusted simultaneously to avoid such an effect; thus, the relevant questions is,
as between families of a given level of income, what should be their relative tax payments (or
transfer receipts) as a function of the number of children.  Second, any characterization of this
sort presumes that one has already determined who is rich and poor and to what extent, but in
setting adjustments for different family units, the point of the enterprise can be understood
(loosely) as an implicit process of defining how rich or poor various family units are in the first
instance.
10.6.  Incentives
The foregoing analysis of optimal taxation of different family units takes labor supply and
family composition as given.  However, there are likely to be interactions between how different
family units are taxed and each of these incentive margins.
First, consider work incentives.  One way to view the optimal income tax problem when
there are different family units (taken to be exogenous for the moment) makes use of the analysis
in subsection 3.5.1 in which a different T(wl) schedule is applied to each group (￿ would now
index family composition).  The analysis in the preceding subsections can be understood as
bearing on the form of individuals’ utility functions for each group.  In other respects, analysis
would proceed as before.
139
One issue that has received special attention is the treatment of second earners, typically140For a survey of evidence on the effects of welfare on family structure, see Moffitt (1992).
141Regarding the effect of welfare on fertility, see Schultz (1994).  Whittington, Alm, and Peters (1990) offer
evidence that income tax exemptions affect the birth rate.
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women in two-parent families (often with children), who some suggest to have a higher elasticity
of labor supply than primary earners or single individuals.  It is argued that, accordingly, they
should face lower marginal tax rates.  See, for example, Boskin and Sheshinski (1983), Feldstein
and Feenberg (1996), and Rosen (1976), and also Schroyen (2003) who considers intrahousehold
behavior.
Second, incentives to marry are arguably affected by the tax system.  In the United States,
for example, married couples face a higher overall schedule than would be faced by two single
individuals each earning half the income, which creates a marriage penalty.  On the other hand, if
two individuals with highly unequal income marry, they face lower taxes on account of rate
graduation, and this effect may exceed the first, creating marriage subsidies.  Other provisions,
especially those in transfer programs, can create relatively significant tax differentials as a
consequence of the decision to marry.
140  See, for example, Alm and Whittington (1996) on the
extent of marriage taxes and subsidies in the United States.  Interestingly, the penalty effect is
caused by a higher schedule often motivated by a desire to account for economies of scale in a
manner that the analysis of subsection 10.3 indicates may not be optimal, and the subsidy effect
is due to rate graduation that the analysis in subsection 3.4 indicates may not be optimal.
A common view is that the tax system should be marriage neutral to avoid distortion of
the marriage decision.  However, there may be positive externalities to marriage, especially when
children are involved, in which case a subsidy may be optimal.  It is often feared that eliminating
marriage penalties or increasing subsidies, such as by making the schedules for married couples
more generous, would be expensive and regressive (since the highest absolute penalties are borne
by higher-income individuals), but just as in the case of adjustments for family size (see
subsection 10.5), this view is misleading: It is possible to adjust the level of other schedules
(here, raising that on single individuals) and the shape of all schedules (preserving the average
amount paid at any level of income), and, regarding regressivity, one cannot define distributive
goals meaningfully without first specifying the relative positions of various family units.
Third, the treatment of children in tax and transfer programs may influence procreation
decisions, a possibility that is usually raised with respect to transfer programs.
141  Nearly all
systems (except in countries that specially penalize or forbid additional births) make the net
treatment at least somewhat more generous as the number of children increases, and the analysis
in subsection 10.5 suggests the possibility that significant adjustments may be optimal.  Whether
any effect of such treatment on child-bearing is desirable depends on the net external effects of
having children.  This problem is particularly vexing when one of the externalities (under at least
some views) pertains to the births per se, i.e., the positive externality to the child thus created. 
See, for example, Mirrlees (1972b) and Nerlove, Razin, and Sadka (1986).142See, for example, Guyton, O’Hare, Stavrianos, and Toder (2003), Internal Revenue Service (1996, 2005), and
Slemrod (1996b).
143See, for example, Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998), Cowell (1990), Roth, Scholz, and Witte (1989), and
Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002).
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11.  Tax Administration and Enforcement
Much analysis of taxation, as reflected in the foregoing sections, abstracts from concerns
about administration and enforcement, implicitly assuming that tax liability is ascertained
accurately and collected costlessly, without any resistance by taxpayers.  This view, of course, is
unrealistic.  For example, in the United States, public and private collection costs for the income
tax are approximately 10% of revenues, and it is estimated that over 15% of tax liability is
unpaid.
142
As outlined by Stiglitz (1985a), tax avoidance – generally understood as constituting
reduction in tax obligations through manipulations permitted by law – comes in a number of
basic forms: deferral (moving a nominal tax liability to a later date, thereby capturing the interest
in the interim), tax arbitrage between individuals or entities with different marginal tax rates
(including the case of the same taxpayer, facing different rates in different periods), and arbitrage
across earnings flows facing different tax treatment (for example, dividends versus interest for
firms, ordinary income versus capital gains for individuals).  If unconstrained by capital market
imperfections or legal limits (such as on the ability to deduct capital losses), Stiglitz suggests that
individuals could eliminate their tax liability altogether without changing their underlying real
behavior.  Gordon and Slemrod (1988) calculated that the United States tax system in 1983
collected, roughly, no revenue from the taxation of capital income.  As a result of subsequent
events, Gordon, Kalambokidis, and Slemrod (2004) find that substantial revenue was raised from
the taxation of capital in 1995, but Gordon, Kalambokidis, Rohaly, and Slemrod’s (2004) update
to account for 2003 legislation concludes that, closer to the previous situation, little such revenue
is collected as of 2004.
Tax evasion – illegal nonpayment – is also significant, as reflected in the aforementioned
estimate of unpaid income tax liability.  Although nearly 100% voluntary compliance is achieved
on wages and salaries (which are subject to information reporting requirements), voluntary
reporting is barely over 40% for self-employment income, due in large part to the difficulty of
identifying evasion in the cash sector.  It is suspected that evasion in many countries, especially
developing economies, is much worse than in the United States, in significant part because so
much more economic activity is in the latter category.  It is worth noting that, on average, evasion
tends to be worse as a percentage of income at the bottom of the income distribution whereas
avoidance tends to be more significant at the upper end, in both cases on account of differential
opportunities for tax reduction.  (There is some important overlap; notably, the self-employed
tend to avoid and evade more than average.)
The substantial literatures that measure avoidance and evasion, examine the effects of
different policies on the extent of revenue loss, and analyze what policies are optimal in light of
these problems are largely beyond the scope of this chapter but are surveyed elsewhere.
143  This144Similar assumptions are invoked concerning key elements of the tax base, such as whether nonpecuniary
income (e.g., imputed rent from owner-occupied housing) may be taxed (see subsection 12.1.1) or whether capital gains
can only be taxed on a realization basis (see subsection 9.4).
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section will focus on conceptual and normative issues that pertain most directly to the topics
addressed in previous sections.
11.1.  Choice of tax systems
Most analyses simply assume that some tax instruments are available and others are not
(just commodity taxes, commodity taxes and income taxes, only linear income taxes, no ability
taxes).
144  However, as emphasized by Mirrlees (1971), Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), and
Slemrod (1990), among others, it is important that the presumed set of available instruments be
motivated by administrative and enforcement concerns that indicate what actually is feasible. 
Ideally, these concerns would not be stipulated but rather would be made endogenous, which is
the point of much of the literature examined in subsection 11.2.  Often, feasibility is a matter of
degree, and one must choose among various imperfect systems, the quality of each being
determined by policy choices regarding administration and enforcement and also by how the
instrument is used (e.g., the extent of evasion may depend on rates and on what other taxes are in
place).
It is useful to consider a few examples of how administrative considerations may affect
the choice among tax systems.  As noted in subsection 3.5.1, Stern (1982) compared an imperfect
ability tax (combined with a linear income tax) to a perfect (that is, error-free) nonlinear income
tax.  More broadly, the analysis in that section considered, for any signals that may correlate with
ability, how one might optimally design a nonlinear income tax system that could be made a
function of the signal.  Further analysis would make endogenous both the government’s
categorization (how accurately to observe the signal, how to set burdens of proof) and private
efforts to manipulate such signals.
In comparing a linear and a nonlinear income tax (subsections 3.2 and 3.4), it is obvious
that the latter dominates the former in a world without administration costs and avoidance
activity.  However, when all income is taxed at the same rate, substitute taxation – notably,
collection at the source – becomes feasible and may have compliance advantages.  Furthermore,
incentives to engage in transactions to shift income between taxpayers subject to different
marginal rates are eliminated.  Hence, if the welfare gain from nonlinear taxation is modest,
linear income taxation may be preferable.
As a further illustration, consider the choice between income taxation and broad
commodity taxes, like sales taxes or a VAT.  Setting aside cases in which differential commodity
taxation would be optimal, it would seem that commodity taxes are redundant and, if they have
any additional administrative cost, undesirable.  However, some propose that such taxes may be
useful if there is significant income tax evasion in some sectors.  Due to its method of collection,
many believe that a VAT is overall harder to evade, so shifting significant collections away from
the income tax may be advantageous.  Moreover, even if commodity taxes are subject to145Kesselman does find some benefit to shifting toward commodity taxation when evasion of the latter (unlike
evasion of the income tax) is incomplete, but he argues that for plausible parameter values this benefit is small. 
Boadway, Marchand, and Pestieau (1994) find supplementation with commodity taxation to be desirable in a model in
which it, unlike income taxation, is not subject to evasion.
146See Gordon and Li (2005).
147Although private compliance and avoidance activity is considered here, no attention will be given to the
possibility that it may be optimal to regulate such activity directly, for example, by taxing professional tax advice because
its use may be socially excessive.  See Kaplow (1998).
148Compare Shavell (1991) on theft.
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significant evasion (perhaps in the same areas as income taxation, such as those involving
informal activity conducted largely in cash), it has been further suggested that a combination of
the two systems may be optimal.  The intuition is that individuals who evade the income tax
would still pay taxes on their consumption (in most sectors).  Yet as Kesselman (1993) shows,
when general equilibrium effects on prices and wages are taken into account, this idea is
incorrect in the case in which commodity taxes are fully evaded in the same sectors as those in
which the income tax is evaded – an approximately plausible scenario since commodity tax
evasion typically will be both possible in such cases and also necessary to avoid detection of the
income tax evasion.  The reason is that the ultimate incidence is the same regardless of whether a
tax is levied on a producer’s inputs (in particular, labor) or sales.
145
These few examples and the limited research to date suggest that greater attention to the
choice among tax systems is warranted.  Whether or not to have a 20% VAT, relying far less on
income taxes, is probably a more important decision than how to set commodity tax differentials
in subtle ways in light of the qualifications to the uniformity result noted in subsection 4.3.  Such
system choices are likely to be particularly important for developing countries, where fewer
options are feasible and the available instruments are changing over time (and in ways that are
influenced by other government policies).
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11.2.  Optimal administration and enforcement
The determination of optimal administration and enforcement of a given tax system is
itself complex.  First, there are many dimensions, ranging from the design of tax rules to the
intensity of audits, extent of information reporting requirements, accuracy of adjudication of
disputes, setting of penalties, and allocation of resources across types of taxes and taxpayers. 
Second, problems of avoidance and evasion and the responses thereto have important feedback
effects, notably, on what tax rates are optimal (should the optimal rate on a commodity subject to
evasion be higher or lower?) and on the initial choice of which forms of taxation to employ.
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The problem is also challenging because of the subtlety of the harm due to avoidance and
evasion, which involves a transfer to taxpayers (or, one might say, a lack of a transfer to the
government) rather than a destruction of resources.
148  To see this, suppose that there exists only
a tax on a single commodity and that taxpayers are costlessly able to avoid taxation on half of
their purchases.  Here, it would not make sense to expend governmental resources to reduce
avoidance, for instead the government could simply double the tax rate.  Though this example is
artificial, it illustrates that the costs of nonpayment are less obvious than they may first appear. 149Earlier work on evasion and avoidance was largely positive.  Allingham and Sandmo (1972) considered a
setting like that in Becker’s (1968) model of law enforcement; the taxpayer’s only decision was the choice of how much
to underreport income, and this choice depended on risk preferences.  Optimal enforcement thus addressed risk-bearing
concerns, as in Polinsky and Shavell (1979).  Extensions to Allingham and Sandmo include Yitzhaki (1974, 1987).  On
models of law enforcement, see generally Polinsky and Shavell (2006).
150Compare Kaplow’s (1989) analysis of horizontal inequity.
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To further complicate matters, consider the fact that, while raising rates tends to increase
distortion, so does increased enforcement since, if it works, it raises effective rates, which are the
source of distortion.  In addition, increasing enforcement entails direct resource costs.
To appreciate the benefits of enforcement and to determine optimal policy, it is necessary
to return explicitly to the SWF; indeed, the problem of administration was one of the motivations
offered in subsection 2.3 for making direct use of the SWF.  The central idea is that, whatever are
the criteria used to determine whether one or another tax system or level of tax rates is optimal in
the first instance, the same criteria should be employed to assess deviations and efforts to correct
them.
This approach has been followed increasingly in recent work, including Kaplow (1990,
1998), Mayshar (1991), Slemrod (2001), and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987, 1996).  The models
employed vary in abstraction (whether they consider generally instruments available to the
government or particular means of enforcement) and in the private behavior addressed.  For
example, Kaplow (1990) considers optimal government expenditure on enforcement that
increases the fraction of taxpayers observed by the taxing authority and how the optimum
depends on private evasion reactions; Mayshar (1991) examines a tax authority that chooses a
range of policy instruments where taxpayers choose the amount of labor effort to devote to
sheltering; and Slemrod (2001) models private avoidance when increasing labor income
increases avoidance opportunity.  In this literature, social costs and benefits depend on how
avoidance, evasion, and enforcement affect the equitable allocation of tax burdens across
individuals, the extent of distortion caused by taxes, the amount of resources devoted to private
compliance and tax reduction activity, government expenditures on administration, and risk-
bearing.
149  It is useful to elaborate on some of these effects.
Tax equity is implicated because the achievable level of social welfare depends on
whether individuals pay the correct amount of tax.  After all, were this not a concern, society
could rely on uniform lump-sum taxes and not have to worry about distortion.  In reality,
imperfections in defining the tax base and in administering the law combined with taxpayers’
efforts to minimize tax obligations result in a system where mismeasurement often occurs.  The
welfare effect can be determined directly from the SWF.  Standard first-order conditions – see
expressions (3.8) for the linear income tax and (3.9) for the nonlinear income tax – have a W￿uc
term, indicating the marginal social value of a dollar to each taxpayer (the marginal utility to the
taxpayer times the marginal social welfare weight).  Holding constant the revenue to be raised
from a particular group of taxpayers, greater error is associated with a greater dispersion in
treatment.
150  Because uc is strictly concave and, if the SWF is not utilitarian, W￿ is as well,
mismeasurement, however produced, tends to be welfare-reducing.  As developed in Kaplow
(1998), the welfare cost is roughly given by a risk premium (determined, in the utilitarian case,- 75 -
by taxpayers’ risk preferences, reflected by the curvature of their utility functions).  One
implication is that, for a given absolute error, mismeasurement is more costly to social welfare
when it affects lower-income taxpayers on account of decreasing absolute risk aversion (and to a
greater extent the more concave are their utility functions and the SWF).
A further point about potential inequity also bears on distortion.  Specifically, as Bittker
(1979) and Bradford (1980, 1986) argue, inequities often turn into inefficiencies.  For example, if
flight attendants are tax exempt on the value of free air travel or if sellers in the underground
economy are effectively exempt from tax (see Kesselman (1989)), equilibrium wages and prices
will adjust so that, for the marginal taxpayer, there is no gain, the benefit being passed on to
consumers (or others).  Accordingly, many imperfections in the tax system involve little inequity
but do cause inefficiency.  The same point holds regarding so-called tax shelters.  For example,
low-income housing tax shelters or tax-advantaged shopping center or office building
developments are likely to result in greater investment and lower rents in the targeted areas of
activity rather than windfalls to those who invest in the shelters.
As the foregoing point suggests, much avoidance and evasion can be analyzed by analogy
to changes in marginal tax rates, such as for particular commodities.  This approach is followed
in Kaplow (1990, 1998).  In some instances, one might be able to offset the distortion by
changing explicit rates.  But if the sector is underground or if evasion is selective, this will not be
feasible.  Instead, resources may need to be spent to reduce noncompliance, such as by expanding
information-reporting, increasing auditing, and so forth.  To the extent that such enforcement
succeeds, effective tax rates will be driven higher.  As noted previously, however, this may
appear to increase distortion.  There are two main reasons why such efforts may nevertheless be
efficient.  First, in some instances distortion may fall directly.  For example, if most activity is
taxed, exempting only some activity increases distortion through inefficient substitution. 
Second, one must make appropriate comparisons.  Consider the prior hypothetical examples, in
which the choice was between raising nominal rates or increasing enforcement.  If, more
realistically, some pay the full nominal rate and others pay less, then raising enforcement tends to
be less distortionary.  The reason relates to the familiar point that marginal distortion rises with
the effective tax rate.  Accordingly, subjecting some individuals to high effective tax rates and
others to low (or zero) effective tax rates, as occurs when there is selective evasion, results in
greater distortion than when everyone is subject to an intermediate tax rate, with which there is
perfect compliance.
The analysis of the potential equity and efficiency effects of evasion indicates how the
social costs can, in principle, properly be measured.  Then it is possible to assess whether
increased expenditures on one or another enforcement instrument are optimal.  However, the
analysis is further complicated by the fact that, in addition to the government’s expenditures,
private costs must also be considered.  Note that, in general, it is possible for these costs – which
unlike nonpayment of taxes are real resource costs – to fall or rise as enforcement increases.  On
one hand, some individuals may be induced to reduce avoidance and evasion activities because
they are rendered unprofitable.  On the other hand, some individuals may spend more, in order to
continue to keep their income out of the government’s hands.151There are qualifications, such as when taxpayers increase charitable contributions or invest in low-income
housing tax shelters, activities that may be preferred because of the positive externalities that they produce.
152See, for example, Auten and Carroll (1994, 1999), Feldstein (1995), Giertz (2004), Goolsbee (2000), Gruber
and Saez (2002), Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000), and Slemrod (1996a).
153See also Wilson (1989) and Yitzhaki (1979) who consider the optimal base of a commodity tax where base
broadening reduces distortion but adding more commodities to the base is costly, and Weisbach (2000) who considers, by
analogy to the commodity tax base problem, where to draw lines between taxable and exempt activities or transactions,
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Finally, it is useful to revisit briefly the question of how these issues bear on the setting of
tax rates and the choice of tax systems.  Regarding the former, the results are ambiguous.  Higher
nominal rates – such as in the extreme, initial example when evasion could be costlessly offset –
may be optimal.  However, if some individuals face the full nominal rate and others face, say, a
zero rate, and little can be done to combat this, then lower rates may be optimal than otherwise
(or a zero rate, when there are fixed costs and little tax can be collected), with greater reliance on
taxes that have a more uniform effect on different taxpayers.  Regarding tax systems, obviously
those that are very costly to administer and highly imperfect even after enforcement is optimized
are less attractive.  Of course, all tax systems suffer in varying degrees, so the question is a
comparative one.
11.3.  Elasticity of taxable income
Important recent work motivated by problems of administration and enforcement
examines what has come to be referred to as the elasticity of taxable income.  The first-order
conditions for the optimal tax problem – such as expressions (3.8) and (3.9) – depend on the
elasticity of labor supply.  It has been emphasized, however, that taxpayers respond to income
taxes in many ways: reducing labor supply, shifting compensation to tax-preferred fringe
benefits, making use of tax shelters, and evading outright.  Furthermore, these responses all have
a qualitatively similar effect on distortion.  See, for example, Feldstein (1999) and Slemrod
(1998).
151  One implication of this literature has been an upward revision in assessments of the
distortionary cost of labor income taxation because estimates of the elasticity of taxable income
are greater than estimates of the elasticity of labor supply.
152  Interestingly, one reason labor
supply responses to tax reforms may be low is that taxpayers are able to respond on these other
margins.
Another implication of the literature is to reinforce the importance of examining the
choice of tax systems, tax rates, and tax enforcement parameters as part of a unified optimization. 
As Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) argue, the pertinent elasticity, of taxable income, unlike the
elasticity of labor supply, is in significant part determined by policy rather than a manifestation of
individuals’ exogenous preferences.  For example, greater problems of avoidance and evasion –
implying a higher elasticity of taxable income – may favor lower tax rates.  But it is also true that
higher optimal tax rates warrant greater expenditures to reduce avoidance and evasion.  Slemrod
and Kopczuk examine a model in which administrative cost considerations are the impediment to
a comprehensive income tax base, and they find that a social desire for a more redistributive tax
should be accompanied by greater administrative expenditures to broaden the base; conversely,
the more costly it is to expand the base, the less redistribution is optimal.  Kopczuk (2005)
analyzes the base broadening of the 1986 Tax Reform Act in this light.
153recognizing that expanding the base may or may not be efficient depending on whether the newly included activity is a
closer substitute for taxed or tax-exempt activities.
154This latter characterization is potentially misleading because one might mistakenly assume that only labor
used in direct household production (meal preparation, cleaning, home repair, child care) is relevant whereas
mismeasurement and distortion are involved on account of the omission of any non-market time from the tax base.
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12.  Additional Features of Tax Systems
Numerous particular features of tax systems have been studied in varying degrees of
depth – far too many to mention much less summarize in a single, conceptual survey on taxation. 
Some elements, however, are particularly significant and have a close relationship to themes
pursued in previous sections (especially section 11 on administration and enforcement), so they
will be examined briefly here.
12.1.  Tax base
12.1.1.  Exclusion of nonpecuniary income
Idealized income and consumption tax systems envision a comprehensive base because it
is thought to provide a better measure for purposes of distributive equity and because omissions
generally are distortionary.  There are, however, certain systematic exclusions that are often
justified on account of the infeasibility – or significant administrative difficulty – of
measurement.  One of the most important sets of exclusions involves nonpecuniary sources of
income.
The most fundamental such exclusion is the value of leisure, sometimes referred to as
imputed income due to household services.
154  Indeed, the central distortion caused by income
taxation (and consumption taxation, where the pertinent exclusion pertains to the value of
nonmarket time) – the labor-leisure distortion – is directly attributable to this exclusion.  See
subsection 3.5.1 on ability taxation.
Another important exclusion, related to the topic of the next subsection, involves
nonpecuniary features of market employment.  These include both positive features – air-
conditioning or artwork – and negative attributes – unpleasantness and danger associated, for
example, with mining, harvesting, and work on assembly lines.  Standard labor market theory
suggests that nonpecuniary features of employment will, in equilibrium, be offset by
compensating wage differentials.  See Rosen (1986).  However, the compensating differentials
are subject to taxation – higher wages are taxed and wage reductions are implicitly excluded
because never earned – whereas the offsetting amenities for which they compensate are not
recognized by the tax system.  Hence, omitting nonpecuniary job characteristics when measuring
labor income or consumption distorts workplace attributes and the allocation of labor across jobs.
An additional significant exclusion, one particularly relevant to an income tax (that
reaches capital as well as labor income), is of the imputed rent from consumer durables, most155Observe that this exclusion is not directly attributable to the home mortgage interest deduction.  Under an
ideal income tax, all interest payments are in principle deductible.  (They are negative interest receipts, which are
taxable.)  The benefit of untaxed imputed rent is fully available to an owner-occupier who has no debt.  The primary
relevance of the mortgage interest deduction is to make the benefit available to individuals with insufficient net worth to
own outright.
156See generally Bernheim (2002) on taxation and saving.
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importantly, housing.  Rental services, a form of consumption, are not deductible.  But if one
owns durables rather than renting them, there is no tax on the imputed rent.  Put another way, the
return to capital is, in principle, subject to tax, but if the return is in the form of services to
oneself, for which no explicit rent is paid, the return is effectively exempt.
155  Because housing
alone is such a large fraction of the capital stock, this exclusion is hardly innocuous.
12.1.2.  Business versus personal expenditures
Related to the preceding subsection’s discussion of nonpecuniary features of
employment, there is a more general problem of distinguishing business (or, more broadly,
income-producing) and personal expenditures.  Pure costs of doing business (a sole proprietor’s
cost of goods sold, rent, utility bills, and so forth) must be deducted or otherwise excluded in
properly measuring net income, whereas items of consumption, which may be heavily present in
many fringe benefits, need to be kept within the tax base of an income or consumption tax.
Some measurement problems concern pure subterfuge, such as when an individual
attempts to deduct a large fraction of housing costs as a “home office” though little work is
performed in the home or when employers pay for what are tantamount to employee vacations. 
Others involve myriad situations of genuinely mixed use: Free meals for restaurant employees
helps monitor quality and makes servers more informative to customers, entertainment may
improve comradery or client relationships, and improved working conditions may simultaneously
raise productivity and utility.  One problem is distinguishing the former and latter cases.  A
second is determining optimal treatment in cases in which consumption and production are
intermingled, on which see Katz and Mankiw (1985).  Observe that, in either situation, to the
extent that there are utility benefits to workers, we would expect wages to adjust, so ultimately
the problem is one of distortion, here involving forms of expenditure at the workplace and the
choice of occupations.
12.1.3.  Retirement savings
156
Under an accrual income tax (in contrast to a labor income tax or a consumption tax), the
return to savings is included in the tax base.  See subsection 5.1.1.  A common feature of income
tax systems, such as in the United States, is to provide tax preferences for retirement savings
though employers (pension plans) and individual retirement accounts of various sorts.  Such
schemes typically provide consumption tax treatment by allowing an exclusion or deduction from
current income for contributions, permitting tax-free build-up, and subjecting withdrawals to tax.
Retirement savings provisions are variously rationalized on the ground that they move in
the direction of a consumption tax, deemed to be preferable; that they increase national savings157Much of the leading commentary on the tax expenditure concept is by legal academics.  See, for example,
Bittker (1969), Griffith (1989), Shaviro (2004), Surrey and McDaniel (1985), and Weisbach and Nussim (2004).
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(which depends on the empirical question of whether the income or substitution effect
dominates), believed by some to be desirable; or that they offset individuals’ tendency to provide
inadequately for their retirement (see subsection 5.3 on social security).  The actual
implementation of such schemes – particularly employer pension plans, which are heavily
regulated – is complex.  Furthermore, it is uncertain the extent to which the latter objectives are
achieved.  Notably, much of what is contributed to retirement savings plans may not be
additional savings but shifts of funds that would have been saved in any event, and, regarding
paternalism, myopic individuals may well be those least likely to respond to savings incentives.
12.1.4.  Tax expenditures
Departures from a tax base that involve exclusions, deductions, or other preferences are
sometimes generically referred to as tax expenditures, a view championed by Surrey (1973).  The
notion is that granting special tax treatment – e.g., for expenditures on energy conservation – is
tantamount to a direct budget outlay for the activity.  Surrey further proposed that an annual tax
expenditure budget be compiled (as it now is), to provide accountability for such expenditures
that, as a whole, constitute a sizeable fraction of government spending.  Additionally, he
generally opposed tax expenditures’ existence on grounds of accountability and their “upside-
down” effect, being worth more to taxpayers in higher brackets.
Although there clearly is some virtue to this viewpoint, there are some difficulties as
well.
157  One concerns what constitutes a tax expenditure, the argument often going to the merits
of the choice of tax base.  For example, favorable treatment of retirement savings is a tax
expenditure under an income tax, but not under a consumption tax, where subjecting ordinary
savings to tax is seen as tax penalized.  Concerns about regressivity can, in principle, be met by
tax rate adjustments, as exemplified in the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the United States, where the
repeal of many tax expenditures was accompanied by a purportedly distribution-neutral
adjustment of tax rates.  Whether it is efficient to deliver subsidies through the tax system or
otherwise and other arguments going to the desirability of various tax expenditures depends on
analysis of pertinent specifics.  Nevertheless, the basic point that there is no clear distinction
between spending and selective tax reduction is important both for tax policy and a broader range
of fiscal matters.
12.2.  Forms of consumption taxation
The discussion of commodity taxation in section 4 and the comparison of income and
consumption taxation in subsection 5.1.1 provide some insight into the nature of consumption
taxation.  It is useful, however, to explore variations in the form of consumption taxation, some
of which are equivalent to others in principle but may differ with regard to administrability and
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12.2.1.  Cash-flow consumption taxation
If a uniform tax on all forms of consumption is desired – and possibility at different
marginal rates depending on individuals’ aggregate consumption – it is not necessary to measure
each individual’s expenditures on each and every commodity.  Instead, one may employ cash-
flow taxation, as developed by Andrews (1974).  Because total consumption in an accounting
period equals income minus net savings (i.e., minus deposits and plus withdrawals), a
consumption tax base may be defined just as an income tax base (that includes labor and capital
income), making an adjustment for net savings.
Indeed, implementing such a consumption tax is likely to be significantly easier than
defining the income tax base, even though the former on its face requires an additional set of
adjustments.  The central reason is that many of the most difficult measurement problems in
defining income involve capital income – especially accruals, such as with capital gains and
depreciation (see subsection 9.4).  But the consumption tax’s adjustment for net savings makes
many of these problems moot.  For example, when an individual purchases an asset, a deduction
would be allowed.  Any intervening changes in value can be ignored under a consumption tax; all
that is necessary is to include the proceeds upon ultimate disposition.  Even that final step is
unnecessary if there is reinvestment.  Thus, for assets held in an account (say, a brokerage
account or a closely-held firm), one need only track flows in and out; all changes in value within
the account are irrelevant.  For this reason, Andrews (1974), Bradford (1986), and others find a
consumption tax superior to an income tax on administrative grounds.  For further aspects of the
comparison, see subsection 5.1.2.
As noted in subsections 4.2 and 5.1.1, a uniform consumption tax is equivalent to a labor
income tax (in a basic setting with linear taxes), so another way to implement a consumption tax
is to tax all labor income while exempting capital income.  (Following the analysis of subsection
9.2.2, these systems are also equivalent in a world with uncertainty, taking into account
individuals’ portfolio adjustments.)  In some respects, a labor income tax seems particularly easy
to administer, for only wages need be taxed.  However, disentangling income from wages and
from capital is sometimes difficult, notably for the self-employed, whereas consumption taxation,
which only needs to track the outflow of funds to the owner, may be easier to implement.  Hybrid
schemes have also been proposed, both regarding sources of labor income and the treatment of
other issues, such as purchases of consumer durables.  See Bradford and U.S. Department of
Treasury (1984).
12.2.2.  VAT and sales taxation
The other main forms of consumption taxation – which generally must be linear, unlike a
cash-flow consumption tax – are value-added taxes (VATs) and sales taxes.  These can be
imposed uniformly, or subject to rate variations and exemptions (such as preferences for
expenditures on food), thereby implementing the full range of commodity tax schemes analyzed
in section 4.
A VAT is applied to the value added at each stage of production.  By contrast, a sales tax158See generally Bradford (1996a).  Employing a sales tax can be administratively problematic when some goods
are intermediate for some purchases and final for others.  Additionally, some sales tax schemes are not legally defined in
terms of the underlying principle of ultimate sales to consumers but instead purport to cover a broad range of sales
subject to numerous specific exemptions covering most intermediate uses; however, this latter approach sometimes
results in multiple taxation (referred to as “cascading”) when there are gaps in the exemptions.
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applies only to final sales to ultimate consumers.  In either case, the same amount, in principle, is
subject to tax, and the equilibrium incidence is the same.
158  The main differences are
administrative.
A sales tax requires policing only the final stage, but this stage is often difficult to
monitor where there are large numbers of small retailers.  A VAT covers all stages, but
production and wholesale distribution are often more concentrated, making enforcement easier
for much of the tax base.  Additionally, certain forms of the VAT have a self-enforcing feature:
Under the credit-invoice method, a seller at any stage pays tax on gross receipts and, in order to
receive an offset for taxes previously paid by others on purchased inputs, the seller must produce
invoices that confirm payment of tax at the prior stages.
13.  Tax Equity
Sections 3 through 12 consider how to employ various tax instruments to maximize a
standard SWF.  This section considers issues bearing on whether social welfare, conventionally
understood, should be the sole social objective and on the form of the SWF.
13.1.  Welfarism
Welfarism is the principle that social decisions should be based exclusively on how they
affect individuals’ utilities (welfare or well-being).  Put another way, data on the levels of utility
achieved by each individual under a policy are deemed to be sufficient information to ground
social choice.  It is common in optimal income tax analysis to employ a function of the additive
form, displayed in expression (2.1), but that is not essential to the concept.
The motivation for the welfarist approach is not only that each individual’s well-being
should matter, but that anything independent of anyone’s well-being should not.  The appeal of
welfarism is bolstered by the fact that any nonwelfarist approach conflicts with the Pareto
principle; that is, following any nonwelfarist approach will sometimes favor a regime under
which everyone would be worse off.  See Kaplow and Shavell (2001).
An important clarification is that much of relevance under welfarism may be important
because of its indirect, ultimate effects on individuals’ utilities, but this does not make something
a social value in its own right.  Some considerations may serve as proxies for well-being; for
example, a simplified tax system may be desirable because it is less costly to administer, which
in turn saves resources, allowing a higher level of welfare to be achieved.  Furthermore, certain
factors may be components of well-being for some individuals; in this spirit, subsection 3.5.2
noted the possibility that individuals may have preferences regarding redistribution itself. 159Welfarism is highly controversial outside of economics.  Notably, much of twentieth-century moral
philosophy is critical of the approach.  See, for example, Sen and Williams (1982), for competing views.  For a survey,
analysis, and response to nonwelfarist writings, see Kaplow and Shavell (2002).
160Suppose, for example, that all individuals have the same utility function, there are two goods, production is
centralized, the marginal rate of transformation between the goods is 1, and the nonwelfarist theory deems the two goods
to be of equal importance.  The planner (taken here to be egalitarian) would produce equal amounts of each good and
distribute them pro rata.  If, however, individuals’ utility functions are optimized at any other combination of the two
goods, everyone would be worse off than if the planner selected utility-maximizing proportions of the two goods instead.
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Welfarism entails the view that once all such effects on well-being are taken into account, the
relevance of any given consideration is exhausted.
Although welfarism has not been highly controversial among economists, the discussion
in subsection 13.3 will indicate that a number of familiar normative criteria that have been used
to assess tax policy do appear to be nonwelfarist, unless they are understood purely as proxies
rather than as independent principles.
159  In more direct apparent confrontation, Sen (1985, 1997)
has suggested that individuals’ situations should be assessed based on their capabilities and
functionings – a sort of list of means of fulfillment – rather than solely their well-being.  Rawls
(1971, 1982) notion of primary goods has been seen by many in a similar light.  A number of
issues have been raised concerning these nonwelfarist approaches.  First, what is on the
privileged list and how is this determined, if capabilities, functionings, and primary goods are to
be viewed not purely instrumentally but rather as constituents of the good itself?  Second and
related is the problem of relative weightings, which are necessary if there is more than one item
on the list.  See, for example, Blair (1988) and Gibbard (1979).  Indeed, it is straightforward to
demonstrate that these alternative approaches conflict with the Pareto principle, unless by chance
the lists and weightings correspond precisely to those implicit in all individuals’ utility functions
(in which case there is no disagreement with the dictates of welfarism).
160  Underlying these
problems is the question of why society should deviate from welfarism.  Perhaps the appeal of
these theories lies not in a genuine rejection of welfarism but, to the contrary, in a concern that
well-being is often assessed too narrowly.  Indeed, the appendices to Sen (1985) and some of his
other work on development emphasize that frequently used measures like per capita GDP do not
adequately capture well-being, whereas supplementation with additional factors provides a more
accurate indicator.
As a practical matter, this debate about welfarism has had little impact on the economic
analysis of tax policy.  Independent of the merits of the dispute, most tax instruments are based
on income, consumption, and related observable flows.  Different views on the proper social
objective matter primarily when individual differences are observable, such as when some
individuals are disabled.  In this realm, actual policy seems to reflect a mixed position.  On one
hand, accommodation requirements may be prompted by a desire to equalize capability rather
than utility.  On the other hand, this approach may be motivated by concerns for welfare, and
there seems to be little enthusiasm for policies that consciously seek to enhance capabilities at the
expense of beneficiaries’ well-being – although this may occur implicitly if non-cost-justified
accommodations are required in lieu of alternative forms of assistance that recipients would, all
things considered, value more highly.161For a discussion of objections and responses, see, for example, Broome (1984), Diamond (1967), Harsanyi
(1975), Myerson (1981), and Strotz (1958).
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13.2.  Choice of social welfare function
As noted in subsection 2.3, when an explicit SWF is required, notably, in optimal income
tax simulations, an additive, often iso-elastic form is used.  See expression (2.2).  As discussed,
the inequality parameter, e, may range from 0 (corresponding to a utilitarian summation) to ￿, the
limiting case that corresponds to maximization of the utility of the least-well-off individual,
inspired by Rawls (1971).
Although most work is formally agnostic about the concavity of the SWF, important
arguments have been offered.  Harsanyi (1953), predating Rawls’s use of a “veil of ignorance” or
“original position,” postulated that the n individuals in a society had to choose regimes not
knowing their actual identity, with each believing that there was a 1/n chance that he or she
would be any of the n individuals in society.  Harsanyi showed how each individual’s expected
utility in this setting corresponded to the utilitarian maximand.  See also Vickrey (1945). 
Independently, Harsanyi (1955) developed an argument that assumed that each individual’s
utility followed the rationality axioms of decision (and expected utility) theory, likewise for the
SWF, and that the SWF depended solely on individuals’ utilities in a positive and symmetric
fashion.  From this, he deduced that the SWF had to be utilitarian.
161
Additional, related arguments for a utilitarian SWF have been offered.  Hammond (1983)
demonstrated that no other SWF was time consistent.  One way to express the idea is to note that,
from an initial point, a reform involving uncertainty may be favored because it raises expected
social welfare; however, after enactment, with a nonlinear SWF it is possible that repeal would
be deemed optimal.  Kaplow (1995) showed that, for any strictly concave SWF, one can
construct examples in which a reform would be unanimously preferred ex ante by all individuals
but rejected under the SWF; that is, there is a conflict with the Pareto principle.
Sen (1997) and others view utilitarianism as insufficiently egalitarian.  The meaning of
such an objection is not entirely clear.  A utilitarian SWF is formally egalitarian (everyone counts
equally, that is symmetrically or anonymously), and in simple cases without incentive concerns it
favors complete equalization.  In realistic settings, none of the standard SWF’s favor complete
equality; then, more concave SWF’s favor greater equality.  However, the degree of equality
favored by any given SWF is a matter of subtlety and controversy, for it depends on individuals’
utility functions (both the degree of concavity, which itself affects the optimal extent of
redistribution, and the labor supply elasticity), the distribution of abilities, and in more complex
models on many additional factors.  Hence, it seems difficult to have an a priori view on the
extent of inequality that should be tolerated, from which one might deduce the appropriate
concavity of the SWF.
Rawls’s (1971) maximin claim, translated into the present framework, is one of the few
other specific SWF’s that has been advocated.  However, it has not commanded wide acceptance
because of its extreme implication – that social welfare is raised by making nearly everyone in162Debates about the comprehensive tax base ideal and about the tax expenditure concept, see subsection 12.1.4,
overlap.
163Blum and Kalven (1953) in a well-known essay employ a traditional approach and conclude that taxes should
be proportional.  As an indication of the difficulty of reasoning to particular conclusions in this fashion, Bankman and
Griffith (1987) and Groves (1974), among others, have explained how Blum and Kalven rely largely on a presumption in
favor of proportionality combined with broad skepticism toward many arguments concerning redistribution.
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society miserable as long as there exists one slightly more miserable person who gains
infinitesimally – and because it purports to be grounded in the original position and rationality
assumptions that, per Harsanyi, imply utilitarianism.  See, for example, Arrow (1973) and Hare
(1973).
An additional set of issues surrounding the choice of SWF concerns whose welfare is to
be included.  Key dimensions include geographic scope (national versus international), the
weighting of future generations, whether average or total welfare should be maximized (which is
highly pertinent to issues bearing on population size), and whether the welfare of other sentient
beings should count.
13.3.  Other normative criteria
13.3.1.  Traditional principles
Prior to the advent of modern welfare economics and its embodiment in optimal tax
theory – and continuing to a lesser extent to the present – tax equity was judged by a range of
criteria, including vertical and horizontal equity, ability to pay, the benefit principle, and
principles of equal sacrifice.  See Musgrave (1959, 1985).  Additionally, certain definitions were
sometimes treated as if they were normative criteria; notably, the Haig-Simons income definition
was used as the foundation for articulating a comprehensive tax base that was portrayed as a
normative ideal.
162
Many of these principles can be understood as intuitive notions of distributive justice, or
certain aspects thereof.  Nevertheless, some appear to be limited to the funding of public goods –
most obviously the benefit principle but also principles of equal sacrifice (with redistribution, it
cannot be that everyone is sacrificing equally) and, under some interpretations, ability to pay.  As
noted in subsection 7.3 on benefit taxation, it is not apparent whether such notions have bite to
the extent that redistributive taxation is also permitted.  And if it is not, there is an arbitrariness
(except under the benefit principle) due to the fact that the extent of permissible redistribution
depends on the extent of public goods provision and on the distributive incidence of the public
goods provided, which is a happenstance of technology and preferences.  Likewise, the
underlying basis for most of these principles is unclear.
163  (Exceptions are the benefit principle,
which might be defended on libertarian, anti-redistributive grounds and the equal marginal
sacrifice version of the sacrifice principle, advanced by Edgeworth (1897) and Pigou (1928) as a
corollary of utilitarianism.)164Not always because, for example, there may be nonconvexities, as Stiglitz (1982b) demonstrates.
165On inequality, see Atkinson and Bourguignon (2000), Cowell (1995), Lambert (2001), and Silber (1999).  On
poverty, see Atkinson (1987b), Clark, Hemming, and Ulph (1981), Lambert (2001), Ravallion (1994), Ruggles (1990),
Sen (1976), and Silber (1999).  On progressivity and redistribution, see Jakobsson (1976), Kakwani (1977), Lambert
(2001), Musgrave and Thin (1948), and Suits (1977).
166The indexes also have descriptive uses, which raise different issues.  See Kaplow (2005).
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13.3.2.  Horizontal equity
As stated by Musgrave (1959), horizontal equity is the principle that equals should be
treated (specifically, taxed) equally.  A number of approaches have been advanced for making
this seemingly uncontroversial concept operational.  See, for example, Aronson and Lambert
(1994), Auerbach and Hassett (2002), Atkinson (1980), Feldstein (1976), King (1983), Musgrave
(1990), and Plotnick (1981).
Two sets of difficulties have been identified.  The first – recognized in much of the
aforementioned literature developing indexes of horizontal inequity – concerns definitional
problems.  What if no two individuals are precisely equal?  Relatedly, does it make a qualitative
difference if individuals begin exactly equal or slightly unequal?  Once measures are extended to
unequals, as they have been, are they still measures of horizontal equity?
Second and more fundamental, just why is horizontal equity valued and why should
society be willing to sacrifice social welfare, conventionally measured, in pursuit of horizontal
equity?  The measurement literature has said little on this question, which seems logically prior
to deriving indexes since it is difficult to assess measurement instruments when the purpose of
measurement is unclear.  See Kaplow (1989).  Kaplow (1995) shows that if any weight is given
to horizontal equity, policies that make everyone better off may be rejected.  This result is a
special case of the more general subsequent demonstration of Kaplow and Shavell (2001),
previously noted, that all nonwelfarist principles conflict with the Pareto principle.  A plausible
explanation for the strong concern about horizontal equity is that, although not itself a constituent
of social welfare, violations serves as a proxy for factors associated with welfare reductions, such
as greater inequality, risk-bearing, mistaken regulations, and abuse of power.  See Kaplow
(1989).  After all, if individuals are truly equal in relevant respects, welfare maximization usually
requires that they be treated equally.
164
13.3.3.  Inequality, poverty, progressivity, and redistribution
Related to the redistributive function of taxation, there have been developed various
indexes of the extent of inequality and poverty existing in a society (whether before or after
taking into account the effects of taxation) and of the degree of progressivity and redistribution
attributed to all or part of the fiscal system.
165  These measures are sometimes employed to offer a
normative assessment of taxation, the standard implication being that systems resulting in less
inequality and poverty and, correspondingly, involving more progressivity and redistribution are
superior.
166
There are two related difficulties with this approach.  See Kaplow (2005).  First, the- 86 -
implicit assumption that more is better is incorrect, for – as with much in economic policy – it is
the optimal extent of redistribution rather than the maximal extent that is desired.  Second, for a
normative measure to be well-grounded, it must be derived from an SWF, as originally suggested
by Dalton (1920) and undertaken by Atkinson (1970) with regard to the measurement of
inequality.  However, in thus deriving a measure, it is necessary as a prerequisite both to choose
an SWF and to employ it to measure the level of social welfare under the regime in question. 
Because it is possible to derive the indexes in question only after a complete welfare assessment
has already been obtained, it is difficult to see how the measure – of inequality, poverty,
progressivity, or redistribution – can be of further normative use.  In sum, indexes of inequality
and poverty seem aimed at a component of social welfare, and measures of progressivity and
redistribution at traits of policies that affect social welfare; hence, all are best seen, as many of
the other normative criteria surveyed here, as proxies for welfare rather than as ultimate bases for
social evaluation.
14.  Conclusion
This essay has offered a conceptual survey of taxation.  It illustrates how many forms of
taxation and widely varied issues of tax policy are illuminated by relating the analysis to a
central, unifying framework.  Specifically, the model of optimal income taxation, extended to
incorporate commodity taxes, serves as the foundation for understanding most of the subjects
considered, including government expenditures on transfers and public goods and the use of
taxes and other instruments to control externalities.  Furthermore, grounding normative
assessment explicitly in the welfare economic framework – where necessary making reference to
a social welfare function or, by holding distribution constant, judging comparisons through use of
the Pareto principle – renders policy evaluation more consistent and cogent.
Future research could advance the mission of providing a more integrated view of various
elements of taxation.  Specifically, the existing body of tax research, far too vast to examine here,
could be better appreciated and its development more precisely guided if its relationship to core
principles and structures was more often made explicit.  In addition, the central building blocks,
including the income tax itself, would benefit from further study because, despite the difficulty of
optimal income tax analysis and what may appear to be the near-exhaustion of basic extensions,
even slight advances have potentially great payoffs.  Empirical research on taxation, which is
beyond the scope of this survey, also could profit from the sharper definition of pertinent issues
that would flow from the foregoing research program.- 87 -
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